Scire Licet

Who writes this blog?

2011-03-12T13:48:00.000+08:00

a male somewhere between 66-100 years old. The writing style is academic and upset most of the time, according to a blog A.I. This cracks me up! Not so much with the supposed gender and age of the blogger but the mood. The mood! lol

Still alive

2011-01-10T21:20:00.000+08:00

Dammit.

Will post something relevant later this week.

Not a Bomberman

2010-09-30T15:57:00.000+08:00

*PHOTO CREDIT: Got this from Facebook friends. I don't know who originally made this. If this photo is yours and you want it taken down or your name to be credited, please leave a comment.

ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT

2010-08-18T08:28:00.001+08:00

(RA 9262, March 8, 2004)

I. PURPOSE (Sec. 2)

It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights

To protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security

II. DEFINITION OF TERMS (Sec. 3)

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN – any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:

PHYSICAL VIOLENCE – acts that include bodily or physical harm

SEXUAL VIOLENCE – an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child, including but not limited to:

rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser;
acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
Prostituting the woman or child.

PSYCHOLOGICAL VIOLENCE - acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children

ECONOMIC ABUSE - acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:

withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;
destroying household property;
controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or properties.

BATTERY - an act of inflicting physical harm upon the woman or her child resulting to the physical and psychological or emotional distress.

BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME - scientifically defined pattern of psychological and behavioral symptoms found in women living in battering relationships as a result of cumulative abuse.

STALKING - an intentional act committed by a person who, knowingly and without lawful justification follows the woman or her child or places the woman or her child under surveillance directly or indirectly or a combination thereof.

DATING RELATIONSHIP - a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a business or social context is not a dating relationship.

SEXUAL RELATIONS - a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a common child

III. ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN (Sec. 5)

The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;
Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:

Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of custody to her/his family;
Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; (3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;
Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity or controlling the victim's own mon4ey or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or common money, or properties;
Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions;
Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual activity which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through intimidation directed against the woman or her child or her/his immediate family;
Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:

Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;
Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child;
Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against her/his will;
Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or her child; and
Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children of access to the woman's child/children.

IV. VENUE (Sec. 7)

RTC designated as Family Court (EOJ)

V. RELIEFS/REMEDIES

A. PROTECTION ORDER (Sec. 8)

A protection order is an order issued under this act for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against a woman or her child specified in Section 5 of this Act and granting other necessary relief.

KINDS:

Barangay protection order (BPO) (Sec. 14) – issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Sec. 5 (a) and (b) of this Act
Temporary protection order (TPO) (Sec. 15) – issued by the court on the date of filing of the application after ex parte determination that such order should be issued; effective for 30 days
Permanent Protection order (PPO) (Sec. 16) – issued by the court after notice and hearing

B. WHO MAY FILE PETITION FOR PROTECTION ORDER (Sec. 9)

Offended party
Parents or guardians of offended party
Ascendants, descendants or collateral relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity
Officers or social workers of the DSWD or social workers of LGUs
Police officers, preferably those in charge of women and children’s desks
Punong barangay or Barangay Kagawad
Lawyer, counsellor, therapist or healthcare provider of the petitioner
At least 2 concerned responsible citizens of the city or municipality where the violence against women and their children occurred and who has personal knowledge of the offense committed

C. WHERE TO APPLY FOR PROTECTION ORDER (Sec. 10)

BPO – Rules on venue under Sec. 409 of LGC
TPO/PPO – Family Court, or if none, RTC, MTC, MeTC, MCTC with territorial jurisdiction over the place of residence of petitioner

D. HOW TO APPLY FOR PROTECTION ORDER (Sec. 11)

Accomplish a standard protection order application form, signed and verified under oath by applicant
Filed as an independent action or as incidental relief
If applicant is not the victim, application must be accompanied by an affidavit of the applicant attesting to (a) the circumstances of the abuse suffered by the victim and (b) the circumstances of consent given by the victim for the filling of the application. When disclosure of the address of the victim will pose danger to her life, it shall be so stated in the application. In such a case, the applicant shall attest that the victim is residing in the municipality or city over which court has territorial jurisdiction, and shall provide a mailing address for purpose of service processing.

VI. BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME AS A DEFENSE (Sec. 26)

Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.

In the determination of the state of mind of the woman who was suffering from battered woman syndrome at the time of the commission of the crime, the courts shall be assisted by expert psychiatrists/ psychologists.

A victim who is suffering from battered woman syndrome shall not be disqualified from having custody of her children. In no case shall custody of minor children be given to the perpetrator of a woman who is suffering from Battered woman syndrome (Sec. 28)

MIGRANT WORKERS AND OVERSEAS FILIPINOS ACT OF 1995

2010-08-17T08:21:00.000+08:00

(RA 8042)

I. PURPOSE

To institute the policies of overseas employment and establish a higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families and overseas Filipinos in distress, and for other purposes

II. DEFINITION OF TERMS (Sec. 3)

MIGRANT WORKER – a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a renumerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a legal resident to be used interchangeably with overseas Filipino worker

OVERSEAS FILIPINOS – refers to dependents of migrant workers and other Filipino nationals abroad who are in distress

III. ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT (II)

A. Any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-license or non-holder of authority

SOME FORMS:

Leaving the country as a tourist but with the intention of working abroad;
Escort Services – tourist/workers “escorted” at the country’s airports and seaports;
By Correspondence – applicants are encouraged by the recruiter to comply with employment requirements and placements through mail;
Blind Ads – fraudulent and misleading advertisements promising facility of employment;
Au Pair – an inter-cultural program wherein a host family sponsors a person to study language and culture for a monthly allowance in exchange for a home to stay in;
Backdoor Exit – going out of the country through some airports and seaports in the southern part of the Philippines;
Camouflaged participation in foreign seminars and sports events;
Workers leave as participants in seminars or sports events but eventually finding jobs in the host country; and,
Traineeship Scheme – Hotel and Restaurant Management (HRM) students leaving in the guise of a traineeship program for hotels abroad but eventually landing jobs in the training establishment.

B. Include the following acts, whether committed by any persons, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority

To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than the specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to make a worker pay any amount greater than that actually received by him as a loan or advance;
To furnish or publish any false notice or information or document in relation to recruitment or employment;
To give any false notice, testimony, information or document or commit any act of misrepresentation for the purpose of securing a license or authority under the Labor Code;
To induce or attempt to induce a worker already employed to quit his employment in order to offer him another unless the transfer is designed to liberate a worker from oppressive terms and conditions of employment;
To influence or attempt to influence any persons or entity not to employ any worker who has not applied for employment through his agency;
To engage in the recruitment of placement of workers in jobs harmful to public health or morality or to dignity of the Republic of the Philippines;
To obstruct or attempt to obstruct inspection by the Secretary of Labor and Employment or by his duly authorized representative;
To fail to submit reports on the status of employment, placement vacancies, remittances of foreign exchange earnings, separations from jobs, departures and such other matters or information as may be required by the Secretary of Labor and Employment;
To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker, employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of the expiration of the same without the approval of the Department of Labor and Employment;
For an officer or agent of a recruitment or placement agency to become an officer or member of the Board of any corporation engaged in travel agency or to be engaged directly on indirectly in the management of a travel agency;
To withhold or deny travel documents from applicant workers before departure for monetary or financial considerations other than those authorized under the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations;
Failure to actually deploy without valid reasons as determined by the Department of Labor and Employment; and
Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the workers in connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered as offense involving economic sabotage.

IV. ECONOMIC SABOTAGE

Illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate or in large scale

A. SYNDICATE - carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another

B. LARGE SCALE - committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group

HUMAN SECURITY ACT

2010-08-16T07:58:00.010+08:00

(RA 9372)

I. PURPOSE (Sec. 2)

To protect life, liberty, and property from acts of terrorism, to condemn terrorism as inimical and dangerous to the national security of the country and to the welfare of the people, and to make terrorism a crime against the Filipino people, against humanity, and against the law of nations

II. ACTS PUNISHED

A. TERRORISM (Sec. 3)

Any person who commits an act punishable under any of the following provisions of the Revised Penal Code:

Article 122 (Piracy in General and Mutiny in the High Seas or in the Philippine Waters);
Article 134 (Rebellion or Insurrection);
Article 134-a (Coup d' Etat), including acts committed by private persons;
Article 248 (Murder);
Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention);
Article 324 (Crimes Involving Destruction), or under

Presidential Decree No. 1613 (The Law on Arson);
Republic Act No. 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Waste Control Act of 1990);
Republic Act No. 5207, (Atomic Energy Regulatory and Liability Act of 1968);
Republic Act No. 6235 (Anti-Hijacking Law);
Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974); and,
Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended (Decree Codifying the Laws on Illegal and Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunitions or Explosives)

thereby sowing and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand shall be guilty of the crime of terrorism and shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment, without the benefit of parole as provided for under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended

Includes accomplices and accessories
EXEMPTION: Accessories who are spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees are exempt (EXCEPT: if they profit by the crime or assisted the principal to profit)

B. CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT TERRORISM (Sec. 4)

C. PROSCRIPTION OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, ASSOCIATION, OR GROUP OF PERSONS (Sec. 17)

Any organization, association, or group of persons organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism, or which, although not organized for that purpose, actually uses the acts to terrorize mentioned in this Act or to sow and create a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand shall, upon application of the Department of Justice before a competent Regional Trial Court, with due notice and opportunity to be heard given to the organization, association, or group of persons concerned, be declared as a terrorist and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons by the said Regional Trial Court

III. SURVEILLANCE

Exception to the Anti-Wire Tapping Law (RA 4200)

A. WHO ARE SUBJECT (Sec. 7)

A police or law enforcement official and the members of his team may, upon a written order of the Court of Appeals, listen to, intercept and record, with the use of any mode, form, kind or type of electronic or other surveillance equipment or intercepting and tracking devices, or with the use of any other suitable ways and means for that purpose, any communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or written words:

Between members of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons
Any person charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism
Any person suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism

EXCEPT: Communications between lawyers and clients, doctors and patients, journalists and their sources and confidential business correspondence

B. APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION (Sec. 8)

Only granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals upon an ex parte written application of a police or of a law enforcement official who has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council created in Section 53 of this Act to file such ex parte application, and upon examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce to establish:

That there is probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the said crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism has been committed, or is being committed, or is about to be committed;
That there is probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that evidence, which is essential to the conviction of any charged or suspected person for, or to the solution or prevention of, any such crimes, will be obtained; and
That there is no other effective means readily available for acquiring such evidence

C. CLASSIFICATION AND CONTENTS OF THE ORDER OF THE COURT (Sec. 9)

Classified Information:

Written order granted by the authorizing division of the CA
Its order to extend or renew the authorization
Written authorizations of the Anti-Terrorism Council

The person being surveilled has the right to be informed of the acts done by the law enforcement authorities in the premises or to challenge the legality thereof

CONTENTS OF WRITTEN ORDER OF AUTHORIZING DIVISION OF CA:

The identity, such as name and address, if known, of the charged or suspected person whose communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words are to be tracked down, tapped, listened to, intercepted, and recorded and, in the case of radio, electronic, or telephonic (whether wireless or otherwise) communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words, the electronic transmission systems or the telephone numbers to be tracked down, tapped, listened to, intercepted, and recorded and their locations or if the person suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is not fully known, such person shall be subject to continuous surveillance provided there is a reasonable ground to do so;
The identity (name, address, and the police or law enforcement organization) of the police or of the law enforcement official, including the individual identity (names, addresses, and the police or law enforcement organization) of the members of his team, judicially authorized to track down, tap, listen to, intercept, and record the communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words;
The offense or offenses committed, or being committed, or sought to be prevented; and
The length of time within which the authorization shall be used or carried out

D. EFFECTIVE PERIOD OF JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION (Sec. 10)

Effective only for the length of time specified in the written order of the authorizing division of the CA

Not exceeding 30 days from the date of receipt of the written order by the applicant police or law enforcement official

EXTENSION: 30 days non-extendible, provided that:

The authorizing division of the CA is satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the public interest
The ex parte application for extension or renewal, which must be filed by the original applicant, has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council

NOTICE TO PERSON SUBJECT OF SURVEILLANCE: required if no case is filed within the 30-day period

E. CUSTODY OF INTERCEPTED AND RECORDED COMMUNICATIONS (Sec. 11)

All tapes, discs, and recordings shall, within, 48 hours after expiration of the period fixed in the written order, be deposited with the authorizing division of the CA in a sealed envelope or sealed package and shall be accompanied by a joint affidavit of the applicant police or law enforcement official and the members of his team

CONTENTS OF THE JOINT AFFIDAVIT (Sec. 12):

The number of tapes, discs, and recordings that have been made, as well as the number of excerpts and summaries thereof and the number of written notes and memoranda, if any, made in connection therewith;
The dates and times covered by each of such tapes, discs, and recordings;
The number of tapes, discs, and recordings, as well as the number of excerpts and summaries thereof and the number of written notes and memoranda made in connection therewith that have been included in the deposit; and
The date of the original written authorization granted by the Anti-Terrorism Council to the applicant to file the ex parte application to conduct the tracking down, tapping, intercepting, and recording, as well as the date of any extension or renewal of the original written authority granted by the authorizing division of the CA
Certify under oath that no duplicates or copies of the whole or part of any of such tapes, discs, and recordings have been made, or if made, such duplicates or copies are included in the sealed envelope or sealed package

F. DISPOSITION OF DEPOSITED MATERIALS (Sec. 13)

Classified information

The sealed envelope or sealed package shall not be opened and its contents (including the tapes, discs, and recordings and all the excerpts and summaries thereof and the notes and memoranda made in connection therewith) shall not be divulged, revealed, read, replayed, or used as evidence unless authorized by written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals

APPLICATION TO USE AS EVIDENCE:

Written application of the DOJ
Filed before the authorizing division of the CA
Upon showing that the DOJ has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council to file the application
With proper written notice to the person whose conversation, communication, message, discussion or spoken or written words have been the subject of surveillance, monitoring, recording and interception, specifying purpose or reason (Sec. 14):

For opening the sealed envelope or sealed package;
For revealing or disclosing its classified contents;
For replaying, divulging, and or reading any of the listened to, intercepted, and recorded communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words (including any of the excerpts and summaries thereof and any of the notes or memoranda made in connection therewith); and
For using any of said listened to, intercepted, and recorded communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words (including any of the excerpts and summaries thereof and any of the notes or memoranda made in connection therewith) as evidence

EVIDENTIARY VALUE (Sec. 15): Absolutely not admissible or usable as evidence, if obtained in violation of this Act

IV. DETENTION WITHOUT JUDICIAL WARRANT OF ARREST

Exception to Article 125, RPC (Arbitrary Detention)

A. DETENTION UNDER ORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES (Sec. 18)

Any police or law enforcement personnel
Duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council
Before detention, present the person before any judge at the latter’s residence or office nearest the place where the arrest took place at any time of the day or night
Take a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism in custody
Immediately after taking custody of the person, notify in writing the judge of the court nearest the place of apprehension or arrest (if Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office hours, then at judge’s residence)
Deliver said charged or suspected person to the proper judicial authorities within a period of 3 days counted from the moment the said charged or suspected person has been apprehended or arrested, detained, and taken into custody
The arrest of those suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism must result from the surveillance under Sec. 7 and examination of bank deposits under Sec. 27 of this Act

B. DETENTION IN THE EVENT OF AN ACTUAL OR IMMINENT TERRORIST ATTACK (Sec. 19)
Suspects may not be detained for more than three (3) days without the written approval of a municipal, city, provincial or regional official of a Human Rights Commission or judge of the municipal, regional trial court, the Sandiganbayan or a justice of the Court of Appeals nearest the place of the arrest. If the arrest is made during Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the arresting police or law enforcement personnel shall bring the person thus arrested to the residence of any of the officials mentioned above that is nearest the place where the accused was arrested. The approval in writing of any of the said officials shall be secured by the police or law enforcement personnel concerned within five (5) days after the date of the detention of the persons concerned: Provided, however, That within three (3) days after the detention the suspects, whose connection with the terror attack or threat is not established, shall be released immediately

C. DUTY OF THE JUDGE

Submit a written report of what he/she had observed when the subject was brought before him to the proper court that has jurisdiction over the case of the person thus arrested. the judge shall forthwith submit his/her report within three (3) calendar days from the time the suspect was brought to his/her residence or office

V. RESTRICTION ON RIGHT TO TRAVEL (Sec. 16)

Even when the accused is out on bail

A. RESTRICTION ON RIGHT TO TRAVEL

Upon application by the prosecutor, limit the right to travel of the accused to within the municipality or city where he resides or where the case is pending, in the interest of national security and public safety

Authorization of the court is needed in order to travel outside the said municipality or city (otherwise, bail may be cancelled)

B. HOUSE ARREST

By order of the court at his usual place of residence

Not allowed to use telephones, cellphones, e-mails, computers, the internet and other means of communications with people outside the residence until otherwise ordered by the court

VI. EXAMINATION OF BANK DEPOSITS, ACCOUNTS AND RECORDS

Exception to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act (RA 1405)

A. JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION (Sec. 27)

1. WHO MAY AUTHORIZE: CA justices designated as a special court to handle anti-terrorism cases, after satisfying themselves of the existence of probable cause in a hearing called for that purpose

2. WHO ARE SUBJECT:

A person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism,
Of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons, and
Of a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons

3. Written authorization to any police or law enforcement officer and the member of his/her team duly authorized in writing by the anti-terrorism council

4. WHAT:

Examine, or cause the examination of, the deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records in a bank or financial institution; and
Gather or cause the gathering of any relevant information about such deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records from a bank or financial institution

B. APPLICATION TO EXAMINE BANK DEPOSITS, ACCOUNTS AND RECORDS (Sec. 18)

Only be granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals

CONDITIONS:

Ex parte application to that effect of a police or of a law enforcement official who has been duly authorized in writing to file such ex parte application by the Anti-Terrorism Council
Upon examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce to establish the facts that will justify the need and urgency of examining and freezing the bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records

C. CLASSIFICATION AND CONTENTS OF THE COURT ORDER AUTHORIZING THE EXAMINATION OF BANK DEPOSITS, ACCOUNTS, AND RECORDS (Sec. 19)

Classified Information

The person whose bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records have been examined, frozen, sequestered and seized by law enforcement authorities has the right to be informed of the acts done by the law enforcement authorities in the premises or to challenge, if he or she intends to do so, the legality of the interference

The written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals designated to handle cases involving terrorism shall specify:

Identity of the said: (1) person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, (2) judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons, and (3) member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons, as the case may be, whose deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records are to be examined or the information to be gathered;
The identity of the bank or financial institution where such deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records are held and maintained;
The identity of the persons who will conduct the said examination and the gathering of the desired information; and
The length of time the authorization shall be carried out

D. EFFECTIVE PERIOD OF COURT AUTHORIZATION TO EXAMINE AND OBTAIN INFORMATION ON BANK DEPOSITS, ACCOUNTS AND RECORDS (Sec. 30)

Effective for the length of time specified in the written order, which shall not exceed a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of the written order of the authorizing division of the CA by the applicant police or law enforcement official

EXTENSION: 30 days, renewable to another 30 days from the expiration of the original period, provided:

The authorizing division of the CA is satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the public interest
The application for extension or renewal, which must be filed by the original applicant, has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council

E. CUSTODY OF BANK DATA AND INFORMATION OBTAINED AFTER EXAMINATION (Sec. 31)

All information, data, excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda, working sheets, reports, and other documents obtained from the examination of the bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records shall, within 48 hours after the expiration of period in the written order (including renewal), be deposited with the authorizing division of the CA in a sealed envelope or sealed package and shall be accompanied by a joint affidavit of the applicant police or law enforcement official and the persons who actually conducted the examination

CONTENTS OF JOINT AFFIDAVIT (Sec. 32):

Identifying marks, numbers, or symbols of the deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records examined;
The identity and address of the bank or financial institution where such deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records are held and maintained;
The number of bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records discovered, examined, and frozen;
The outstanding balances of each of such deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets;
All information, data, excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda, working sheets, reports, documents, records examined and placed in the sealed envelope or sealed package deposited with the authorizing division of the CA;
The date of the original written authorization granted by the Anti-Terrorism Council to the applicant to file the ex parte application to conduct the examination of the said bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records, as well as the date of any extension or renewal of the original written authorization granted by the authorizing division of the CA; and
That the items enumerated were al that were found in the bank or financial institution examined at the time of the completion of the examination

Certify under oath that no duplicates or copies have been made, or if made, such duplicates or copies are included in the sealed envelope or sealed package

F. DISPOSITION OF BANK MATERIALS (Sec. 33)
Classified information

Shall not be opened and its contents shall not be divulged, revealed, read, or used as evidence unless authorized in a written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals

APPLICATION TO USE AS EVIDENCE:

Written application of the DOJ
Upon showing that the DOJ has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council to file the application
Notice in writing to the party concerned not later than 3 days before scheduled opening
Clearly state the purpose and reason (Sec 34):

For opening the sealed envelope or sealed package;
For revealing and disclosing its classified contents; and
For using the classified information, data, excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda, working sheets, reports, and documents as evidence

EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF DEPOSITED BANK MATERIALS (Sec. 35): Absolutely not admissible and usable as evidence, if secured in violation of this Act

VII. SEIZURE AND SEQUESTRATION

A. WHO ARE SUBJECT (Sec. 39)

The deposits and their outstanding balances, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records in any bank or financial institution, moneys, businesses, transportation and communication equipment, supplies and other implements, and property of whatever kind and nature belonging:

To any person suspected of or charged before a competent RTC for the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism;
To a judicially declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons; or
To a member of such organization, association, or group of persons shall be seized, sequestered, and frozen in order to prevent their use, transfer, or conveyance for purposes that are inimical to the safety and security of the people or injurious to the interest of the State

RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED: (1) to withdraw such sums as may be reasonably needed by the monthly needs of his family including services of his or her counsel and his family’s medical needs upon approval of the court; and (2) to use any of his property that is under seizure or sequestration or frozen because of his or her indictment as a terrorist upon permission of hte court for any legitimate reason

B. NATURE OF SEIZED, SEQUESTERED AND FROZEN BANK DEPOSITS, PLACEMENTS, TRUST ACCOUNTS, ASSETS AND RECORDS (Sec. 40)

Property held in trust by the bank or financial institution

Use or disposition of such is subject to approval of the court while case is pending

C. DISPOSITION OF THE SEIZED, SEQUESTERED AND FROZEN BANK DEPOSITS, PLACEMENTS, TRUST ACCOUNTS, ASSETS AND RECORDS (Sec. 41)

ACQUITTAL/DISMISSAL OF CHARGES: seizure order shall be deemed lifted and the property shall be immediately released

LIQUIDATED DAMAGES: Upon acquittal or dismissal of charges, P500,000 a day for the period in which his properties, assets or funds were seized shall be paid , the amount to be taken from the appropriations of the police or law enforcement agency that caused the filing of the charges

APPEAL/MOTION FOR RECON: will not stay the release of said funds

CONVICTION BY FINAL JUDGMENT: automatic forfeiture in favour of the government

VIII. CONTINUOUS TRIAL (Sec. 48)

In cases of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, the judge shall set the case for continuous trial on a daily basis from Monday to Friday or other short-term trial calendar so as to ensure speedy trial.

IX. PROSECUTION UNDER THIS ACT SHALL BE A BAR TO ANOTHER PROSECUTION UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE OR ANY SPECIAL PENAL LAWS (Sec. 49)

When a person has been prosecuted under a provision of this Act, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for any offense or felony which is necessarily included in the offense charged under this Act

X. DAMAGES FOR UNPROVEN CHARGE OF TERRORISM (Sec. 50)

Upon acquittal, any person who is accused of terrorism shall be entitled to the payment of damages in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) for every day that he or she has been detained or deprived of liberty or arrested without a warrant as a result of such an accusation. The amount of damages shall be automatically charged against the appropriations of the police agency or the Anti-Terrorism Council that brought or sanctioned the filing of the charges against the accused. It shall also be released within fifteen (15) days from the date of the acquittal of the accused. The award of damages mentioned above shall be without prejudice to the right of the acquitted accused to file criminal or administrative charges against those responsible for charging him with the case of terrorism

XI. LIABILITIES OF POLICE OFFICER OR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIAL

A. INFIDELITY IN THE CUSTODY OF INTERCEPTED AND RECORDED COMMUNICATIONS (Sec. 11)

It shall be unlawful for any person, police officer or any custodian of the tapes, discs and recording, and their excerpts and summaries, written notes or memoranda to copy in whatever form, to remove, delete, expunge, incinerate, shred or destroy in any manner the items enumerated above in whole or in part under any pretext whatsoever

B. FALSE OR UNTRUTHFUL STATEMENT OR MISREPRESENTATION OF MATERIAL FACT IN JOINT AFFIDAVITS (Sec. 12 and Sec. 32)

Any false or untruthful statement or misrepresentation of material fact in the joint affidavits required respectively in Section 12 and Section 32 of this Act shall constitute a criminal offense and the affiants shall suffer individually the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.

C. VIOLATION OF DUTY TO NOTIFY IN WRITING PERSONS SUBJECT OF SURVEILLANCE ON DISPOSITION OF DEPOSITED MATERIALS (Sec. 13)

Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to notify in writing the persons subject of the surveillance as defined above shall suffer the penalty of six (6) years and one day to eight (8) years of imprisonment

D. UNAUTHORIZED OR MALICIOUS INTERCEPTIONS AND/OR RECORDINGS (Sec. 16)

Any police or law enforcement personnel who, not being authorized to do so by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, tracks down, taps, listens to, intercepts, and records in whatever manner or form any communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or written word of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
Any police or law enforcement personnel who maliciously obtained an authority from the Court of Appeals to track down, tap, listen to, intercept, and record in whatever manner or form any communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or written words of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism (in addition to above)

E. FAILURE TO NOTIFY THE JUDGE IN DETENTION WITHOUT JUDICIAL WARRANT (Sec. 18)

The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon the police or law enforcement personnel who fails to notify any judge as provided in the preceding paragraph

F. FAILURE TO DELIVER SUSPECT TO THE PROPER JUDICIAL AUTHORITY WITHIN 3 DAYS (Sec. 20)

The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon any police or law enforcement personnel who has apprehended or arrested, detained and taken custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism and fails to deliver such charged or suspected person to the proper judicial authority within the period of three (3) days.

G. PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF RIGHTS OF DETAINEE (Sec. 22)

Any police or law enforcement personnel, or any personnel of the police or other law enforcement custodial unit that violates any of the aforesaid rights of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.

Unless the police or law enforcement personnel who violated the rights of a detainee or detainees as stated above is duly identified, the same penalty shall be imposed on the police officer or head or leader of the law enforcement unit having custody of the detainee at the time the violation was done.

H. FAILURE TO KEEP AN OFFICIAL CUSTODIAL LOGBOOK (Sec. 23)

The police or other law enforcement custodial unit who fails to comply with the preceding paragraph to keep an official logbook shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.

I. PENALTY FOR THREAT, INTIMIDATION, COERCION, OR TORTURE IN THE INVESTIGATION AND INTERROGATION OF A DETAINED PERSON (Sec. 25)

Any person or persons who use threat, intimidation, or coercion, or who inflict physical pain or torment, or mental, moral, or psychological pressure, which shall vitiate the free-will of a charged or suspected person under investigation and interrogation for the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment.

J. FAILURE TO NOTIFY IN WRITING THE PERSON WHOSE BANK DEPOSITS IS SUBJECT TO EXAMINATION WITHIN 30 DAYS IF NO CASE IF FILED (Sec. 30)

Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to notify in writing as defined above shall suffer the penalty of six (6) years and one day to eight (8) years of imprisonment.

K. INFIDELITY IN THE CUSTODY OF BANK DATA AND INFORMATION (Sec. 32)

It shall be unlawful for any person, police officer or custodian of the bank data and information obtained after examination of deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records to copy, to remove, delete, expunge, incinerate, shred or destroy in any manner the items enumerated above in whole or in part under any pretext whatsoever.

L. FAILURE TO NOTIFY IN WRITING THE PERSON WHOSE BANK MATERIALS ARE SUBJECT OF APPLICATION FOR DISPOSITION (Sec. 33)

Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to notify in writing as defined above shall suffer the penalty of six (6) years and one day to eight (8) years of imprisonment.

M. UNAUTHORIZED OR MALICIOUS EXAMINATION OF A BANK OR A FINANCIAL INSTITUTION (Sec. 36)

Any person, police or law enforcement personnel who examines the deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, or records in a bank or financial institution
Any police or law enforcement personnel, who maliciously obtained an authority form the CA to examine the deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, or records in a bank or financial institution (in addition to above)

N. REFUSAL TO FOLLOW ORDER TO ALLOW ACCUSED TO WITHRDAW (Sec. 39)

Any person who unjustifiably refuses to follow the order of the proper division of the Court of Appeals to allow the person accused of the crime of terrorism or of the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism to withdraw such sums from sequestered or frozen deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records as may be necessary for the regular sustenance of his or her family or to use any of his or her property that has been seized, sequestered or frozen for legitimate purposes while his or her case is pending shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.

O. UNJUSTIFIED REFUSAL TO RESTORE OR DELAY IN RESTORING SEIZED, SEQUESTERED AND FROZEN BANK DEPOSITS (Sec. 42)

Any person who unjustifiably refuses to restore or delays the restoration of seized, sequestered and frozen bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records of a person suspected of or charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism after such suspected person has been found innocent by the investigating body or after the case against such charged person has been dismissed or after he is acquitted by a competent court shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.

P. LOSS, MISUSE, DIVERSION OR DISSIPATION OF SEIZED, SEQUESTERED AND FROZEN BANK DEPOSITS (Sec. 43)

Any person who is responsible for the loss, misuse, diversion, or dissipation of the whole or any part of the seized, sequestered and frozen bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records of a person suspected of or charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.

Q. INFIDELITY IN THE CUSTODY OF DETAINED PERSONS (Sec. 44)

Any public officer who has direct custody of a detained person under the provisions of this Act and who by his deliberate act, misconduct, or inexcusable negligence causes or allows the escape of such detained person shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of: (a) twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment, if the detained person has already been convicted and sentenced in a final judgment of a competent court; and (b) six (6) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment, if the detained person has not been convicted and sentenced in a final judgment of a competent court.

R. UNAUTHORIZED REVELATION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIALS (Sec. 46)

The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon any person, police or law enforcement agent, judicial officer or civil servant who, not being authorized by the Court of Appeals to do so, reveals in any manner or form any classified information under this Act.

S. FURNISHING FALSE EVIDENCE, FORGED DOCUMENT, OR SPURIOUS EVIDENCE (Sec. 47)

The penalty of twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly furnishes false testimony, forged document or spurious evidence in any investigation or hearing under this Act.

XII. PENALTY OF BANK OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES

Defying court authorization (Sec. 37)

Fried.

2010-08-01T22:25:00.000+08:00

Yes, they are. Sure their usefulness and pervasiveness might lull you into thinking they're the only completely dependable constants in your life until you practically live and breathe technology, whether it be your trusty desktop or (if you're a sucker for hype) the effin' cool new iPad, but mark my words, they are evil. They will lure unsuspecting victims into relying on them for almost anything (mind you, that includes bathroom calisthenics), and then they will randomly and utterly fail to work, FOR NO APPARENT REASON, other than 'oh, did I push the wrong button?' And no amount of fixing and kicking and begging (with real tears!) will revive the blasted things. You are doomed. You are doomed. You are so doomed I have to type the same sentence thrice. That is, unless you are willing to develop muscles in all the wrong places as you haul the whole thing, brains, intestines and all, to the service technician whose office is. of bloody course, located far, far away.

Well, booger.

Long story short, this bog is on hiatus while my computer is being repaired at the service center.

United Airlines vs. Uy

2010-07-28T07:36:00.000+08:00

G.R. No. 127768, Nov. 19, 1999

INTERNATIONAL LAW: Applicability of the Warsaw Convention: the Convention's provisions do not regulate or exclude liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier or misconduct of its officers and employees, or for some particular or exceptional type of damage. Neither may the Convention be invoked to justify the disregard of some extraordinary sort of damage resulting to a passenger and preclude recovery therefor beyond the limits set by said Convention. Likewise, we have held that the Convention does not preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. It does not regulate, much less exempt, the carrier from liability for damages for violating the rights of its passengers under the contract of carriage, especially if willful misconduct on the part of the carrier's employees is found or established

FACTS:

October 13, 1989 – Respondent Willie Uy is a passenger of petitioner United Airlines, bound from San Francisco to Manila. While in San Francisco, it was found that one piece of his luggage was over the maximum weight allowance of 70 kg. per bag. A United Airlines employee rebuked him and in a loud voice, in front of the milling crowd, ordered him to repack his things accordingly. Wishing not to create a scene, Willie did as asked. Unfortunately, his luggage was still overweight so the airline billed him overweight charges. Willie offered to pay the charges with a Miscellaneous Charge Order (MCO) or an airline pre-paid credit but the same employee, and an airline supervisor, refused to honor it, contending that there were discrepancies in the figures. Thus, Willie was forced to pay the charges with his American Express credit card. Upon arrival in Manila, Willie discovered that one of his bags had been slashed and its contents, amounting to US$5,310.00, stolen.

October 16, 1989 – he sent his first letter of demand to United Airlines. The airline did not refute Willie’s allegations and mailed a check representing payment of his loss based on the maximum liability of US$9.70 per pound. Willie, thinking the amount to be grossly inadequate to compensate him for his losses as well as for the indignities he was subjected to, sent two more letters to petitioner airline, one dated January 4, 1990 and the other dated October 28, 1991, demanding out-of-court settlement of P1,000,000.00.

June 9, 1992 – Willie filed a complaint for damages before the Philippine courts. He had two causes of action: (1) the shabby and humiliating treatment he received from petitioner’s employees at the San Francisco Airport which caused him extreme embarrassment and social humiliation; and (2) the slashing of his luggage and the loss of personal effects amounting to US$5,310.00.

For its part, United Airlines moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was filed out of time. Under Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention, the right to damages shall be extinguished if an action is not brought within 2 years. However, the second paragraph of the said provision stated that the method of calculating the period of limitation shall be determined by the law of the court to which the case is submitted. It is Willie’s position that our rules on interruption of prescriptive period should apply. When he sent his letters of demand, the 2-year period was tolled, giving him ample time to file his complaint.

The trial court ordered the dismissal of the case, holding that Art. 29(2) refers not to the local forum’s rules in interrupting the prescriptive period but only to the rules of determining the time in which the action was deemed commenced (meaning “filed”). Willie filed his motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal only on the 14th day. The trial court denied his motion and 2 days later Willie filed his notice of appeal. United Airlines this time contended that the notice of appeal was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period and should therefore be dismissed. The CA, however, took cognizance of the case in the interest of justice and ruled in favour of respondent. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action for damages is barred by the lapse of the 2-year prescriptive period under Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention

HELD:

Supreme Court held that although the 2-year prescriptive period under the Warsaw Convention has lapsed, it did not preclude the application of other pertinent provisions of the Civil Code. Thus, the action for damages could still be filed based on tort which can be filed within 4 years from the time cause of action accrued. As for the action pertaining to the loss of the contents of the luggage, while it was well within the bounds of the Warsaw Convention, the Supreme Court found that there was an exception to the applicability of the 2-year prescriptive period – that is when the airline employed delaying tactics and gave the passenger the run-around.

Applicability of the Warsaw Convention: Courts have discretion whether to apply them or not

Within our jurisdiction we have held that the Warsaw Convention can be applied, or ignored, depending on the peculiar facts presented by each case. Thus, we have ruled that the Convention's provisions do not regulate or exclude liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier or misconduct of its officers and employees, or for some particular or exceptional type of damage. Neither may the Convention be invoked to justify the disregard of some extraordinary sort of damage resulting to a passenger and preclude recovery therefor beyond the limits set by said Convention. Likewise, we have held that the Convention does not preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. It does not regulate, much less exempt, the carrier from liability for damages for violating the rights of its passengers under the contract of carriage, especially if willful misconduct on the part of the carrier's employees is found or established.

Respondent's complaint reveals that he is suing on two (2) causes of action: (a) the shabby and humiliating treatment he received from petitioner's employees at the San Francisco Airport which caused him extreme embarrassment and social humiliation; and, (b) the slashing of his luggage and the loss of his personal effects amounting to US $5,310.00.

While his second cause of action - an action for damages arising from theft or damage to property or goods - is well within the bounds of the Warsaw Convention, his first cause of action -an action for damages arising from the misconduct of the airline employees and the violation of respondent's rights as passenger - clearly is not.

Action for damages arising from the misconduct of the airline employees and the violation of the respondent’s rights as passengers is covered under the Civil Code

Consequently, insofar as the first cause of action is concerned, respondent's failure to file his complaint within the two (2)-year limitation of the Warsaw Convention does not bar his action since petitioner airline may still be held liable for breach of other provisions of the Civil Code which prescribe a different period or procedure for instituting the action, specifically, Art. 1146 thereof which prescribes four (4) years for filing an action based on torts.

Exception to the Application of the 2-year prescriptive period: When airline employed delaying tactics

As for respondent's second cause of action, indeed the travaux preparatories of the Warsaw Convention reveal that the delegates thereto intended the two (2)-year limitation incorporated in Art. 29 as an absolute bar to suit and not to be made subject to the various tolling provisions of the laws of the forum. This therefore forecloses the application of our own rules on interruption of prescriptive periods. Article 29, par. (2), was intended only to let local laws determine whether an action had been commenced within the two (2)-year period, and within our jurisdiction an action shall be deemed commenced upon the filing of a complaint. Since it is indisputable that respondent filed the present action beyond the two (2)-year time frame his second cause of action must be barred. Nonetheless, it cannot be doubted that respondent exerted efforts to immediately convey his loss to petitioner, even employed the services of two (2) lawyers to follow up his claims, and that the filing of the action itself was delayed because of petitioner's evasion.

Verily, respondent filed his complaint more than two (2) years later, beyond the period of limitation prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for filing a claim for damages. However, it is obvious that respondent was forestalled from immediately filing an action because petitioner airline gave him the runaround, answering his letters but not giving in to his demands. True, respondent should have already filed an action at the first instance when his claims were denied by petitioner but the same could only be due to his desire to make an out-of-court settlement for which he cannot be faulted. Hence, despite the express mandate of Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention that an action for damages should be filed within two (2) years from the arrival at the place of destination, such rule shall not be applied in the instant case because of the delaying tactics employed by petitioner airline itself. Thus, private respondent's second cause of action cannot be considered as time-barred under Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals reversing and setting aside the appealed order of the trial court granting the motion to dismiss the complaint, as well as its Resolution denying reconsideration, is AFFIRMED. Let the records of the case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings taking its bearings from this disquisition.

SO ORDERED.

Laurel vs. Garcia

2010-07-27T07:32:00.000+08:00

G.R. No. 92013, July 25, 1990

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Before determining whether it is domestic or foreign law that should be applied, one must first determine whether a conflict of laws situation exists.

FACTS:

The Roppongi Property is one of the four properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement, as part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their suffering during WWII. The Roppongi property became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to another site when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. Due to the failure of our government to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi property has remained undeveloped since that time. After many years, the Aquino administration advanced the sale of the reparation properties, which included the Roppongi lot. This move was opposed on the ground that the Roppongi property is public in character. For their part, the proponents of the sale raised that Japanese law should apply, following the doctrine of lex loci rei sitae.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conflict of law rule on lex loci rei sitae should apply

HELD:

We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined (See Salonga, Private International Law, 1981 ed., pp. 377-383); and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should apply.

In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.

The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.

The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real properties procured through reparations nor the existence in what body of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which should determine who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable. We see no point in belaboring whether or not this opinion is correct. Why should we discuss who can acquire the Roppongi lot when there is no showing that it can be sold?

Tayag vs. Benguet Consolidated, Inc.

2010-07-26T07:32:00.000+08:00

G.R. No. L-23145, Nov. 29, 1968

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Situs of Shares of Stock: domicile of the corporation
SUCCESSION: Ancillary Administration: The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets of the deceased liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs.
SUCCESSION: Probate: Probate court has authority to issue the order enforcing the ancillary administrator’s right to the stock certificates when the actual situs of the shares of stocks is in the Philippines.

FACTS:

Idonah Slade Perkins, an American citizen who died in New York City, left among others, two stock certificates issued by Benguet Consolidated, a corporation domiciled in the Philippines. As ancillary administrator of Perkins’ estate in the Philippines, Tayag now wants to take possession of these stock certificates but County Trust Company of New York, the domiciliary administrator, refused to part with them. Thus, the probate court of the Philippines was forced to issue an order declaring the stock certificates as lost and ordering Benguet Consolidated to issue new stock certificates representing Perkins’ shares. Benguet Consolidated appealed the order, arguing that the stock certificates are not lost as they are in existence and currently in the possession of County Trust Company of New York.

ISSUE: Whether or not the order of the lower court is proper

HELD:

The appeal lacks merit.

Tayag, as ancillary administrator, has the power to gain control and possession of all assets of the decedent within the jurisdiction of the Philippines

It is to be noted that the scope of the power of the ancillary administrator was, in an earlier case, set forth by Justice Malcolm. Thus: "It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate. When a person dies intestate owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country, administration is had in both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is termed the principal administration, while any other administration is termed the ancillary administration. The reason for the latter is because a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted. Hence, an administrator appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the [Philippines]. The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets of the deceased liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs."

Probate court has authority to issue the order enforcing the ancillary administrator’s right to the stock certificates when the actual situs of the shares of stocks is in the Philippines.

It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to require that ancillary administrator's right to "the stock certificates covering the 33,002 shares ... standing in her name in the books of [appellant] Benguet Consolidated, Inc...." be respected is equally beyond question. For appellant is a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance and subject to the unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of stock cannot therefore be considered in any wise as immune from lawful court orders.

Our holding in Wells Fargo Bank and Union v. Collector of Internal Revenue finds application. "In the instant case, the actual situs of the shares of stock is in the Philippines, the corporation being domiciled [here]." To the force of the above undeniable proposition, not even appellant is insensible. It does not dispute it. Nor could it successfully do so even if it were so minded.

I give a crap

2010-07-21T21:20:00.000+08:00

Yes. That icon text. Still here, still alive. Will continue with the usual updating schedule: Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday.

Wow, 12 followers. Thanks for continuing to visit this blog.

Vda. De Perez vs. Tolete

2010-07-21T07:04:00.000+08:00

G.R. No. 76714, June 2, 1994

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Extrinsic Validity of Wills of Non-Resident Aliens
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Reprobate of Foreign Wills: Requirement of Notices

FACTS:

Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens and residents of New York, each executed a will also in New York, containing provisions on presumption of survivorship (in the event that it is not known which one of the spouses died first, the husband shall be presumed to have predeceased his wife). Later, the entire family perished in a fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was named trustee in Jose’s will, filed for separate probate proceedings of the wills.

Later, Evelyn’s mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in Bulacan. Rafael opposed, arguing that Salud was not an heir according to New York law. He contended that since the wills were executed in New York, New York law should govern. He further argued that, by New York law, he and his brothers and sisters were Jose’s heirs and as such entitled to notice of the reprobate proceedings, which Salud failed to give.

For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the two wills were in accordance with New York law. But before she could present evidence to prove the law of New York, the reprobate court already issued an order, disallowing the wills.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be allowed

HELD:

Extrinsic Validity of Wills of Non-Resident Aliens

The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in this country upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.

Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.

Evidence for Reprobate of Wills Probated outside the Philippines

The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]). Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.

The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them.

On Lack of Notice to Jose’s Heirs

This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact - petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992]).

The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required.

The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are entitled to notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . . "

WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Santos III vs. Northwest Orient Airlines

2010-07-20T06:56:00.001+08:00

G.R. No. 101538, June 23, 1992

INTERNATIONAL LAW: Warsaw Convention is constitutional, a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this country.
INTERNATIONAL LAW: Warsaw Convention, when applicable: To all "international transportations of persons by aircraft for hire." Whether the transportation is "international" is determined by the contract of the parties, which in the case of passengers is the ticket. When the contract of carriage provides for the transportation of the passenger between certain designated terminals "within the territories of two High Contracting Parties," the provisions of the Convention automatically apply and exclusively govern the rights and liabilities of the airline and its passenger.
INTERNATIONAL LAW: Warsaw Convention, jurisdiction: Place of Destination vis-a-vis Agreed Stopping Place: The contract is a single undivided operation, beginning with the place of departure and ending with the ultimate destination. The use of the singular in this expression indicates the understanding of the parties to the Convention that every contract of carriage has one place of departure and one place of destination. An intermediate place where the carriage may be broken is not regarded as a "place of destination."

FACTS:

Petitioner is a minor and a resident of the Philippines. Private respondent Nortwest Orient Airlines (NOA) is a foreign corporation with principal office in Minnesota, U.S.A. and licensed to do business and maintain a branch office in the Philippines. The petitioner purchased from NOA a round-trip ticket in San Francisco, U.S.A. In December 19, 1986, the petitioner checked in the at the NOA counter in the San Francisco airport for his departure to Manila. Despite a previous confirmation and re-confirmation, he was informed that he had no reservation for his flight for Tokyo to Manila. He therefore had to be wait-listed. On March 12, 1987, the petitioner sued NOA for damages in RTC Makati. NOA moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention is in accordance with the constitution so as to deprive the Philippine Courts jurisdiction over the case

HELD:

Art. 28. (1) An action for damage must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the court of the domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of business, or where he has a place of business through which the contract has been made, or before the court at the place of destination.

Constitutionality of the Warsaw Convention

The Republic of the Philippines is a party to the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, otherwise known as the Warsaw Convention. It took effect on February 13, 1933. The Convention was concurred in by the Senate, through its Resolution No. 19, on May 16, 1950. The Philippine instrument of accession was signed by President Elpidio Quirino on October 13, 1950, and was deposited with the Polish government on November 9, 1950. The Convention became applicable to the Philippines on February 9, 1951. On September 23, 1955, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 201, declaring our formal adherence thereto. "to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled in good faith by the Republic of the Philippines and the citizens thereof."

The Convention is thus a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this country.

Does the Warsaw Convention apply in this case?

By its own terms, the Convention applies to all international transportation of persons performed by aircraft for hire.

International transportation is defined in paragraph (2) of Article 1 as follows:

(2) For the purposes of this convention, the expression "international transportation" shall mean any transportation in which, according to the contract made by the parties, the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in the transportation or a transshipment, are situated [either] within the territories of two High Contracting Parties . . .

Whether the transportation is "international" is determined by the contract of the parties, which in the case of passengers is the ticket. When the contract of carriage provides for the transportation of the passenger between certain designated terminals "within the territories of two High Contracting Parties," the provisions of the Convention automatically apply and exclusively govern the rights and liabilities of the airline and its passenger.

Since the flight involved in the case at bar is international, the same being from the United States to the Philippines and back to the United States, it is subject to the provisions of the Warsaw Convention, including Article 28(1), which enumerates the four places where an action for damages may be brought.

Does Article 28(1) refer to Jurisdiction or Venue?

...where the matter is governed by the Warsaw Convention, jurisdiction takes on a dual concept. Jurisdiction in the international sense must be established in accordance with Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, following which the jurisdiction of a particular court must be established pursuant to the applicable domestic law. Only after the question of which court has jurisdiction is determined will the issue of venue be taken up. This second question shall be governed by the law of the court to which the case is submitted.

Was the case properly filed in the Philippines, since the plaintiff’s destination was Manila?

The place of destination, within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention, is determined by the terms of the contract of carriage or, specifically in this case, the ticket between the passenger and the carrier. Examination of the petitioner's ticket shows that his ultimate destination is San Francisco. Although the date of the return flight was left open, the contract of carriage between the parties indicates that NOA was bound to transport the petitioner to San Francisco from Manila. Manila should therefore be considered merely an agreed stopping place and not the destination.

Article 1(2) also draws a distinction between a "destination" and an "agreed stopping place." It is the "destination" and not an "agreed stopping place" that controls for purposes of ascertaining jurisdiction under the Convention.

The contract is a single undivided operation, beginning with the place of departure and ending with the ultimate destination. The use of the singular in this expression indicates the understanding of the parties to the Convention that every contract of carriage has one place of departure and one place of destination. An intermediate place where the carriage may be broken is not regarded as a "place of destination."

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. vs. NLRC

2010-07-19T06:55:00.000+08:00

G.R. No. 129584, December 3, 1998

LABOR LAW: Disease as Ground for Dismissal, requisites: (1) the disease must be such that employee’s continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-employees; and (2) there must be a certification by competent public authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of 6 months with proper medical treatment.
LABOR LAW: same; The requirement for a medical certificate under Article 284 of the Labor Code cannot be dispensed with; otherwise, it would sanction the unilateral and arbitrary determination by the employer of the gravity or extent of the employee’s illness and thus defeat the public policy on the protection of labor.
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Lex Loci Contractus: Established is the rule that lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made) governs in this jurisdiction. There is no question that the contract of employment in this case was perfected here in the Philippines.
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Law of the Forum vis-a-vis Public Policy: Settled is the rule that the courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy. Here in the Philippines, employment agreements are more than contractual in nature. The Constitution itself, in Article XIII Section 3, guarantees the special protection of workers.

FACTS:

Osdana, a Filipino citizen, was recruited by Triple Eight for employment with the latter’s principal, Gulf Catering Company (GCC), a firm based in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The employment contract (originally as “food server” but later changed to “waitress”) was executed in the Philippines but was to be performed in Riyadh. Once in Riyadh, however, Osdana was made to perform strenuous tasks (washing dishes, janitorial work), which were not included in her designation as a waitress. Because of the long hours and strenuous nature of her work, she suffered from Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, for which she had to undergo surgery. But during her weeks of confinement at the hospital for her recovery, she was not given any salary. And after she was discharged from the hospital, GCC suddenly dismissed her from work, allegedly on the ground of illness. She was not given any separation pay nor was she paid her salaries for the periods when she was not allowed to work. Thus, upon her return to the Philippines, she filed a complaint against Triple Eight, praying for unpaid and underpaid salaries, among others.

The LA ruled in her favour, which ruling NLRC affirmed. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Osdana was illegally dismissed
If so, whether or not she is entitled to award for salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract

HELD:

The petition must fail.

Disease as a Ground for Dismissal

Under Article 284 of the Labor Code and the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, for disease to be a valid ground for termination, the following requisites must be present:

The disease must be such that employee’s continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-employees
There must be a certification by competent public authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of 6 months with proper medical treatment

In the first place, Osdana’s continued employment despite her illness was not prohibited by law nor was it prejudicial to her health, as well as that of her co-employees. In fact, the medical report issued after her second operation stated that “she had very good improvement of the symptoms.” Besides, “Carpal Tunnel Syndrome” is not a contagious disease.

On the medical certificate requirement, petitioner erroneously argues that “private respondent was employed in Saudi Arabia and not here in the Philippines. Hence, there was a physical impossibility to secure from a Philippine public health authority the alluded medical certificate that public respondent’s illness will not be cured within a period of six months.”

Petitioner entirely misses the point, as counsel for private respondent states in the Comment. The rule simply prescribes a “certification by a competent public health authority” and not a “Philippine public health authority.”

If, indeed, Osdana was physically unfit to continue her employment, her employer could have easily obtained a certification to that effect from a competent public health authority in Saudi Arabia, thereby heading off any complaint for illegal dismissal.

The requirement for a medical certificate under Article 284 of the Labor Code cannot be dispensed with; otherwise, it would sanction the unilateral and arbitrary determination by the employer of the gravity or extent of the employee’s illness and thus defeat the public policy on the protection of labor. As the Court observed in Prieto v. NLRC, “The Court is not unaware of the many abuses suffered by our overseas workers in the foreign land where they have ventured, usually with heavy hearts, in pursuit of a more fulfilling future. Breach of contract, maltreatment, rape, insufficient nourishment, sub-human lodgings, insults and other forms of debasement, are only a few of the inhumane acts to which they are subjected by their foreign employers, who probably feel they can do as they please in their country. While these workers may indeed have relatively little defense against exploitation while they are abroad, that disadvantage must not continue to burden them when they return to their own territory to voice their muted complaint. There is no reason why, in their own land, the protection of our own laws cannot be extended to them in full measure for the redress of their grievances.”

Which law should apply: Lex Loci Contractus

Petitioner likewise attempts to sidestep the medical certificate requirement by contending that since Osdana was working in Saudi Arabia, her employment was subject to the laws of the host country. Apparently, petitioner hopes to make it appear that the labor laws of Saudi Arabia do not require any certification by a competent public health authority in the dismissal of employees due to illness.

Again, petitioner’s argument is without merit.

First, established is the rule that lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made) governs in this jurisdiction. There is no question that the contract of employment in this case was perfected here in the Philippines. Therefore, the Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and other laws affecting labor apply in this case. Furthermore, settled is the rule that the courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy. Here in the Philippines, employment agreements are more than contractual in nature. The Constitution itself, in Article XIII Section 3, guarantees the special protection of workers.

This public policy should be borne in mind in this case because to allow foreign employers to determine for and by themselves whether an overseas contract worker may be dismissed on the ground of illness would encourage illegal or arbitrary pre-termination of employment contracts.

Award of Salaries granted but reduced

In the case at bar, while it would appear that the employment contract approved by the POEA was only for a period of twelve months, Osdana’s actual stint with the foreign principal lasted for one year and seven-and-a-half months. It may be inferred, therefore, that the employer renewed her employment contract for another year. Thus, the award for the unexpired portion of the contract should have been US$1,260 (US$280 x 4 ½ months) or its equivalent in Philippine pesos, not US$2,499 as adjudged by the labor arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC.

As for the award for unpaid salaries and differential amounting to US$1,076 representing seven months’ unpaid salaries and one month underpaid salary, the same is proper because, as correctly pointed out by Osdana, the “no work, no pay” rule relied upon by petitioner does not apply in this case. In the first place, the fact that she had not worked from June 18 to August 22, 1993 and then from January 24 to April 29, 1994, was due to her illness which was clearly work-related. Second, from August 23 to October 5, 1993, Osdana actually worked as food server and cook for seven days a week at the Hota Bani Tameem Hospital, but was not paid any salary for the said period. Finally, from October 6 to October 23, 1993, she was confined to quarters and was not given any work for no reason at all.

Moral Damages granted but reduced

Now, with respect to the award of moral and exemplary damages, the same is likewise proper but should be reduced. Worth reiterating is the rule that moral damages are recoverable where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. Likewise, exemplary damages may be awarded if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner.

According to the facts of the case as stated by public respondent, Osdana was made to perform such menial chores, as dishwashing and janitorial work, among others, contrary to her job designation as waitress. She was also made to work long hours without overtime pay. Because of such arduous working conditions, she developed Carpal Tunnel Syndrome. Her illness was such that she had to undergo surgery twice. Since her employer determined for itself that she was no longer fit to continue working, they sent her home posthaste without as much as separation pay or compensation for the months when she was unable to work because of her illness. Since the employer is deemed to have acted in bad faith, the award for attorney’s fees is likewise upheld.

How not to get caught while sleeping

2010-06-25T22:08:00.000+08:00

When Hapontukin sets in I...

1. Sit Down

Pfft. This is by far the simplest and requires the least effort from you. I've tried this dozens of time already during my stint at a call center. My supe was not quite tolerant of reps falling asleep in their chairs, even though there aren't that many calls coming in. I developed this technique simply because I didn't like sleeping at the sleeping room during lunch hour. So what to do?

Just sit there, place both your arms on the armrest, and close your eyes. If there's no armrest, cross your arms over your chest. Don't slouch because that's always a dead giveaway that you're sleeping. Instead, just sit with your back straight and close your eyes. Believe me, they won't even give you a second glance.

2. Drop-Your-Pen Act

Now, this reqiures a little bit of effort but don't worry the method is quite simple. All you need is a pen (a pencil will do, too). Be sure your pen is just an ordinary pen (not pilot) so it won't mess up when you try writing with it after employing this method of creative sleeping. The first thing you do is sit there in class. Make every appearance that you're paying attention to the lecturer or your professor (if you're in class). Taking down notes will even make it more convincing. So ok, while you're busy taking down notes, you "accidentally" drop your pen. Lean down as though to pick it up but instead of coming up, don't. Stay there and doze for a bit.

3. Four-Eyed Bean Pole

You need a prop. A pair of eyeglasses, in fact. In a typical lecture hall, the lights always come from the front. The lecturer or your professor will most likely be using a projector or LCD screen for his visual aid. Now, with eyeglasses, the glass is concave which means the light will bounce right off it, which further means that you can just close your eyes and your lecturer won't even notice anything amiss. All he sees is you sitting there, your eyeglasses and oily forehead reflecting the light from the projector. Wahahah! Ok, on to the next tip.

4. Cover Up

This one is a little bit complicated and needs some help from a trusted friend. First, make sure you're sitting beside your friend or a close acquaintance (the kind you can ask favors from without feeling embarassed). During the lecture, make as though you're talking to your friend. Look at him/her but use your hand to cover half of your face, primarily the eyes. Ask your friend, "Wake me up when he's done talking" and then sleep for the duration of the lecture.

5. Pray

This is classic. I've tried this a couple of times. This works best when you're in the library where sleeping's simply not aloud. Place both your hands on top of the table and rest your forehead there. Note that it will really appear as though you are sleeping (which you really are) but when the librarian approaches you or when she wakes you up rudely, make the sign of the cross quickly and then smile politely, "Yes?" She'll think she disturbed you from your path to heaven and will feel properly embarassed.

I'm sure there are lots more ways to sleep creatively. But let's leave the rest to more creative minds.

Book List for Bar Review

2010-04-22T20:55:00.001+08:00

These are the books that I used for my review. TIP: It's advisable to use the books you've been using all through your entire four years of law school. The advantages are: (1) you are already familiar with it; (2) you've probably already noted the more important passages and added in some text of your own; and finally (3) you can save your money for more important things, like your plane tickets to and accommodation in Manila for the exam month.

Political Law

Nachura's Outline/Reviewer in Political Law
1987 Constitution of the Philippines codal (with LGC, Omnibus Election Code, etc.)
Personal notes (with updated jurisprudence)

Labor Law and Social Legislation

Azucena's Everyone's Labor Code
Full text of social legislations
Personal notes (with updated jurisprudence)

Civil Law

Jurado's Civil Law Review
Civil Code of the Philippines codal
Personal notes (with updated jurisprudence)

Taxation Law

Vitug's Tax Law and Jurisprudence
Personal notes (with updated jurisprudence)

Commercial Law

Sundiang's Commercial Law Reviewer
Personal notes (with updated jurisprudence)
Materials provided by my professor in Commercial Law Review

Criminal Law

Reyes' Criminal Law Books I & II
Personal notes (with updated jurisprudence)

Remedial Law

Regalado's Remedial Law Compendium Vol. 1
Rules of Court codal
Personal notes (with updated jurisprudence)

Legal Ethics

Sample forms
Memory aids
Rules of Court codal

For the Saturdays before the exam, I no longer went through my review materials but instead read past Bar Exam questions and answers in order to school myself on the form of questions to be expected and the proper way to answer them.

Hiatus Extended

2010-04-05T22:10:00.003+08:00

This blog's hiatus is extended for I don't know exactly how long. Changes shall be announced so keep posted right here.

In the meanwhile, you might notice the shiny new "read more" link after some posts. I've decided to install that particular code because I want to display 5 posts a page without killing your eyes entirely. It's a tedious process as I have to go back to all my old posts and manually edit them. Be patient.

Also, on a different note, I've decided to try out in-text advertising for this blog. I'm referring to those green-colored double underline hyperlinks you see all over my posts. If you hover your mouse over those links, a box-shaped bubble will appear containing content from an advertiser. If you want the bubble to disappear, just hover your mouse somewhere else. By the way, clicking on those links will direct you to the advertiser's landing page. I want to emphasize that YOU ARE NOT required to click any of those links.

Holy Week 2010

2010-03-29T06:00:00.000+08:00

This blog is on hiatus for this week. Returning to the regular schedule after the week-long solemn celebration.

2009 Philippine Bar Exam Results

2010-03-26T22:39:00.004+08:00

It's out. Congratulations to all my fellow new lawyers (although if we have to be technical, and according to my Legal Ethics professor, we're not yet lawyers until we sign our names on the Roll)

1. ABANTE, Maria Evitha A.
2. ABAQUITA, Allan C.
3. ABARQUEZ, Leandro E.
4. ABARQUEZ, Paolo E.
5. ABDULLAH, Anzarullah Zhadradi A.
6. ABELLA, Harve B.
7. ABELLAR, Eleanor Agnes F.
8. ABENOJAR, Irene U.
9. ABIBICO, Mona Liza D.
10. ABIERA, Stephanie E.
11. ABLAÑA, Lindy Andre P.
12. ABOGANDA, Alexander D.
13. ABRASALDO, Wilson C.
14. ABRUGAR, Vanessa Q.
15. ABUEDO, May Flor C.
16. ABUTAN, Leah C.
17. ACAS, Althea Barbara E.
18. ACOSTA-QUIROS, Annemarie
19. ADAOAG, Janice M.
20. ADASA, William Chino T.
21. ADDUG, Fredelyne H.
22. ADEVA, III, Daniel A.
23. AGATON, Jonathan R.
24. AGNES, JR., Jerry P.
25. AGRAVIADOR, Karisma Ivee L.
26. AGUHAYON-ESCOLAR, Ghenee Rose C.
27. AGUIHAP, Beverly D.
28. AGUILA, Mildred R.
29. AGUINALDO-BALUYA, Ranelle R.
30. AGUIRRE, Leandro Angelo Y.
31. AHAJA, Yasmin Ayesha K.
32. ALABAN, Daniel B.
33. ALAGAR-BERNARDO, Rowena E.
34. ALAGCAN, Angeli A.
35. ALARILLA, Jeffrey John S.
36. ALARILLA, Maria Angela I.
37. ALASKA, Hazel Mae A.
38. ALAZAS, Adrianne Marie C.
39. ALAZAS, Beatriz Irina Denise C.
40. ALBAN, Beethoven M.
41. ALBANO, Wyndel P.
42. ALBERTO, Ruby Ann Theresa L.
43. ALBORES, Melanie F.
44. ALCERA, Aimee Marie B.
45. ALDAY, Arlene D.
46. ALEGARBES, Augustus M.
47. ALEGRE, Adrian B.
48. ALEJANDRO, Eduardo Jerome T.
49. ALEJO, Judith Ann C.
50. ALESNA, Sheena A.
51. ALESON, Melanie F.
52. ALFECHE, Claribelle Jane A.
53. ALIBANG-SALUD, Jocelyn M.
54. ALICUMAN, Abelardo C.
55. ALINDATO, Diane Angela O.
56. ALIVIO, Kenneth O.
57. ALMAJOSE, Maricar C.
58. ALMERO, Leo Rey F.
59. ALMERO, Marie Beth S.
60. ALMOITE, Wilma M.
61. ALO, Jennifer Karen L.
62. ALPASAN, Roumelia B.
63. ALQUIROZ, Jason B.
64. ALQUISADA, Pamela Joy L.
65. ALURA, Maricris O.
66. ALVAREZ, Jeanette S.
67. ALVAREZ, Riza Gloria V.
68. ALVARICO, James Roulyn R.
69. ALZATE, Kimberley Joy T.
70. AMANO, Rachel O.
71. AMARGA, Lizanilla J.
72. AMARILLA, Romela T.
73. AME, Valentino Alvin C.
74. AMORANTO, Sarah Jane SJ.
75. AMORES, Luvim D.
76. ANCIADO, Pilar C.
77. ANCIANO, Frederick I.
78. ANDAL, Maria Bernadeth S.
79. ANDALIS, JR., Roberto C.
80. ANDAMAN, Margaret Raizza A.
81. ANDAMO, John Paul A.
82. ANDOLANA, Christ May V.
83. ANDRES, Paraluman D.
84. ANG, Anna Margarita G.
85. ANGELES, Francisco B.
86. ANGWAY, Cohleen Dianne SJ.
87. ANORE, Marlon DL.
88. ANSELMO, Duchess Veneru J.
89. ANTONIO-LADISLAO, Bianca Cecilia B.
90. APALING, Allen D.
91. APOLINAR, Anna Luisa P.
92. APOLINARIO, Floreida A.
93. APOLONIO, Joseph O.
94. AQUINO, Benedict Benigno A.
95. AQUINO, Mary Joy S.
96. AQUINO, III, Leopoldo D.
97. AQUINO, JR., Rodrigo F.
98. ARANDIA, Erwin F.
99. ARANETA, Henry O.
100. ARAOS, Tessa Mae L.
101. ARBOLADURA, Magelio S.
102. ARCEGA, Garnet Eneli Mae M.
103. ARDIENTE, Rochelle S.
104. ARDINA, Elmarie C.
105. ARENAS, Jose Lemuel S.
106. ARIAS, Alma Alyn O.
107. ARICAYOS, Crisale B.
108. ARIOLA, Reynaldo A.
109. ARLES, Maria Estelita B.
110. ARMECIN, Jhomel M.
111. ARNESTO, Tristan G.
112. AROMAS, Camille Khristine I.
113. ARPON, Renold C.
114. ARTIFICIO, Aileen R.
115. ASADON, Baltazar C.
116. ASTAÑO, Imelda L.
117. ASUNCION, Hirou Glenn A.
118. ATANACIO-FACUN, Mary Ann S.
119. ATIENZA, Shermaine M.
120. ATIENZA, JR., Edgardo P.
121. AUMAN, Evangeline C.
122. AUSTRIA, Mary Evangeline J.
123. AVENGOZA, Ma. Rhoda J.
124. AVILA, Mae Lizbeth I.
125. AVILA, Mark Gregory R.
126. AWKIT-BAN-EG, Alice L.
127. AYONG, Juris Iris M.
128. AYSON, Aldin C.
129. AYUYANG, Helga Anne Treasure L.
130. AZUCENA, Michael David B.
131. AZUR, Marita Lourdes S.
132. AÑOVER, Josephine Ann W.
133. BABALCON, Julius P.
134. BABIA, Jose Marcos A.
135. BACANI, Philip Jorge P.
136. BADDIRI, Jurmobin T.
137. BADILLA, Reynaldo R.
138. BAGASIN, Gladys Sarah R.
139. BAGRO, III, Herminio C.
140. BAGSAO-MANALANG, Liza Lorena C.
141. BAINTO, Naealla Rose M.
142. BALAGOT, Anthony Quin A.
143. BALAIS, Jason P.
144. BALANGKIG, Glynmar C.
145. BALBASTRE, Kristoffer Gil P.
146. BALBASTRE, III, Juanito H.
147. BALDERAMA, Gilberth D.
148. BALDOMAR, Ceezaye A.
149. BALDRIAS-SERRANO, Lorybeth R.
150. BALISACAN, Ryan Hartzell C.
151. BALIÑA, Elsa T.
152. BALLESTEROS, Danilo C.
153. BALSICAS, Noel D.
154. BALTAZAR, Ben Joshua A.
155. BANA, Aldous Januarius S.
156. BANDAY, Christine Joy B.
157. BANDERADO, Theodore P.
158. BANDILLA, Enrico G.
159. BANDONG, Therese Lynn R.
160. BANGUIS, Joseph L.
161. BANQUERIGO, Mark Christoffel L.
162. BAQUIAL, Cheryl L.
163. BAQUIANO, Randolph P.
164. BAQUIRAN, Giovani Gio G.
165. BARBA, Ria Karla A.
166. BARENG, Christian P.
167. BARENG, Jezer G.
168. BARIMBAO, Maria Rainelda L.
169. BARIT-CARIG, Ayn Marie Grace G.
170. BARLIS, Lanie Lee Marie A.
171. BARODI, Norhabib Bin Suod S.
172. BAROLA, Sherwin Gardner A.
173. BARROA, III, Guillermo B.
174. BARRON, E. Patrice Jamaine T.
175. BARTOLOME, Ryan Philipp L.
176. BARZAGA, Kristian G.
177. BASAR, Jamaloden A.
178. BATALA, Ngiyan P.
179. BATAN, Timothy John R.
180. BATHAN, Joseph Patrick Byron M.
181. BATHAN, Marygrace DC.
182. BATINGANA, Nicole R.
183. BATINGANA, Nikko R.
184. BATONAN, Elizabeth O.
185. BAUTISTA, Antonette L.
186. BAUTISTA, Deodar Lovell C.
187. BAUTISTA, Gino Marco P.
188. BAUTISTA, Jennifer L.
189. BAUTISTA, Ma. Carmencita P.
190. BAUTISTA, Roderick L.
191. BAUTISTA-ALDAVE, Maria Minerva T.
192. BAUZON, Edward R.
193. BAYHON, Margret D.
194. BAYOT, Armi Beatriz E.
195. BAÑAL, Gilemi L.
196. BAÑARES, Marcus Aurellius M.
197. BELENO, Efren B.
198. BELGICA, Jeremiah B.
199. BENIPAYO, Lourdes P.
200. BERANGO, Joan Abigail B.
201. BERNARDO, Arly Christine S.
202. BERNARDO, JR., Lester F.
203. BEROL, Ronald S.
204. BERONQUE, Al L.
205. BETITO, James Anthony D.
206. BILGERA, Ma. Corazon B.
207. BILLONES, Cherrie Lou H.
208. BINALDO, Julie M.
209. BINUYA, Mary Dian Grace N.
210. BLANCO, Janess A.
211. BOGACON, Melissa W.
212. BOGNEDON, Jado Rafael A.
213. BOLAÑO, Richie John D.
214. BOLAÑOS, Ma. Julie C.
215. BOLISAY, Bernard James S.
216. BONIFACIO, Gherwin S.
217. BORNAS, Renier Joy Nonito B.
218. BORRES, Mark D.
219. BORROMEO, Carlo C.
220. BORROMEO, Maria Lilia Gemmilyn M.
221. BORROMEO, II, Noel T.
222. BORROMEO-SY, Ruth G.
223. BOSI, Christine Joy D.
224. BOY, Allen Blair B.
225. BRAVO, Hanna Lee E.
226. BRIASA, Gerardo S.
227. BRILLANTE, JR., Bayani B.
228. BRION, Valery Joy A.
229. BRUAL, Johannes Angelo L.
230. BUENAFE, Roy L.
231. BUENVIAJE, Rickson M.
232. BUMAGAT-NACPIL, Journalyn S.
233. BURGOS, Aileen Grace H.
234. BUSLIG, Jenny Vi B.
235. BUTED, Kristine Angeline R.
236. CAABAY, Herminia E.
237. CABADING, III, Mauro Anthony B.
238. CABALONGA, Ella A.
239. CABANSAG, Jasmin S.
240. CABAYAN, Maria Theresa P.
241. CABEZA, April D.
242. CABIGAS, Chato A.
243. CABRAL, Fernan H.
244. CABRERA, Nathaniel G.
245. CABRIDO, Jorge Christian A.
246. CADIO, Joan O.
247. CAFE, Dominador
248. CAGAS, Den Ryan R.
249. CAGUIOA, Arvin M.
250. CAJARA, Marian L.
251. CAJARDO, Monique E.
252. CAJIPO, Karen C.
253. CALABIO, Garri T.
254. CALACAL, Roda K.
255. CALAOA, Elizabeth B.
256. CALDERON, Arnel T.
257. CALEJESAN, Roldan G.
258. CALLEJO, Marc Karlo N.
259. CAMAZO, Lawrence S.
260. CAMBA, John Rainier T.
261. CAMPILAN, Kristine Esther F.
262. CAMPOS, Maria Paz Geraldine J.
263. CAMTUGAN, II, Francis Rae G.
264. CANAPI-OTGALON, Marites A.
265. CANIOS, Charisma Eden N.
266. CANLAS, Jerome D.
267. CANO, Maricel D.
268. CANTO-HERNANDEZ, Rosalyn C.
269. CANTUBA-SINGSON, Daria B.
270. CAPISTRANO, Armand P.
271. CARBO, Ramon Q.
272. CARDENAS, Marites G.
273. CARDENAS-EJERCITO, Aileen Mary S.
274. CARIÑO, Materno Marcos Ma. G.
275. CARO, Danna Wylene R.
276. CARPIO, May Flor C.
277. CARRANZA, Kamille Joyce E.
278. CARRASCO, Angeline Marie T.
279. CARRASCO-AZUCENA, Maria Bernadette R.
280. CARREON, Cresilda B.
281. CARTUJANO, Mariblithe A.
282. CASES, Katharina C.
283. CASIPIT, Jekereen Joy R.
284. CASTELLANO, Janice P.
285. CASTILLO, Chrisgene A.
286. CASTILLO, Dyann O.
287. CASTILLO-ABENALES, Aivy Lou P.
288. CASTILLO-CANDIDO, Hope Jan D.
289. CASTRO, Easter Princess U.
290. CASTRO, Meliecar R.
291. CATAHAN, Emmanuel D.
292. CATALAN, Kelly Eusebio P.
293. CATAMEO, Marizon C.
294. CATAPAT, Maria Nenita D.
295. CAYLAO, Christian Ferdinand R.
296. CAYOD-ONG, Ma. Angelica M.
297. CAÑARES, Marlon T.
298. CAÑAS, Vicente B.
299. CAÑERO, Marvin P.
300. CAÑETE, Maria Floren S.
301. CAÑETE, Vincent Ryan Y.
302. CEBUJANO, Ceasar Augustos E.
303. CENIZA, Deonhar M.
304. CEPILLO, Kenelyn DG.
305. CERVANTES, Maria Patricia R.
306. CHAM, Edward C.
307. CHAN, Rochelle T.
308. CHARCOS, Katheri Ann L.
309. CHAVEZ, Stephanie R.
310. CHING, Diane Madelyn C.
311. CHING, Wilbert H.
312. CHIONG, Chiole L.
313. CHU, Allan Christopher S.
314. CHUA, Joana Olivia L.
315. CHUA, Jose L.
316. CHUA, Robinita P.
317. CHUA, Sheryl Lyn T.
318. CIPRIANO, Ma. Dominique Christine S.
319. CLAR, Edgar Bonette B.
320. CLAVERIA, Kathleen Karinina R.
321. CLEDERA, Tristan Jiff B.
322. CLORIBEL, Michael P.
323. CLOSA, Felippe Mart E.
324. CO, Jillian Marie B.
325. CO, Maria Theresa C.
326. COLAGO, John Paul G.
327. COLIAMCO, Cherry C.
328. COLLADO, Jo Ellaine L.
329. COMPE, JR., Graciano C.
330. CONCEPCION, Haidee M.
331. CONCEPCION, Mark Nette E.
332. CONCEPCION, Rowena L.
333. CONDAT, Ariel B.
334. CONEJOS, Antonio Esteban G.
335. CONSTANTINO, Aiza B.
336. CONSTANTINO, Arturo Jose M.
337. CONSUL, Jurist Castrence R.
338. CORDERO, Antonette B.
339. CORDERO, JR., Jose I.
340. CORPUZ, Marichelle G.
341. CORRO, Arlyn T.
342. CORSIGA, Joachim Florencio Q.
343. CORTEZ, Elmo R.
344. CORTON, Gabriel P.
345. CREAG, Mary Joyce Roselle P.
346. CREER, Eleanor M.
347. CRISTALES, Inban Q.
348. CRUCIO, Gina A.
349. CRUZ, Mary Grace G.
350. CRUZ, Richard Leonard A.
351. CRUZ, JR., Jessie A.
352. CU, Lourdes Clarissa Donnatilla K.
353. CUANSING, Edward Joseph C.
354. CUARTERO, Floritz G.
355. CUEVAS, Dolly Angeli M.
356. CUEVAS, Faith A.
357. CULIMA, Riza Ann Donalyn B.
358. CUNANAN, Earvene Jared S.
359. CUNANAN, Myron C.
360. CUNTAPAY, Ana Florence S.
361. DACAWI, Joseph-hans B.
362. DACPANO, Jeannette M.
363. DADIS, Joel P.
364. DALANGIN, Aysac V.
365. DALAWAMPU, Louie Mark M.
366. DALIGCON, Mumar T.
367. DAMASCO, Elmer P.
368. DANAO, JR., Camilo N.
369. DANGLI, Florimae L.
370. DAPULA, Katrina C.
371. DARBIN, Billy Joe Ivan D.
372. DARE, Katrina S.
373. DAUS, Christopher B.
374. DAVIDE, JR., Jorge S.
375. DAY, Tzadhi C.
376. DAYANGHIRANG, Rochelle A.
377. DAYAO, Vincent M.
378. DAYO, Jesus Frederick D.
379. DE CASTRO, Maureen B.
380. DE GRACIA, Elinor E.
381. DE GUIA, Eugenie Celie A.
382. DE GUZMAN, Cara Martha R.
383. DE GUZMAN, Jacquelyn L.
384. DE GUZMAN, Jason B.
385. DE GUZMAN-ALINAO, Kristina D.
386. DE JESUS, Allelu N.
387. DE JESUS, Darren M.
388. DE JESUS, Jennyvive L.
389. DE KEYSER, Evee Eunice P.
390. DE LEON, Cindy A.
391. DE LOS REYES, Maricor V.
392. DE VERA, Coney Rose M.
393. DE VERA, IV, Felipe Geoffrey K.
394. DE VILLA, Lezel E.
395. DECANO, Ronald John B.
396. DEGUIÑO, Aileen M.
397. DEKIRE, Samrollah M.
398. DEL ROSARIO, Katrina Elsa D.
399. DEL CASTILLO, Xavier Paolo R.
400. DEL PILAR, Jovill C.
401. DEL PUERTO, Laurence Edgardo A.
402. DEL ROSARIO, Maria Katrina G.
403. DEL ROSARIO, Rafael Celestino D.
404. DELA CALZADA, Jo Feliz Marie M.
405. DELA CRUZ, Lenielyn S.
406. DELA CRUZ, Roderick C.
407. DELA CRUZ, Walter Magnum D.
408. DELA FUENTE, Kim Ceasar P.
409. DELA PEÑA, Eleanor P.
410. DELA PEÑA, Nikki Rose L.
411. DELA ROSA, Arnel A.
412. DELANTAR, Eleanor S.
413. DELAS ALAS, Noel A.
414. DELEGIRO, Janet L.
415. DELES, Karla Grace J.
416. DELEÑA, Ryan B.
417. DELFIN, Diana Jane F.
418. DELFIN, Gerri Ann C.
419. DELOS SANTOS, Benito Jose L.
420. DEMAFELIS, Jo Anne S.
421. DEMANO, Mary Pauline R.
422. DENILLA, Resly Ann M.
423. DEPASUCAT, Hope Marey B.
424. DESINGAÑO, Ritchelle M.
425. DETICIO, Farid Eshwer C.
426. DEVELOS, V, Esperidion Augustus O.
427. DIAZ, Ana Charissa D.
428. DIAZ, Daniel L.
429. DIAZ, Ferdinand Arthur B.
430. DIAZ, Ma. Hiyasmin N.
431. DIAZ, Romano M.
432. DIAZ, JR., Honorio T.
433. DICHAVES, Kenny Roy S.
434. DICKPUS, Charisma Anne O.
435. DIESTRO-DESLATE, Gwendolyn
436. DIETA, Don G.
437. DILLA, Marlon A.
438. DIMARUCUT, Ivy C.
439. DIOKNO, Michael William T.
440. DIWA, Wilhelmina M.
441. DIZON, Betheena C.
442. DIZON, Jeifan-ira C.
443. DIZON, Mark Anthony P.
444. DIZON, Peter Michael G.
445. DOBLADA, Marife C.
446. DOBLE, Francis R.
447. DOFELIZ, Auxillador Avitus D.
448. DOGELIO, Jairus Anthony D.
449. DOLIGON, Daniel C.
450. DOMINGO, Katrina Frances M.
451. DOMOGAN, Janice Marie N.
452. DOOLANI, Sunita G.
453. DOQUILLA, Rubylin G.
454. DRILON, Catherine Marie D.
455. DUEÑAS, Odyssa A.
456. DUJUNCO, Raquel R.
457. DUKA, Annabelle B.
458. DULIG, Amethyst L.
459. DUMALIANG, Jana A.
460. DUMPIT, Donna Diana R.
461. DY, Samantha Paula G.
462. EBARLE, Emanuelle A.
463. ECLAR, Catherine M.
464. EDULAN, Charles Ceasar L.
465. ELBANBUENA, Kahlil Paolo O.
466. ELTANAL, Karen Mae G.
467. EMBIDO-BUENAVENTURA, Crystal Dei L.
468. ENAGE, Kim Boysie A.
469. ENCANTO, Melissa R.
470. ENCARNACION, Vincent Joseph T.
471. ENCINARES, Marife E.
472. ENERIA, Celeste E.
473. ENRILE, Christy Irene D.
474. ENRIQUEZ, Marizza P.
475. ENRIQUEZ, III, Juan Jose P.
476. ENTREDICHO, Delima S.
477. ESCALA, Lyndon D.
478. ESCALANTE, JR., Felix M.
479. ESCALANTE, JR., Vic T.
480. ESCANDER, Abdel Jalil A.
481. ESCIO, Madonna Gay L.
482. ESCOLANO, JR., Benjamin V.
483. ESCOLAR, Ahmad Clay C.
484. ESCUBIO, Jessica Guia E.
485. ESPALDON, Ruel H.
486. ESPARRAGO, Janice C.
487. ESPEJO, Bernadette B.
488. ESPEJO, Edwin M.
489. ESPEJON, Charisse B.
490. ESPERANTE, Jason C.
491. ESPINAS, Jeshiree D.
492. ESPINO, Franco P.
493. ESPINOSA, Kristine M.
494. ESPUELAS, Haide T.
495. ESTAÑO, Liza Jane B.
496. ESTEBAN, Sheena E.
497. ESTORNINOS, Jamil V.
498. ESTUR, Mark Julius C.
499. EUSTAQUIO, Karldon M.
500. EVANGELISTA, Anna Tricia P.
501. EVANGELISTA, Ma. Rebecca G.
502. EVANGELISTA, Roberto P.
503. FAJARDO, Juan Paolo F.
504. FALCON, Lyndon D.
505. FAMOR, Pacholo S.
506. FARAON, Redeemer B.
507. FAUNI, Peter Joseph L.
508. FELIX, Melchor M.
509. FERNANDEZ, Clint M.
510. FERNANDEZ, Dick F.
511. FERRER, Anthony G.
512. FETILO, Aires R.
513. FILARMEO, Charmaine Joy P.
514. FLORES, Divina M.
515. FLORES, Erickson A.
516. FLORES, Judith T.
517. FONTANILLA, Psyche Rizsavi B.
518. FORNOLLES, Angelo Vegie A.
519. FORTICH, Farrah N.
520. FRANCISCO, Valerie E.
521. FRIAS, Ma. Karla Denise M.
522. FUENTES-DUMLAO, Camille Rose D.
523. FUNTILA, Karla A.
524. GABATO, Vien Lawrence S.
525. GABINETE, John Warren P.
526. GABRILLO, Jenifer M.
527. GABUYA, Ademar A.
528. GAFFUD, Jovilyn M.
529. GALANG, Arman Jason M.
530. GALANG, Marianette A.
531. GALARRITA, Kathryn A.
532. GALIMA, III, Epifanio Delbert G.
533. GALLARDO, Jeffrey G.
534. GALURA, Maria Ofelia B.
535. GALVEZ, Grace A.
536. GAMALO, Castor A.
537. GAMAS, Godwin B.
538. GAMBOA, Jufran A.
539. GAMBOA, Mark Anthony M.
540. GAN, Hansen P.
541. GANAN, Mark Anthony N.
542. GANDAMRA, Khanini B.
543. GANDIONCO, Barbara Anne A.
544. GANZON, Leo Theodore A.
545. GARCE-MEJIA, Racquel F.
546. GARCELLANO, Anita B.
547. GARCIA, Andrea Lou J.
548. GARCIA, Charlie S.
549. GARCIA, Irvin L.
550. GARCIA, Leamor B.
551. GARCIA, Ronaldo M.
552. GARCIA, JR., Alberto C.
553. GARCIA, JR., Jose Melandro H.
554. GARCIANO, Suzette L.
555. GARIANDO, Cesar C.
556. GARRAEZ, Albert C.
557. GARRIDO, Maica C.
558. GATCHALIAN, Oliver R.
559. GATMAITAN, Rowena B.
560. GAUDIEL, IV, Bibiano Marc P.
561. GAVIOLA, Bryan O.
562. GAVIOLA, Maria Christina E.
563. GAVIOLA, Mark Anthony P.
564. GAYAGAY-APALING, Catherine B.
565. GEALAN, Noel Francis L.
566. GELLADO-CARREON, Maricon M.
567. GENCIANOS, Eden Rachel M.
568. GENERAL, Jose Martin O.
569. GENERAL, Maria Francina Louise O.
570. GENERAL, Marianne C.
571. GENOVA, Carmi Rose M.
572. GENOVESA, Katherine A.
573. GENTUGAYA, Norman Vincent O.
574. GEPOLONGCA, Josecor S.
575. GERONIMO, Krystine B.
576. GERONIMO, Maria Ilyn C.
577. GERONIMO, Michelle N.
578. GEROY, Mylen C.
579. GERSAVA, Socrates T.
580. GESMUNDO, Joseph Benedict G.
581. GEÑOSO, Al An E.
582. GIGANTONE, Alexander G.
583. GIGAWIN, Ma. Kristina R.
584. GINGO, Rowena G.
585. GITGANO, Lylani A.
586. GLORIA, Laila May A.
587. GO, Sheila Abigail O.
588. GOCHANGCO, Jose Marie V.
589. GODORNES, Janice A.
590. GOMEZ, Gian Franco R.
591. GOMEZ, Ma. Krizna S.
592. GONZALES, Antonio G.
593. GONZALES, Jesus Nathaniel Martin B.
594. GONZALES, Nichole D.
595. GONZALES, Ricel M.
596. GONZALES, Ulysses L.
597. GONZALES, III, Emilio R.
598. GONZALES-DIEGO, Maria Victoria M.
599. GONZALEZ, Yves-randolph P.
600. GOZE, Gilbert C.
601. GREGORIO, Carlo O.
602. GUALBERTO, Rhett Matthew S.
603. GUANZON, Kathlyn Joy M.
604. GUAZON, Rhea A.
605. GUELOS, Orchid Marie D.
606. GUERRA, Marvin Jasper B.
607. GUIAM, Joseph E.
608. GUIANG, Sandra Therese Christine C.
609. GUINOCOR, Rysan C.
610. GUIRAO, Nerissa G.
611. GUMALING, JR., Robert N.
612. GUTIERREZ, Alvin A.
613. GUTIERREZ, Chiara Feliz C.
614. GUTIERREZ, Melina Rose E.
615. GUTIERREZ, Rowena M.
616. GUZMAN, Carl Stephen A.
617. GUZMAN, Cristina Amelia R.
618. HAIRUN-NATIVIDAD, Jhihann C.
619. HALILI, Madonna F.
620. HAMOY, Jim A.
621. HERMOSO, Rosa Christina R.
622. HERMOSURA, Glenda V.
623. HERNAEZ, III, Rosendo Emilio R.
624. HERNANDEZ, Juan Carlo B.
625. HERNANDEZ, Katrina P.
626. HERNANDEZ, Mary Catherine T.
627. HERNANDEZ, Michael Gerard S.
628. HERNANDO, Harold Kim C.
629. HERRERA, Pamela Joy T.
630. HILADO, Jessica Kristine F.
631. HILARIO, Alen Fredd L.
632. HIPOL, Aurora Catalina M.
633. HIRANG, Gemelee G.
634. HOLLERO, Valerie Anne H.
635. HONTUCAN-QUIJANO, Vanessa A.
636. HUMARANG, Michael John M.
637. IBAOC, Cherry P.
638. IBAÑEZ, III, Manuel Joseph B.
639. IGNACIO, Erik Donn
640. IGNACIO, Vanessa Grace M.
641. ILAGAN, Ma. Criselda D.
642. ILAHAN, Benjan B.
643. ILANO, Helen Grace O.
644. IMPERIAL, Jonas Luis P.
645. INES, Benedict Vincent L.
646. INFANTE, Philippe Lauren M.
647. INGUITO, Lora Mae T.
648. INVENTOR, Angelo T.
649. IPAC, Jay-R C.
650. IRASGA, Matthew N.
651. IRORITA, Jay M.
652. JACOBA, Anthony Raphael V.
653. JAGMIS, Richander G.
654. JALA, Gena B.
655. JALAD, Andrew S.
656. JAMBALOS, Johanna V.
657. JANIYA, Shalom P.
658. JARDELEZA, Maria Carmen L.
659. JARENCIO, Cherylle E.
660. JAVELLANA, Gerardo B.
661. JAVIER, Maureen Seymour D.
662. JAVIER, IV, Eugene C.
663. JAVIER-JIMENEZ, Cristina Marie Eugenie R.
664. JAVINAR, Donato B.
665. JIMENEZ, Arianne Vanessa Josephine T.
666. JIMENEZ, Jasmine M.
667. JIMENEZ, Thea Marie B.
668. JIMENO, Nikki Sarah V.
669. JORDAN, Roma Joy R.
670. JORNADA, Ryan Rene C.
671. JORVINA, Karmela H.
672. JOSON, Joanna Marie O.
673. JOVEN, Suzette C.
674. JUBAN, Rowell G.
675. JULIAN, Cherry Amor A.
676. JUNIO, Irene May I.
677. KABATAY, Rodrigo Jose A.
678. KANAPI, Erwin Bryan S.
679. KAPUNAN, Armina Dielle R.
680. KATALBAS, Jubert P.
681. KO, Kevin L.
682. LABADAN, Leah Theresa L.
683. LABANEN, Argyle Karen M.
684. LABAO, Daisy Jane L.
685. LABITAD, Tarcisio Z.
686. LABRO, JR., Edwin Valente Z.
687. LACANILAO, Redgeanald S.
688. LACUATA, Daniel Christian B.
689. LACUESTA, Andrea Patricia R.
690. LAGMAY, Nikko G.
691. LAGOS, Caroline P.
692. LAGUESMA, Gabriel Russel B.
693. LAGUINDAM, Arvin E.
694. LAINEZ, Marco Gregorio L.
695. LAITA, Rainier F.
696. LAMANILAO, Stephen A.
697. LAMAYAN, Gretchen D.
698. LAMBINO, Marie Claire Therese C.
699. LAMEYRA, Ericson D.
700. LAMINATO, Claryl-anne D.
701. LAPUZ, Anson T.
702. LAPUZ, Jesusa R.
703. LARON, Richard E.
704. LASAM, Ma. Katrina A.
705. LASSITER, Bryan A.
706. LASTIMOSO, Arthur J.
707. LATAWAN, Wade A.
708. LATO, Lesley Norreen G.
709. LAVA, Ma. Glaiza L.
710. LAYSON, Reinier B.
711. LAYUG, Marilet S.
712. LAZA, Rely D.
713. LAZARO, Paul Ernest M.
714. LEE, Everlene O.
715. LEE, Judith Z.
716. LEGASPI, Melvin I.
717. LEQUIGAN-PIOL, Milagros C.
718. LERIOS, Edmar D.
719. LEYNES, Jerome Christopher G.
720. LIANZA, Mellicent C.
721. LIBERATO, Allen A.
722. LIBUTAQUE, Jenny G.
723. LICAROS, Anna Theresa L.
724. LIGUTAN, Amando Virgil D.
725. LIM, Aldean Philip A.
726. LIM, Bernadette C.
727. LIM, Charmian D.
728. LIM, Dianne A.
729. LIM, Elnathan C.
730. LIM, Janette T.
731. LIM, John Paul T.
732. LIM, May Abigail T.
733. LIM, Shelly T.
734. LIMBONHAI, Katrina Anne T.
735. LIMPOT, Marcelina C.
736. LIN, Chin C.
737. LINDONGAN, Arnel A.
738. LIONG, Frederick G.
739. LIPORADA, Isagani S.
740. LIQUETE, John Henry C.
741. LIRA, Jimmy Lyn F.
742. LIZANO, Jennifer M.
743. LIZASO, Marina Elenita S.
744. LLAMEDO, Lecel R.
745. LLASOS, Ma. Paz A.
746. LLAVE, Jose Fernando G.
747. LLEDO, Precious Angela L.
748. LLESOL, Kristine Jolly S.
749. LLOSA, Ruben M.
750. LOBO, Allan C.
751. LOBO, Alvin C.
752. LOGRONIO, Nelson U.
753. LOMBOY, Alex Norman B.
754. LONTOK, Benito M.
755. LOPEZ, Jess Raymund M.
756. LOPEZ, Nastasja Karina J.
757. LOPEZ, Precious Czar A.
758. LOPEZ, Sarah Jane D.
759. LOPEZ, Welson M.
760. LORENZO, Rochelle V.
761. LORENZO, III, Andres D.
762. LOZANO, JR., Ernesto S.
763. LOZARE, Allan C.
764. LUBRIO, Maria Cristina L.
765. LUCERO, Arlene O.
766. LUCILA, Marguerite Therese L.
767. LUGO, Marylois C.
768. LUMAGUE, Ma. Cecille D.
769. LUMAUIG, Timothy Joseph N.
770. LUMAWAG, Joan O.
771. LUNA, Hans Roger S.
772. LUNA, Reymund F.
773. LUNDANG, Lynneth T.
774. LUPOS-GERALE, Lyn N.
775. LUZUNG, Fred C.
776. MABANSAG, Ulidia B.
777. MABUTE, Neddejohn L.
778. MACABATA, Michael S.
779. MACAGAAN, Sittie Aleah C.
780. MACALABO-ABDUL, T'hasmin P.
781. MACALINTAL, Ma. Jinel G.
782. MACAM, JR., Cezar A.
783. MACAPAS-GAGARACRUZ, Leah Meih S.
784. MACAPAYAG, Neliza N.
785. MACAPILI, Judelyn T.
786. MACASAET, Bhong Paulo A.
787. MACASAET, Julius Caesar Junior I.
788. MACLANG, Cisco Franz S.
789. MADARCOS, Rachelle G.
790. MADERAZO, Gail Stephanie C.
791. MADRID, Dianne Ricci DC.
792. MAGALLOSA, Jan Rey E.
793. MAGAT, Edward S.
794. MAGCAMIT, Eric Jay A.
795. MAGLANQUE, JR., Abelardo P.
796. MAGLASANG, Chevrolie E.
797. MAGLUNOG, Tiffany Kim R.
798. MAGMANLAC, Joysha D.
799. MAGSANO, Rexie May E.
800. MAGUGAT, Jenny Vi H.
801. MAGUIGAD, Vanessa Q.
802. MAILOM, Mariel A.
803. MAIQUEZ, Kristine Anne L.
804. MALABANAN, Melvin C.
805. MALALUAN, Joseph S.
806. MALANG, Kristine Margret M.
807. MALAPITAN, Elmar H.
808. MALINAO, Rose A.
809. MALLETE, Elbert R.
810. MALLILLIN, Bryan Joseph L.
811. MALLILLIN, Maria Rea A.
812. MALVEDA, Patrick John V.
813. MANAHAN, Elson B.
814. MANAHAN, Geline Joy C.
815. MANALANG, Jerry L.
816. MANALO, Eric N.
817. MANANES, Edward Martin M.
818. MANCOL, Creschic C.
819. MANDAP, Charity P.
820. MANGAMPO, Mark Philip C.
821. MANGUERA, Aris S.
822. MANGUERA, Erwin C.
823. MANINGAS, Peter Kate C.
824. MANLANGIT, Constantino U.
825. MANLAPAZ, Benedicto G.
826. MANLAPAZ, Raian Joy G.
827. MANTICAJON, Ian Vincent C.
828. MANZANO, Catherina N.
829. MAPULA, Paolo Marco R.
830. MAQUIRAYA, Mark Albert Gregory B.
831. MARAJAS, Camille Suzanne R.
832. MARALIT, Maricon Z.
833. MARASIGAN, Michael Jobert M.
834. MARASIGAN, Nicholas S.
835. MARAÑON, III, Emilio L.
836. MARIANO, Charlen Masha A.
837. MARIANO, Karmina A.
838. MARISTAZA, Ryan F.
839. MARISTAZA, JR., Romulo T.
840. MAROHOMSALIC, Aliya L.
841. MARQUEZ, Carlo B.
842. MARQUEZ, Jemil Christian B.
843. MARTIN, Marilou C.
844. MARTINEZ, Joseph L.
845. MARTINEZ, Ken Emery B.
846. MARTIZANO, Giuseppe G.
847. MARZAN, Kareen Silver P.
848. MAS, JR., Emmanuel N.
849. MATIAS, Michael Drake P.
850. MATIB, Erwin G.
851. MATOZA, Jason T.
852. MATULOY, Rhandell Alvin B.
853. MAUHAY, Gisela Cecilia A.
854. MAUNTING, Aisa (Bruneiry) G.
855. MAZO, Rosalie T.
856. MEDEL, Edward B.
857. MEDEZ, Rosanne Chriselle S.
858. MEDRANO, Ryan P.
859. MEER, Francis James E.
860. MELCHOR, Jennifer M.
861. MENCHAVEZ, Estrella G.
862. MENCHAVEZ, Llewelyn P.
863. MENDIGUARIN, Donna D.
864. MENDIOLA, Dana Paula B.
865. MENDOZA, Bernadette C.
866. MENDOZA, Felix Glenn C.
867. MENDOZA, Josephine Marie B.
868. MENDOZA, Julie Aylene DV.
869. MENDOZA, Marco T.
870. MENDOZA, Rizaldy L.
871. MENDOZA-MACROHON, Iris May T.
872. MERACAP, Charlemaigne L.
873. MERCADO, Aissa C.
874. MERCADO, Ronald Crisanto P.
875. MERIN, Iris Victoria U.
876. MESA, Reina L.
877. MESINA, Bridget Rose M.
878. MESINA, Rita Marie L.
879. MIGRIÑO, Joseph R.
880. MIGUEL, Filamer D.
881. MIJARES, Cecil Joy T.
882. MIMBALAWAG, Ibrahim M.
883. MINA, Marita Anna C.
884. MIRANDA, Francis E.
885. MIRANDA, Hazel May P.
886. MIRANDA, Maricel C.
887. MIRASOL, Rommel Jan T.
888. MOCNANGAN, Tom P.
889. MODESTO, Katherine Joy R.
890. MOHAMETANO, Gift S.
891. MOLDEZ, Maria Cecilia A.
892. MOLINA, Chenellyn S.
893. MOLINA, Mat J.
894. MOLINA, Rosana M.
895. MOLO, Junalit G.
896. MONCERA, Ana Marie N.
897. MONDEZ, Thomas Elliot A.
898. MONFERO, Deane Ruth S.
899. MONJE, Johannes S.
900. MONSOD, Eunice Zuleika N.
901. MONTEALTO, Beverly V.
902. MONTECILLO, Conchita D.
903. MONTEFALCON, Donna April G.
904. MONTEMAYOR, Patrick G.
905. MONTENEGRO, Nabi Karl Bayani O.
906. MONTERO, Froilan A.
907. MONTERO, II, Jose Voltaire B.
908. MONTESA, Cyrus Richard A.
909. MONTEZA, Evangeline C.
910. MONTIBON, Gemmini N.
911. MONTILLA, Aris R.
912. MORAL, Leah Marie A.
913. MORALDE, Ginalyn O.
914. MORALES, Maria Liberty D.
915. MORALES, Maria Teresa G.
916. MORALES, Rhea Joy M.
917. MORANDARTE, Ian E.
918. MOREÑO, J. Ricardo H.
919. MOSCARE, Daisy Lily O.
920. MOSQUERA, Joanne Lenny M.
921. MUAÑA, Cara S.
922. MUTIA, Rowena F.
923. MUÑIZ, Sheila DM.
924. MUÑOZ, Jo Ann Marie A.
925. NADUMA, Mat Kieven T.
926. NAMUAG, Maria Roana O.
927. NARIDO, Eleuterio C.
928. NATIVIDAD, Cynthia C.
929. NATIVIDAD, Peter Paul T.
930. NAVAL, Bodie Edward D.
931. NAVAL, Vanessa O.
932. NAVALLO, Michael Jobert I.
933. NAVARRO, Analissa V.
934. NAVARRO, F.J. Edmund Jensen S.
935. NAVARRO, Herbert C.
936. NAVERA, Angeline Z.
937. NEDIC, Riya Adelaida C.
938. NER, Alexander D.
939. NICANOR, Morgan R.
940. NICOLAS, Jeneline N.
941. NICOLAS, Jona Liza F.
942. NIERE, Sheila Simonet G.
943. NIERVA, Carmela B.
944. NOCOS, Gent Paul A.
945. NOLASCO, May Rachel S.
946. NUEVE, Thea Gicela C.
947. NUGUIT, Mark Anthony M.
948. NUÑEZ, Rene John V.
949. OANDASAN, Nelia O.
950. OASAY, Jenny F.
951. OBILES, Jayson
952. OBLIGACION, Romelyn A.
953. OBON, Maureen Rose T.
954. OBSUM, Shaun Hassen C.
955. OCAMPO, Analita E.
956. OCAMPO, Angelique Michelle Irene L.
957. OCAMPO, Kenneth Z.
958. OCAMPO, Lovereal Joy M.
959. OCAMPO, Ma. Sarah Kay N.
960. ODERO, Rhoda N.
961. OFENDA, Giovanni C.
962. OGOY-BERNARDO, Sherryl B.
963. OJEDA, Susana Grace L.
964. OLAN, Rodolfo M.
965. OLANO, Alisa Trena R.
966. OLERIANA, Caress L.
967. OLITOQUIT, Leila C.
968. ONA, Maricar L.
969. ONCOG-ALBANO, Rosa Theresa A.
970. ONG, Edward T.
971. ONG, Vic Ruskin M.
972. ONTALAN, Frances Mae Cherrie K.
973. OQUINDO-GONZAGA, Maria Karina B.
974. ORDONEZ, Lady May F.
975. ORILLA, Donna Marie G.
976. OROLA-ABAYGAR, Elnora J.
977. ORPIADA, Mary Jane N.
978. ORTEGA, Sarah T.
979. PAALA, Eumaida C.
980. PABALAN, Mary Grace A.
981. PABELLANO, Joycee M.
982. PABLEO, Ann Marie Teresa B.
983. PACHECO, Peter John Raymund B.
984. PACLEB, Kathleen Carisa C.
985. PADILLA, Agnes L.
986. PADILLA, Dexter V.
987. PADILLA, Patrick A.
988. PADILLA, Rafael Angelo M.
989. PADILLA, II, Victor Luis Q.
990. PADKIW, Appasan K.
991. PADULLO, JR., Macario C.
992. PAGAYANAN, Claire Eufracia P.
993. PAGUE, Kristine Jane B.
994. PAGUNSAN, Pampross J.
995. PALACAO-CONDAT, Cheryl M.
996. PALAD, Dennis M.
997. PALIC, Anabelle S.
998. PALLARCA, Cecilia S.
999. PALOMA, Eileen C.
1000. PAMINTUAN, III, Alberto D.
1001. PANDOY, May R.
1002. PANES, Shirley S.
1003. PANGANIBAN, Jasmin P.
1004. PAPA, Ma. Leonila P.
1005. PARAS, Joyce D.
1006. PARCIA, Mark Anthony M.
1007. PARDUCHO, Nestle Lyn M.
1008. PAREDES, Annabel M.
1009. PAREDES, Mark Allen M.
1010. PARGAS, May Chrysaliz E.
1011. PARROCHA, Rodan G.
1012. PASAGUI, Ryan Rey L.
1013. PASAMONTE, Jan Philip O.
1014. PASANA-TURGANO, Princesita C.
1015. PASCO, Lyle Filomeo C.
1016. PASCO, Maria Rosario B.
1017. PASCUA, Elmer G.
1018. PASCUA, Sherwin P.
1019. PASCUAL, Kalvin Henson C.
1020. PASCUAL, Rafael Allan P.
1021. PASCUAL, Rosemary T.
1022. PASTOR, Mark Steven C.
1023. PASTOR-CORPUZ, Gizelle R.
1024. PASTORFIDE, Grace C.
1025. PATALITA-ARCOLAS, Nelsie V.
1026. PATANGAN, Al-may Sair F.
1027. PATDU, Ivy D.
1028. PATRIARCA, Judith P.
1029. PAUDAC, Hasminah D.
1030. PAULINO-GOGOLIN, Edna C.
1031. PAZ, Ma. Patricia B.
1032. PE LIM, Alfred John C.
1033. PEDROSA, Arnel M.
1034. PELAEZ, Joseph Paul B.
1035. PELAYO-ALUTAYA, Marlou
1036. PELEA, Emmanuel E.
1037. PENADOS, Faith C.
1038. PENSOY, Randolf C.
1039. PEPITO, Charisse Faith T.
1040. PEPITO, Isar O.
1041. PERALTA, Xandrix J.
1042. PERANDOS, Mitos Shiela J.
1043. PERDIGUERRA-MUÑOZ, Divina Lea A.
1044. PEROLA, Melissa Grace T.
1045. PETEROS, Rosarie A.
1046. PEYRA, JR., Monico L.
1047. PEÑA-MALLANAO, Ana May Concepcion C.
1048. PEÑAFLOR, Maria Christina P.
1049. PICAR, Rianne M.
1050. PICO-ELUMBA, April Joan B.
1051. PIJO, JR., Reynaldo M.
1052. PINATARA, Nadjer D.
1053. PITAHIN, Ferdinand Emmanuel C.
1054. PITPIT, Froilan B.
1055. PIZARRO, January C.
1056. PIZARRO, IV, Zacarias L.
1057. PLATA, Kristine C.
1058. PLOTEÑA, Vivian T.
1059. PONCE, Rebecca Carla M.
1060. PONIO, IV, Amelia S.
1061. POSIO, Jake Patrick P.
1062. POZON, Ira Paulo A.
1063. PRADAS, Liza D.
1064. PRESTOZA, Anthony G.
1065. PUA, Maricris Connie B.
1066. PUACHE, Melojean M.
1067. PUERTO, Ofelia R.
1068. PULICAY, Rey B.
1069. PUNAY, Arceli C.
1070. PUNO, Vincent I.
1071. PUNSALAN, Enjl D.
1072. PURGANAN, Anthony J.
1073. PUSPUS, Archie B.
1074. PUZON, Dominique Jose S.
1075. PUZON, Jocelyn V.
1076. QUEROL, Marah Victoria S.
1077. QUEVENCO, Jesus Ramon M.
1078. QUIJANO, Mia Antonette M.
1079. QUILAQUIGA, Sharina C.
1080. QUIMPO, Nancy Aurora D.
1081. QUINIO, Patrick Joseph M.
1082. QUINTANILLA, Czarina G.
1083. QUINTON, Larry M.
1084. QUIOC, Marina Luz P.
1085. QUIOGUE, Marie Antonette B.
1086. QUIPSE, Isabel Milagros L.
1087. QUIRANTE, Aileen L.
1088. QUIÑONES, Charlie A.
1089. RABANAL, Diana F.
1090. RACOMA, Monica Rose B.
1091. RAFOLS, Jeanny Mae H.
1092. RAGOJOS, Michael A.
1093. RAMIREZ-CAÑETE, Margaux Angeli R.
1094. RAMIRO, Tanya Faye O.
1095. RAMOS, Frances Lynn C.
1096. RAMOS, Kristian Lorenz B.
1097. RAMOS, Lanie B.
1098. RAMOS-TEJADA, Elsiemarie B.
1099. RANCES, Katherine May N.
1100. RAPATAN, Neil Jerome A.
1101. RAVANERA, Ilya Kristine R.
1102. RAYOS DEL SOL, Juan Fermin D.
1103. REANTASO, Maria Celeste A.
1104. REBADOMIA, Venice Cyrus M.
1105. REBUGIO, Dani Jay G.
1106. RECTO, Rolando R.
1107. REDOBLADO, Bea Carla C.
1108. REDOBLE, Luisito D.
1109. REGALA-PAVIA, Alma Renee C.
1110. REGALADO, John Christian Joy A.
1111. RELAMPAGOS, Janris Jay G.
1112. REMIGIO, Frederick Jay E.
1113. REQUIÑO, II, Claudio G.
1114. RESARI, Steve G.
1115. REVAMONTE, Vanessa G.
1116. REY, Mark Ryan B.
1117. REYES, Cherrie Lynne May P.
1118. REYES, Irene Mischele B.
1119. REYES, Jennylyn V.
1120. REYES, John Philip L.
1121. REYES, Julius Christian L.
1122. REYES, Leslie Ann A.
1123. REYES, Mariflor V.
1124. REYES, Mark Anthony P.
1125. REYES, Mary Kristine C.
1126. REYES, Mary Ann H.
1127. REYES, Remus Romano A.
1128. REYES, JR., Arsenio C.
1129. REYNOSO, Jay Paolo A.
1130. RICABLANCA-PARGAS, Sonia Philipa M.
1131. RIMANDO, Rhiza Lee D.
1132. RISMA, Ace Victor F.
1133. RIVAS, Amy S.
1134. RIVERA, Lordaliza R.
1135. RIZON, Maria Theresa V.
1136. ROBINO, Leif John L.
1137. ROBLES, Margarita Angela B.
1138. ROBREDILLO, Jose Ruther P.
1139. ROCAMORA, Timothy John G.
1140. RODAS, Carlo D.
1141. RODENAS, Jason G.
1142. RODRIGUEZ, Jay Y.
1143. ROJAS, Aileez C.
1144. ROJO, Alejandro N.
1145. ROLDAN, Maria Theresa A.
1146. ROMERO, Anna Leah T.
1147. ROMERO, Ginalin Joy C.
1148. ROMERO, Maria Paula G.
1149. ROMERO, Ryan V.
1150. RONDARIO, Christina Eden M.
1151. RONULO, Jonathan B.
1152. ROQUE, Patricia Marie Regina V.
1153. ROSACIA, Diane Christie A.
1154. ROSALES, Rose Anne P.
1155. ROSOS, Mya Analene D.
1156. ROXAS, JR., Almario H.
1157. RUBINOS, Danielle-anne O.
1158. RUBIO, Ophelia Pilar E.
1159. RUEDAS, Ronald P.
1160. RUFO, Ivy G.
1161. RUFON, III, Jose Athanasius S.
1162. RUIZ, Kathleen Joy M.
1163. RUSELL, Rosemarie A.
1164. SABADO, Kathryn S.
1165. SABINO, Sheila May S.
1166. SAC, Abbiegail D.
1167. SACAY-HWANG, Emmeline A.
1168. SACLOLO, Sharon N.
1169. SACRAMENTO, Allan M.
1170. SAGADAL, Darius L.
1171. SAGCAL, Michael Arthur C.
1172. SAID, Johaira B.
1173. SALADA, Mary Ann T.
1174. SALAMAT, Aimee Abigail E.
1175. SALANGA, Yolanda A.
1176. SALAVER-VILLALINO, Audrey A.
1177. SALCEDO, R Epicurus Charlo S.
1178. SALCEDO, Vera Shayne G.
1179. SALES, Rodante A.
1180. SALIGUMBA, Dyan Kristine R.
1181. SALLIDAO, Debie K.
1182. SALONGA, Rowena Fatima M.
1183. SALUD, Jose Victorniño L.
1184. SALVA, JR., Nelson C.
1185. SALVADOR, Christopher Sam S.
1186. SALVADOR, Jana Rebekah A.
1187. SALVADORA-ASPERIN, Melamy A.
1188. SALVE, Maria Edbiesa B.
1189. SAMPER, Yvette H.
1190. SAN DIEGO, Larina DG.
1191. SAN DIEGO-QUIJANO, Celine Muriel C.
1192. SAN JUAN, Leika P.
1193. SAN MIGUEL, Melisa L.
1194. SAN PEDRO, Fraulein B.
1195. SAN PEDRO, Kristin C.
1196. SANA, Elias Omar A.
1197. SANCHEZ, Angelo Albert T.
1198. SANCHEZ, Jennifer DL.
1199. SANCHEZ, Maruli Ali G.
1200. SANCHEZ, Olive B.
1201. SANCHEZ, Reinhard C.
1202. SANCHEZ, Richard P.
1203. SANCHEZ, JR., Jacinto C.
1204. SANCHEZ-LLORITO, Livian May
1205. SANDALO, Winlove Apple R.
1206. SANDOVAL, Edouard Y.
1207. SANGALANG, Ela A.
1208. SANIDAD, Dick R.
1209. SANIDAD, JR., Pablito F.
1210. SANTIAGO, Evangeline A.
1211. SANTIAGO, Glendale R.
1212. SANTIAGO, Marco P.
1213. SANTIAGO, Ronacyn P.
1214. SANTIAGO, JR., Eugenio M.
1215. SANTO, Carissa E.
1216. SANTOS, Ayesa Theresa S.
1217. SANTOS, Darwin B.
1218. SANTOS, Deborah B.
1219. SANTOS, Lea D.
1220. SANTOS, Nikki Neil R.
1221. SANTOS, Ryan V.
1222. SANTOS, Sheila A.
1223. SANTOS, Verna Kate B.
1224. SANTOS-MONTEBON, Arlyn S.
1225. SAPALO, Ignacio A.
1226. SAQUING, Claudette Michelle T.
1227. SARMIENTO, Frances Jeanne L.
1228. SAROMINES, Jonathan L.
1229. SARONA, Jazzie M.
1230. SARZA, Maneeka A.
1231. SAURA, III, Ramon A.
1232. SAYAS, Gerard M.
1233. SAYAT, Jenny H.
1234. SAYSON, Frances Lynette V.
1235. SEARES, Raphael Joseph B.
1236. SEDILLA, Jasmin P.
1237. SEGUERRA, Candy P.
1238. SENCIO, Suzanne Margaret T.
1239. SEREDRICA, Rodolfo M.
1240. SERGIO, Oliver Jhones R.
1241. SERILO, Rowena L.
1242. SERRANO, Jennifer J.
1243. SEVILLA, Hanniyah P.
1244. SEÑA, Raymund B.
1245. SIAO, Ronaldo Horacio B.
1246. SILONGAN, Sahara Alia J.
1247. SILVA, Hector C.
1248. SIMUNDAC, Maria Concepcion P.
1249. SINGSON, Wellah R.
1250. SINSON, Katherine G.
1251. SIOSANA, Minerva V.
1252. SISTOZA, Cristian Paulinne H.
1253. SO, Jim Roy D.
1254. SOBREVEGA, Mary Jean Q.
1255. SOLIDEO, Shin Kenneth A.
1256. SOLIMAN, Maria Aurora M.
1257. SOLIS, Rochelle Marie R.
1258. SOLIVEN, Victor Ariel G.
1259. SOLON, JR., Edgardo C.
1260. SOMERA, Aimie D.
1261. SOMERA, Quennie Agnes C.
1262. SONGCO, Christine Dianne V.
1263. SORIANO, Al L.
1264. SORIANO, Octavius G.
1265. SORIANO-AFALLA, Brenda Lyn S.
1266. SOTO, Katherine L.
1267. STA. ANA, Florences G.
1268. STA. ANA, Freznel B.
1269. STA. MARIA, Cicero L.
1270. STA. MARIA, Eunice M.
1271. STA. TERESA, Maria Luz S.
1272. SUAREZ, Marvin C.
1273. SUGANOB, Lynie C.
1274. SULIT, Jam Tristan L.
1275. SULTAN, Abdinsa S.
1276. SUMAGIT, Michael B.
1277. SUMAYOD, Jhoana Marie P.
1278. SUMILE, Barry C.
1279. SURALTA, Maria Doris B.
1280. SUSA, Jose B.
1281. SY, Catherine C.
1282. SY, Khristopher M.
1283. SY, Rachelle T.
1284. SY, Sherwin S.
1285. TABANAY, Ryan D.
1286. TABANDA, Roy Patrick C.
1287. TABERNERO-BUNAG, Vanessa P.
1288. TABIOS, Anna Leah A.
1289. TABIQUE, Katrina C.
1290. TABUNDA, Rod Patrick A.
1291. TACLA, Russell E.
1292. TADEO, Alexie Jane C.
1293. TADEO, Yasmine Lee R.
1294. TADINA-PASIA, Melody F.
1295. TAGALOGUIN, Fritz Z.
1296. TAHIR, Sharina I.
1297. TAJAN, Joy Stephanie C.
1298. TALLUNGAN, Brigida Jeanne T.
1299. TALUCAD, Tatiana Dolores F.
1300. TAMALA, Kenneth O.
1301. TAMAYO, Catherine E.
1302. TAMAYO, Ma. Yvette M.
1303. TAMONDONG, Juan Carlos S.
1304. TAN, Annie U.
1305. TAN, Art Lynson A.
1306. TAN, Eric David C.
1307. TAN, Joyce Melcar T.
1308. TAN, Maria Cristina A.
1309. TAN, Mhedora B.
1310. TAN, Stephanie Michelle C.
1311. TAN, JR., David P.
1312. TANKIANG, III, Eduardo Martin A.
1313. TANQUIENG, Paula Mae B.
1314. TAPALES, Patrick Joseph S.
1315. TAPIC, Charlene Mae C.
1316. TAPIRE, Helen Paulette D.
1317. TAQUED, Gamaliel S.
1318. TAVANLAR, Tomi L.
1319. TAÑGAN, Margret Faye G.
1320. TAÑOLA, Mc Ferlin P.
1321. TE, Meiji Hanna Z.
1322. TEH, Roselle P.
1323. TEMPLORA, Imerson L.
1324. TENAJA, Darwin A.
1325. TENTATIVA, June G.
1326. TERRADO, Marlon C.
1327. TIBAYAN, Irish Kirbee V.
1328. TIOJANCO, Bryan Dennis G.
1329. TIU, Jiecel S.
1330. TO, Joan Mae S.
1331. TOBES, Giselle Jill D.
1332. TOLEDO, Maria Joy O.
1333. TOLENTINO, Lovely V.
1334. TOLOSA, Gretchel L.
1335. TOMAS, Rudolfh M.
1336. TOMBO, Peter Paul M.
1337. TONGCUA, Paulette V.
1338. TORIO, John Ryan P.
1339. TORMON, Alvin A.
1340. TORREMOCHA, Edric P.
1341. TORRES, Ivy Grace O.
1342. TORRES, Maria Melissa G.
1343. TORREVILLAS, Juan Alfonso P.
1344. TRABAJO, III, Aureliano Marcus C.
1345. TRINIDAD, Carlos Vincent C.
1346. TRINIDAD, Chloe Hope B.
1347. TRIVIÑO, Diana Cecilia E.
1348. TRUMPO, Magno T.
1349. TUADLES, Leticia R.
1350. TUAZON, Cecilia M.
1351. TUBILLEJA, Liza T.
1352. TUGADO, Judie Rose P.
1353. TUMALIUAN, Gliricidia C.
1354. TURANO, Earlene Lirio R.
1355. TURANO II, Earl Ligorio R.
1356. TURINGAN, Norman Paul A.
1357. UEDA, Eric O.
1358. UMALI, Ma. Flerida Ruth B.
1359. UNCIANO, Rodel C.
1360. UNTALAN, Maria Rhodora P.
1361. UNTAYAO, Dictador V.
1362. URBANO, Mary Grace M.
1363. URBIZTONDO, Maria Cassandra M.
1364. USON, Anthony B.
1365. UY, Diana Grace L.
1366. UY, Karl Jordan D.
1367. UY, Kenneth T.
1368. UY, Lancaster L.
1369. UY, Michael Dionisio
1370. UY, Rachelle E.
1371. UY, Vismarck S.
1372. VALDEAVILLA, Maria Ermina V.
1373. VALDEZ, Joey N.
1374. VALDEZ, V, Francesco Manuel P.
1375. VALENCIA, Daisy Jane H.
1376. VALENZUELA, Ida Kristina Z.
1377. VALERA, Karla Regina D.
1378. VALERIO, Cristiellane T.
1379. VALEZA, Carlo T.
1380. VALLEJO, Maria Johanna N.
1381. VALMORES, Christopher Rey P.
1382. VARGAS, Michael George Andrew R.
1383. VASQUEZ, Ian Albert M.
1384. VECINA, Leilani P.
1385. VELASCO, Adrian Jay-R A.
1386. VELASCO, Diana A.
1387. VELASCO, Resurrection Florimae C.
1388. VELASCO-LAO, Francesca Marie R.
1389. VELMONTE, Rovelson R.
1390. VELUZ, Trixie Hazel C.
1391. VEN, Arlene A.
1392. VENTURA, Charleen L.
1393. VENTURA, III, Manuel Angelo B.
1394. VERALLO, Ivan B.
1395. VERANO, Toni Joy C.
1396. VERDIDA, Pete Uliver O.
1397. VERGA, Ma. Venarisse V.
1398. VERGARA, Doris R.
1399. VICTORIANO, Joni-Ross
1400. VILLACASTIN, Dandel Rose P.
1401. VILLAHERMOSA, Michelle Ann T.
1402. VILLALON, Rivah J.
1403. VILLANUEVA, Arjay Karlo F.
1404. VILLANUEVA, Elvin B.
1405. VILLANUEVA, James E.
1406. VILLANUEVA, Marc A.
1407. VILLANUEVA, Rafael Archie E.
1408. VILLANUEVA, Tessa Marie S.
1409. VILLAPANDO, Dorothy Grace R.
1410. VILLAR, Wilhenry M.
1411. VILLARAMA, Carlo D.
1412. VILLARIAS, Carlyn L.
1413. VILLAROMAN-FIEL, Madel P.
1414. VILLAROYA, Errol L.
1415. VILLARTA, III, Romeo P.
1416. VILLARUEL, Ma. Carmela S.
1417. VILLASENDA, Emee M.
1418. VILLASTER, Michael Hanz D.
1419. VISTA, Maria Viola B.
1420. VITERBO, Llonil R.
1421. VIVAS, Darlene R.
1422. WAHAB, Johaira C.
1423. WAKAN, Edd Mark O.
1424. WARREN, Luis Anthony K.
1425. WEE, Sonia Bea L.
1426. WONG, Jerlyn M.
1427. YAMBAO, Reslyn M.
1428. YAN, Benjamin C.
1429. YANEZA, Yvette T.
1430. YANTO, Sofia C.
1431. YAP, Anna Marie D.
1432. YAP, Francis Sol S.
1433. YAP, German Lyndon O.
1434. YAP, Yellen B.
1435. YBAÑEZ, Serena Mae S.
1436. YEBRA, Reinier Paul R.
1437. YEUNG, Kurt Glen T.
1438. YLAGAN, Immaculada Concepcion C.
1439. YU, Ma. Karina P.
1440. YU, Margarita F.
1441. YU, JR., Cesar B.
1442. YULDE, Princessita M.
1443. YUMANG, Jose Edmar J.
1444. ZABALA, Reuben U.
1445. ZAFRANCO, Fernan Reagan P.
1446. ZAMBRANO, Jude Francis V.
1447. ZAMORA, Bettina N.
1448. ZANTUA, Maria Felicia T.
1449. ZARAGOZA, Ma. Edelyn A.
1450. ZERRUDO, John Paul C.
1451. ZULUETA, Amber June M.

From SC website.

Elections: Pre-Proclamation Controversy

2010-03-24T07:32:00.001+08:00

Sec. 241, B.P. 881: A pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233 (delayed lost or destroyed), 234 (material defects), 235 (tampering or falsification) and 236 (discrepancies in election returns) in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns.

Q: When is a pre-proclamation case allowed?
A: It is allowed in cases involving elective provincial, city or municipal officers. Pre-proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice-, Senator, Congressman and Party-List are not allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or certificates of canvass. But the canvassing board may correct manifest errors in the Certificates of Canvass or Election Returns, motu propio or upon verified petition of an interested person. (sec. 15, R.A. 7166)

WHO CAN FILE: candidate, registered political party or coalition

WHERE FILED: Board of Canvassers or COMELEC in division

Is the COMELEC in a pre-proclamation case allowed to go beyond the face of the election returns?

Belac v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 145802, April 4, 2001
The Supreme Court held that Diasen’s petition pertains to a pre-proclamation controversy. Specifically, it alleges that the votes for petitioner Belac were all padded through “Operation Dagdag”; the election returns for him (Diasen) was tampered, falsified and manufactured; and that the election returns were already prepared even before the counting of votes. But Diasen did not say that the alleged irregularities appear on the face of the election returns. Obviously, they came from external sources and, therefore, not manifest on the election returns.

In a pre-proclamation controversy, the COMELEC, as a rule, is restricted to an examination of the election returns and is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind them and investigate election irregularities. The prevailing doctrine is that as long as the returns appear to be authentic and duly accomplished on their face, the Board of Canvassers cannot look beyond or behind them to verify allegations of irregularities in the casting or the counting of the votes. The reason is that determination of the result of the election must be arrived at as quickly as possible on the basis of the canvass.

A party seeking to raise issues resolution of which would compel or necessitate COMELEC to pierce the veil of election returns, which appear prima facie regular on their face, has his proper remedy in a regular election protest. By their very nature, and given the obvious public interest in the speedy determination of the results of elections, pre-proclamation controversies are to be resolved in summary proceedings without the need to present evidence aliunde and certainly without having to go through voluminous documents and subjecting them to meticulous technical examinations which take up considerable time.

Issues That May Be Raised

Sec. 243, B.P. 881: The following shall be proper issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy:

Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers:
When majority or all members of the canvassing Board do not hold legal appointments or are in fact usurpers
When the canvassing has been a mere ceremony that was pre-determined and manipulated to result in nothing but a sham canvassing as were: (1) there was convergence of circumstances of precipitate canvassing; (2) there was terrorism; (3) there was lack of sufficient notice to the members of the canvassing Board; (4) disregard of manifest irregularities on the face of the questioned returns/certificates in appropriate cases
The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235, and 236 of this Code
The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic
When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates.

Q: May there be other issues which may be properly subjects of a pre-proclamation controversy?
A: No, because the enumeration under sec. 243 is restrictive and exclusive. NEVERTHELESS, the Commission has authority to correct manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of the results during the canvassing and such errors could not have been discovered during the canvassing despite the exercise of due diligence and proclamation of the winning candidate had already been made (filed directly with the COMELEC en banc not later than 5 days from date of proclamation, impleading all candidates who may be adversely affected). HOWEVER if the manifest error was discovered before proclamation during canvassing, then its correction may be filed with the canvassing Board.

Q: What issues must be raised with the Board at the first instance and not directly with the COMELEC?
A: Matters raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the elections returns.

WHEN PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSIES FILED DIRECTLY WITH COMELEC

Canvassing Board begins to act as such
At the time of the appointment of the member whose capacity to sit as such is objected to if it comes after the canvassing of the board
Immediately at the point where the proceedings are or begin to be illegal. In which case, the canvassing board shall not commence, proceed or resume the canvass unless otherwise ordered by the COMELEC

WHEN TO FILE WITH THE BOARD

Canvassing board begins to act as such
Immediately at the point where the proceedings are or begin to be illegal

NOTA BENE: If an appeal from the ruling of the Board is taken to the COMELEC, the canvass shall be immediately suspended during pendency of appeal until the COMELEC orders continuation or resumption.

PROCEDURE BEFORE CANVASSING BOARD ON GROUND OF ILLEGAL COMPOSITION/PROCEEDING:

Make a ruling, with notice to the petitioner, within 24 hours from the filing of the petition
Appeal to the COMELEC within 3 days after the ruling with proper notice to the canvassing Board
Hearing by COMELEC en banc with due notice to the parties
Decide the case within 5 days from filing thereof

Defects in form not a ground for pre-proclamation controversy

Bandala vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 159369, March 7, 2000
The absence of inner paper seals, although illegal, the paper seals being required in the conduct of proper canvassing of election returns, is not a proper subject of pre-proclamation controversies because such absence does not affect the authenticity or genuineness of the subject election returns. They are merely defects in form which do not warrant the exclusion of the questioned returns.

Excluded Issues

No exclusion if returns are regular on its face

Ocampo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 136282, Feb. 15, 2000
“To check and double check” if it were true that the contested election returns were tampered with, altered or falsified, the COMELEC en banc examined two separate copies of the election returns: (1) the copy for the Municipal Board of Canvassers and (2) the COMELEC copy, and found that the defects alleged are merely formal defects. Specifically, the findings are as follows:
no number of registered voters in the precinct, actual number of votes cast and number of valid votes cast: formal defect is not a ground for exclusion
no thumb mark of the chairman on page 4 and of members of the board of election inspectors on page 3 of the election returns: a mere oversight that did not vitiate the validity of the votes nor destroy the integrity of the election return
one “missing” vote with 153 voters who actually voted and one candidate receiving 152 votes but zero for the other candidate: this does not necessarily mean that 1 vote is missing because it could also mean that one voter desisted from casting his vote or may have voted but his vote was not credited because it was stray or just illegible; not a ground for exclusion

That the election returns were obviously manufactured must be evident from the face of said documents. In the absence of strong evidence establishing spuriousness of the returns, the basic rule that the election returns shall be accorded prima facie status as bona fide reports of the results of the count of the votes for canvassing and proclamation purposes must perforce prevail.

The bare fact that candidates for public office had received zero votes is not enough to make the returns statistically improbable.

For as long as the election returns which on their face appear regular and wanting of any physical signs of tampering, alteration or other similar vice, such election returns cannot just be unjustifiably excluded. To look beyond or behind these returns is not a proper issue in a pre-proclamation controversy as in the case at bar.

Comelec may rule on “manner of preparation” of the returns, but no exclusion, just recounting if integrity of ballots was violated

Dagloc vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154442-47, Dec. 10, 2003
Dagloc is questioning the ruling of the COMELEC en banc to exclude certain election returns for being spurious due in part to the alleged disqualification of some members of the board of election inspectors (BEI) and that the BEI committed illegal acts, such that the votes reported in the subject returns do not reflect the true will of the electorate. However, in arriving at the resolution, the COMELEC en banc also gave great weight to the affidavit of the BEI members which were supposed to prove the regularity of the BEI’s assigned task. The COMELEC en banc found that these affidavits lacked signatures of the BEI members.

The Supreme Court held that pre-proclamation controversies are limited to: (1) challenges directed against the composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers (not the BEI), or (2) challenges related to election returns to which a party must have made specific objections. This case falls under the second category (2) and that the COMELEC en banc’s findings on the nine election returns are anchored on “the manner of their preparation,” which it found to be a sham. This ground is a pre-proclamation issue under sec. 241 and 243 in relation to sec. 235.

Furthermore, the doctrine that “as long as the returns appear to be authentic, and duly accomplished on their face, the Board of Canvassers cannot look beyond or behind them to verify allegations of irregularities in the casting and counting of the votes,” is not applicable in this case due to the following reasons: (1) the COMELEC has authority to review the rulings of the Board of Canvassers in a pre-proclamation controversy; (2) the COMELEC en banc found that the nine election returns are fraudulent in the manner of their preparation; and (3) the allegations of irregularity is not in the casting and counting of votes but in the preparation of the election returns (tampered, falsified and were prepared under duress, threats, coercion and intimidation).

Given this factual finding, doubt is cast on the authentic appearance of said returns. Hence, the subject election returns cannot be accorded prima facie status as genuine reports of the results of the counts of votes.

However, the proper remedy in case of spurious election returns is not outright exclusion on the ground that they were fraudulently prepared by some members or non-members of the BEI. Doing so would disenfranchise the voters. What the COMELEC should have done is to ascertain whether the integrity of the ballots was violated. If it was not, then a recounting of ballots is in order and Board will use new returns. If it was violated, then the COMELEC need not recount but should seal the ballot box and order its safekeeping.

COMELEC has no jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies in presidential, vice-presidential, senatorial and congressional elections; Correction of Manifest Error in the Statement of Votes may be filed directly with COMELEC en banc

Sandoval vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133842, Jan. 26, 2000
The case involves the elective office of congressman of one legislative district, which is contested on the ground of manifest error arising from the non-inclusion of 19 election returns in the canvass, thus making the same incomplete.

While the COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies, the exception to the general rule can be found under sec. 15 of RA 7166 which prohibits candidates in the presidential, vice-presidential, senatorial and congressional elections from filing pre-proclamation cases.

The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the winner in the election, which delay might result in a vacuum in these sensitive posts. The law, nonetheless, provides an exception to the exception. The second sentence of Sec. 15 allows the filing of petitions for correction of manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns even in elections for president, vice-president and members of the House for the simple reason that the correction of manifest error will not prolong the process of canvassing nor delay the proclamation of the winner in the election.

Correction of a manifest error in the Statement of Votes may be filed directly with the COMELEC en banc (rule 27, sec. 5, 1993 Rules of the COMELEC). This is another exception to the rule that pre-proclamation controversies must first be heard and decided by a division of the Commission.

In determination of the case, the COMELEC must observe due process of law since this involves the exercise of its quasi-judicial power.

GROUNDS FOR CORRECTION OF MANIFEST ERRORS IN THE TABULATION/TALLYING OF RESULTS DURING CANVASSING:

Where a copy of the election returns or certificate of canvass was tabulated more than once
Where two or more copies of the election returns of one precinct were tabulated separately
Where there was a mistake in the copying of the figures from the election returns to the statement of votes by precinct or from the municipal/city Certificate of Canvass to the Statement of Votes by municipality; or from the Provincial/City Certificate of Canvass to the Statement of Votes by province/city
Where there was a mistake in the addition of the votes of any candidate

PROCEDURE BEFORE THE CANVASSING BOARD:

Correct the manifest errors motu propio or upon verified petition by any candidate, political party, organization, coalition, after due notice and hearing
Order of promulgation which must be in writing
Appeal to the COMELEC within 24 hours from the promulgation
No proclamation of winning candidate during pendency of appeal, UNLESS the votes are not affected by the appeal
Appeal must implead as respondents the canvassing Board and all parties who may be adversely affected
Clerk of Court of COMELEC issues summons, with copy of the appeal to the respondents
Clerk sets appeal for hearing
COMELEC decides en banc

Distinguished from Other Remedies

Pre-proclamation controversy vs. Failure of Election

Ampatuan vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 149803, Jan. 31, 2002
This case involves the election of provincial officials which are claimed to be “completely sham and farcical.” The ballots were filled up en masse by a few persons the night before election day, and in some precincts, the ballot boxes, official ballots and other election paraphernalia were not delivered at all. There was also an allegation of massive fraud and terrorism. Consequently, a petition with the COMELEC for the annulment of election results and/or declaration of failure of elections was filed. The question is whether or not declaration of failure of elections is the proper remedy.

The Supreme Court ruled that a pre-proclamation controversy is not the same as an action for annulment of election results or failure of elections. While, however, the COMELEC is restricted, in pre-proclamation cases, to an examination of the election returns on their face and is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind them and investigate election irregularities, the COMELEC is duty bound to investigate allegations of fraud, terrorism, violence, and other analogous causes in actions for annulment of election results or for declaration of failure of elections. Thus, the COMELEC, in the case of actions for annulment of election returns or declaration of failure of elections, may conduct technical examination of election documents and compare and analyze voters’ signature and thumbprints in order to determine whether or not the elections had indeed been free, honest and clean.

In this case, the proper remedy was annulment of election results and/or declaration of failure of elections which is cognizable under the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC.

Pre-proclamation Controversy vs. Election Contest

Sarangani vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 155560-62, Nov. 11, 2003
This case involves two rulings of the Provincial Board of Canvassers, signed by only two of its members. The rulings excluded Certificates of Canvass from the municipalities of Wao and Bubong on the ground that they were manufactured and falsified. Consequently, the COMELEC directed an investigation to be conducted on the two members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers for any culpable violation of the election laws which they might have committed by the following acts: (1) their failure to appear on the scheduled hearings/meetings in the instant cases after the suspension of the canvass despite their assurances and legal duty to do so; (2) their having issued the alleged written rulings excluding the COCs from Wao and Bubong without giving the Vice-Chairman the opportunity to participate and take part in the deliberations; and (3) their unprecedented act of deliberating and/or issuing the written rulings by themselves and of clandestinely submitting or turning over the said rulings to the Office of the COMELEC Secretary for promulgation without setting any hearing or giving notice to the Vice-Chairman and/or to the herein parties.

The Supreme Court upheld the findings of the COMELEC during its investigation that the alleged tampering and falsification in the Certificates of Canvass were duly accounted for and did not affect the integrity of the ballot.

In a pre-proclamation controversy, the board of canvassers and the COMELEC are not required to look beyond or behind the election returns which are on their face regular and authentic. Where a party seeks to raise issues the resolution on which would necessitate the COMELEC to pierce the veil of election returns which are prima facie regular, the proper remedy would be a regular election protest and not a pre-proclamation controversy.

Pre-proclamation Controversy is summary in nature

Lucman vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 166229, June 29, 1995
In this case, the objections initially raised before the Municipal Board of Canvassers were proper in a pre-proclamation controversy, i.e. the election returns are obviously manufactured and/or falsified, it is not authentic, it contains alterations. However, in the appeal to the COMELEC, it was further alleged that the elections held in the precincts were tainted with massive election irregularities, such as “massive substitution of voters, snatching of ballots from the voters and filling them (ballots) up against the will of the voters by force or coercion, threats, intimidation, casting of votes by double registrants in the same precincts and flying voters.”

These allegations pertain not only to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns, but to the conduct of the elections as well.

Pre-proclamation controversies are limited to challenges directed against the Board of Canvassers and proceedings before said Board relating to particular election returns to which private respondent should have made specific verbal objections subsequently reduced to writing. A pre-proclamation controversy is limited to an examination of the election returns on their face. It is beyond the COMELEC’s jurisdiction to go beyond the face of the returns or investigate election irregularities.

The proceedings in a pre-proclamation controversy are summary in nature. Reception of evidence aliunde is proscribed. Issues such as fraud or terrorism attendant to the election process, the resolution of which would compel or necessitate the COMELEC to pierce the veil of election returns which appear to be prima facie regular, on their face, are anathema to a pre-proclamation controversy. Such issues should be posed and resolved in a regular election protest, which is within the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In a regular election protest, the parties may litigate all the legal and factual issues raised by them inasmuch detail as they may deem necessary or appropriate.

Procedure for Raising Objections

Sec. 20, RA 7166: Procedure in Disposition of Contested Election Returns. -

(a) Any candidate, political party or coalition of political parties contesting the inclusion or exclusion in the canvass of any election returns on any of the grounds authorized under Article XX or Sections 234, 235 and 236 of Article XIX of the Omnibus Election Code shall submit their oral objection to the chairman of the board of canvassers at the time the questioned return is presented for inclusion in the canvass. Such objection shall be recorded in the minutes of the canvass.

(b) Upon receipts of any such objection, the board of canvassers shall automatically defer the canvass of the contested returns (also indicate the date and time of receipt) and shall proceed to canvass the returns which are not contested by any party (i.e. the votes for President, Vice-, Senators, Congressmen and party-list).

(c) Simultaneous with the oral objection, the objecting party shall also enter his objection in the form for written objections to be prescribed by the Commission. Within twenty-four (24) hours from and after the presentation of such an objection, the objecting party shall submit the evidence in support of the objection, which shall be attached to the form for written objections. Within the same period of twenty-four (24) hours after presentation of the objection, any party may file a written and verified opposition to the objection in the form also to be prescribed by the Commission, attaching thereto supporting evidence, if any. The board shall not entertain any objection or opposition unless reduced to writing in the prescribed forms.

The evidence attached to the objection or opposition, submitted by the parties, shall be immediately and formally admitted into the records of the board by the chairman affixing his signature at the back of each and every page thereof.

(d) Upon receipt of the evidence, the board shall keep up the contested returns, consider the written objections thereto and opposition, if any, and summarily and immediately rules thereon. The board shall enter its ruling on the prescribed form and authenticate the same by the signatures of its members.

(e) Any part adversely affected by the ruling of the board shall immediately inform the board if he intends to appeal said ruling. The board shall enter said information in the minutes of the canvass, set aside the returns and proceed to consider the other returns.

(f) After all the uncontested returns have been canvassed and the contested return ruled upon by it, the board shall suspend the canvass. Within forty-eight (48) hours, therefrom, any party adversely affected by the ruling may file with the board a written and verified notice of appeal; and within an unextendible period of five (5) days thereafter an appeal may be taken to the Commission.

(g) Immediately upon receipt of the notice of appeal, the board shall make an appropriate report to the Commission, elevating therewith the complete records and evidence submitted in the canvass, and furnishing the parties with copies of the report.

(h) On the basis of the record and evidence elevate to it by the board, the Commission shall decide summarily the appeal within seven (7) days from receipt of said record and evidence. Any appeal brought before the Commission on the ruling of the board, without the accomplished forms and the evidence appended thereto, shall be summarily dismissed.

The decision of the Commission shall be executory after the lapse of seven (7) days from receipts thereof by the losing party.

(i) The board of canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized by the Commission after the latter has ruled on the object brought to it on appeal by the losing party. Any proclamation made in violation hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns will not adversely affect the results of the election.

Q: What remedy does one have if a proclamation is made pending pre-proclamation petition/appeal?
A: A petition to annul proclamation filed with the COMELEC.

Q: What is the remedy if the pre-proclamation petition/appeal is finally dismissed by the COMELEC and the opposing candidate is proclaimed?
A: Election protest filed within 10 days from the date of proclamation.

Elections: Certificates of Candidacy and Campaign Period

2010-03-23T06:59:00.002+08:00

Certificates of Candidacy

WHO MAY FILE:

citizen
registered voter
read/write Filipino
1-yr. residence

WHEN TO FILE: not later than the day before the date legally fixed for the beginning of the campaign period (90-45-15)

WHERE FILED: Comelec (5 legible copies)

HOW FILED: personally filed or by duly authorized representative

EFFECT OF FILING (Comelec Resolution No. 6520, Jan. 6, 2004; RA 9006)

Prior to Reso. 6520, any elective official running for public office other than the one he is currently holding in permanent capacity is considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. However, after the COMELEC Resolution was passed, elective officials are now no longer deemed resigned should they run for office
RA 9006 repealed Sec. 67 but maintained Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code so that now, only appointive officials running for elective office are deemed resigned upon filing of certificate of candidacy

Waiver of permanent resident status in a foreign country

Gayo vs. Verceles, G.R. No. 150477, Feb. 28, 2005
Verceles is running for mayor and was subsequently proclaimed as the winner in that election. Her proclamation was however questioned for the reason that she is a greencard holder and has not complied with the residence requirement.

Supreme Court held that when Verceles abandoned her “greencard holder” status when she surrendered her alien registration receipt card before the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the American Embassy in Manila prior to her filing for certificate of candidacy. Thus, when Verceles filed her certificate of candidacy, she was no longer disqualified to run as an elective official because of such waiver of permanent resident status in a foreign country.

Residence - imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention

ELEMENTS OF ACQUISITION OF NEW DOMICILE:

residence or bodily presence in the new locality
intention to remain there
intention to abandon the old domicile - animus manendi + animus non revertendi

NOTA BENE: The purpose to remain at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinitive period of time; change of residence must be voluntary; and residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

En Masse Filipinization under the Philippine Bill 1902

Tecson vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004
This is a petition to deny due course or to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Fernando Poe Jr. (Ronald Allan Kelley Poe) on ground that he is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines because his parents were foreigners: Bessie Kelley Poe (American) and Allan Poe (Spanish national, son of Lorenzo Pou who was a Spanish subject). It is their contention that FPJ, being an illegitimate child, follows the citizenship of his mother, who was an American.

The Supreme Court held that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902; that such citizenship, if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe. FPJ, having been born during the effectivity of 1953 Constitution, follows the citizenship of his father who is a Filipino citizen, the law not having made any distinction as to legitimacy of the child.

A beach house is not a place of residence

Tess Dumpit-Michelena vs. Boado, G.R. No. 163619-20, Nov. 17, 2005
Dumpit-Michelena is running for mayor in the municipality of Agoo, La Union. Her disqualification was sought on the claim that she is a resident and was a registered voter of Naguilian and not Agoo, La Union. Dumpit-Michelena countered that she already acquired a new domicile in Agoo when she purchased a residential lot there, designating a caretaker of her house. Supreme Court held that Dumpit-Michelena failed to comply with the 1-yr. residency requirement in the place where she intends to be elected.

REQUIREMENTS FOR A CHANGE OF DOMICILE:
(1) an actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
(2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one
(3) acts which correspond with the purpose

Dumpit-Michelena failed to establish that she has abandoned her former domicile. Evidence shows that her house in Agoo is beach house and a beach house is at most a place of temporary relaxation. It can hardly be considered a place of residence. Moreover, her designation of a caretaker only shows that she does not regularly reside in the place.

DISQUALIFICATIONS (Sec. 68, BP 881)

given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy
spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by law
solicited, received, or made any prohibited contributions
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country, UNLESS he waives such status

Effect of disqualification: no proclamation of the second placer

Trinidad vs. COMELEC, 315 SCRA 175, G.R. No. 135716
Sunga and Trinidad are both running for mayor in Iguig, Cagayan. Trinidad won so Sunga filed a letter-complaint for disqualification against Trinidad, accusing him of using 3 local government vehicles in his campaign and committing acts of terrorism, threats, intimidation, and other forms of coercion. Sunga also moved that, on account of Trinidad’s disqualification, he be declared as Mayor. While case is pending final resolution, Trinidad’s mayoralty term has expired.

Supreme Court held that the issue has been rendered moot and academic by the expiration of petitioner’s challenged term of office. Also, Sunga cannot claim any right to the office even if Trinidad was disqualified for the reason that “to simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. xxx To allow the private respondent, a defeated and repudiated candidate, to take over the mayoralty despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the importance and meaning of democracy and the people’s right to elect officials of their choice.”

Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy (Sec. 78, BP 881; Sec. 5 & 7, RA 6646)

WHO CAN FILE: any party

HOW: petition to deny due course or cancel certificate of candidacy under oath

WHEN: any time not later than 25 days from filing of certificate of candidacy

WHERE: COMELEC must decide the case not later than 15 days before election (period is not mandatory however)

EXCLUSIVE GROUND: material misrepresentation

What constitutes material misrepresentation

Salcedo II vs. COMELEC, 312 SCRA 447
Neptali Salcedo married Agnes Celiz. Without dissolving his first marriage, he married Ermelita Cacao. In the May 11, 1998 elections. Ermelita and Salcedo II both ran for mayor of Sara, Iloilo. Salcedo II filed a petition for cancellation of Cacao’s certificate of candidacy on ground of false representation because Ermelita, not being legally married to Neptali, still used the surname “Salcedo.”

The Supreme Court held that the material misrepresentation contemplated by sec. 78 refers to qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, legal age, residence. The misrepresentation must be so grave that it would prevent the candidate from running, or if elected, from serving, or enough to prosecute him for violation of election laws.

False Representation - deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible to run for elective office; intention to deceive the electorate

ELEMENTS FALSE REPRESENTATION:

Materiality
Intention to mislead

REMEDIES AGAINST DISQUALIFIED CANDIDATES

Before Election (sec. 78) - petition to deny due course or cancel certificate of candidacy
After Election (sec. 253) - petition for quo warranto on ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Philippine Republic

Q: What is the effect if the petition to deny due course has been granted?
A: If it has already attained final judgment, the election of that candidate is suspended and the votes cast in his favor are not counted. However, if after the election is finished pending resolution of the case, the votes cast in his favor are counted but the COMELEC may suspend the proclamation.

Nuisance Candidate

- a candidate whose filing of the certificate of candidacy has been shown to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrated the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate (Sec. 69, BP 881)

WHO MAY FILE DISQUALIFICATION CASE AGAINST NUISANCE CANDIDATE:

Motu propio by the Comelec
Verified petition by any registered candidate

PROCEDURE (sec. 5, RA 6646)

file verified petition within 5 days from last day of filing of certificate of candidacy
upon receipt, within 3 days, COMELEC issues summons
verified answer within 3 days from receipt of summons
hearing (summary in character) - by COMELEC official who is a lawyer; RECOMMENDATION: within 5 days from submission of evidence; DECISION: within 5 days from receipt of recommendation
Final and executory after 5 days from receipt by parties of the decision, UNLESS stayed by Supreme Court
DISSEMINATION: within 24 hours through the fastest available means

Equal access to opportunity for public service is a privilege subject to limitations

Pamatong vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong ran for president. COMELEC denied due course on ground that he is a nuisance candidate: he cannot wage a nationwide campaign and/or not nominated by a political party or not supported by a registered by a political party with a national constituency. Pamatong contended that his right to equal access to opportunity for public service was violated.

Supreme Court held that “equal access to opportunity for public service” is not a constitutional right but a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Sec. 26, Art. II neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to an enforceable right. The aforesaid provision forms part of the “Declaration of Principles of State Policies,” which is generally considered non- self-executing and are merely guidelines for legislative or executive action, and not operative because in the absence of legislation, it lacks proper definition of its effective means and reach. As long as limitations are applied equally without discrimination, the equal access clause is not violated.

“The rationale is that the State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective and orderly. The poll would be bogged by irrelevant minutae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. Owing to the superior interest in ensuring a credible and orderly election, the State could exclude nuisance candidates and need not indulge in ‘their trips to the moon on gossamer wings.’”

Substitution

Sec. 77, BP 881: Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another – If after the last day for the filing of certificate of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. xxxx”

Q: Can independent candidates be substituted in any of the instances mentioned above?
A: While the law specifically mentions that candidates who are party members may be substituted, the law nevertheless does not expressly prohibit the substitution of independent candidates. The law being silent on the matter, this cannot be perceived as a prohibition.

Substitution is allowed in barangay elections

Rulloda vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154198, Jan. 20, 2003
Romeo Rolluda and Remegio Placido are contending candidates for barangay chairman. Romeo died and his wife (Betty) makes a letter-request to substitute her husband. Betty won but Remegio was declared the barangay captain because Betty’s votes were not counted on the ground that her substitution was invalid.

The Supreme Court held it is non sequitor to say that sec. 77 allows only substitution in partisan elections. It is Rolluda’s contention that barangay elections being non-partisan, substitution does not apply. But the Supreme Court said that this would be tantamount to ignoring the purpose of election laws which is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters. In case of doubt, political laws must be so construed as to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. The absence of provision governing substitution of candidates in barangay elections can’t be inferred as a prohibition.

Substitution not allowed when certificate was denied due course

Ong vs. Alegre, G.R. No. 163295, Jan. 23, 2006
Ong (incumbent) and Alegre are both running for mayor. Ong’s certificate of candidacy was denied due course on ground of violation of three-term rule. Thus, he was substituted by Romeo Ong. Was the substitution valid?

The Supreme Court held that “while there is no dispute as to whether or not a nominee of a registered or accredited political party may substitute for a candidate of the same party who had been disqualified for any cause, this does not include those cases where the certificate of candidacy of the person to be substituted had been denied due course and cancelled under sec. 78 of the Code.

Expression unius est exclusio alterius. While the law enumerated the occasions where a candidate may be validly substituted, there is no mention of the case where a candidate is excluded not only by disqualification but also by denial and cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. Under the foregoing rule, there can be no valid substitution for the latter case, much in the same way that a nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy is denied due course and/or cancelled may not be substituted. If the intent of the lawmakers were otherwise, they could have so easily and conveniently included those persons whose certificates of candidacy have been denied due course and/or cancelled under the provisions of sec. 78 of the Code.”

NOTA BENE: A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered as a candidate, much the same as one who has no certificate of candidacy. And because Ong is not a candidate, then he cannot be substituted because substitution presupposes that the person to be substituted is a candidate.

Campaign and Election Propaganda

Q: What is the campaign period?
A: For President, Vice-President and Senators, the period begins 90 days before the day of election. For Congress and other elective officials, it begins 45 days before the day of election. Violation of the period constitutes an election offense.

NOTA BENE:

This presupposes that the person is already a candidate – i.e. he has filed his certificate of candidacy. But if the person has not yet filed his certificate of candidacy and has started campaigning for votes even though the campaign period has yet to start, this cannot be considered an election offense.
Automated Election Law, or Republic Act 8436, provides that a person who has filed a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the campaign period starts.
Penera vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 181613, November 25, 2009: What the law (RA 8436) says is “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period.” The plain meaning of this provision is that the effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.

Q: What is the importance of having a campaign period?
A: To provide the candidates with a chance to prepare for the election through partisan political activities that promote the election or defeat of a candidate.

Q: What are the limitations as to the manner or conduct of an election campaign?
A: Authorized expenses, observance of truth in advertising, and prohibited forms under Sec. 85, BP 881.

Q: Do these limitations run counter to freedom of expression?
A: Distinguish between the two kinds of limitation of freedom of expression. If the restriction is content-neutral, then the measure of the restriction is some government interest. If the restriction is content-based, then the measure of the restriction is the clear-and-present-danger rule.

Q: What are the limitations as to extent?
A: The amount of money you can spend for the campaign is limited. Each candidate is required to submit a sworn statement of expenses and contribution to the COMELEC within 30 days after the day of the election. If the candidate does not submit, sec. 111 of BP 881 shall stand (the candidate cannot enter into office)

Elections and the Right to Vote

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Constitutional Basis

ART. II, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution: “The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.”

Q:Why make a distinction between “democratic” and “republican?”
A: There are two kinds of democracy: direct democracy (pure) and indirect democracy (representative/republican). The Philippines follows both forms of democracy – republican because the people express their sovereignty through the ballot, voting for candidates who will represent them in government, but also democratic because of initiative and referendum, which express the direct will of the people through plebiscite.

People vs. San Juan, 22 SCRA 505
“Each time the enfranchised citizen goes to the polls to assert this sovereign will, that abiding credo of republicanism is translated into living reality. If that will must remain undefiled at the starting level of its expression and application, every assumption must be indulged in and every guarantee adopted to assure the unmolested exercise of the citizen’s free choice. For to impede, without authority valid in law, the free and orderly exercise of the right of suffrage is to inflict the ultimate indignity on the democratic process. As numerous as they are insidious are long-standing techniques of terror and intimidation that have been conceived by man – in derogation of the right of suffrage – which we have repeatedly and unqualifiedly condemned. When the legislature provided in section 133 of the Revised Election Code an explicit and unequivocal guarantee of a voter’s free access to the polling place, it could have intended no purpose other than to maintain inviolate the right to vote by safeguarding the voter against all manner of unauthorized interference and travesty that surveyors of fear can devise. Every unlawful obstacle, by whatever means or method, interposed to the free entry of a voter into the polling place to cast his vote, strikes at the very heart of the right of suffrage.”

Philosophical Bases

Puno’s Separate Opinion, Macalintal vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003
PLATO - rejected democracy as “tyranny of the majority” (numerical superiority) and supported the “philosopher-king rule”

ARISTOTLE - democracy is desirable but only under certain conditions and of the upper class; “will of the enlightened many”

INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION - “social contract theory;” the people exercise their sovereignty and creates a government to which they consent

Who May Exercise the Right to Vote

ART. V, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution: “Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.”

Qualifications

Puno’s Dissenting Opinion, Tolentino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 148334, Jan. 21, 2004
Citizenship - Suffrage is a political right appertaining to citizenship; reserved only to Filipinos whose allegiance to the country are undivided; each individual qualified to vote is a particle of popular sovereignty
Age (18 years) - Voting is an act of choice and involves prescience; familiarity and maturity
Residence - For the vote to be more meaningful, more than a passing acquaintance with the country’s problems and prospects is required

“One year residence in the Philippines” - refers to “domicile,” the place to which whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return

ELEMENTS OF DOMICILE:

Physical presence
Animus manendi (intent to return permanently)

“Six months residence in the place where one intends to vote” - refers to “temporary domicile”

PURPOSE OF 6-MONTH RESIDENCY:

Determine the place where the voter will register
Determine the place where voter will vote

CLASSES OF DOMICILE:

Domicile of Origin - place of birth
Domicile of Choice - replace the domicile of origin
Domicile by Operation of Law - applies to infants, incompetents and other persons under disabilities that prevent them from acquiring a domicile of choice

Electoral System

- free and open party system; distinguished from a multi-party system because in free and open party system, a unicameral or bicameral system is possible (ART. IX (c) (6), Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution)

OTHER MODES OF DEMOCRACY

Plebiscite - a system by which the people exercise their sovereignty by approving or rejecting any amendments or revisions of the Constitution prepared by the legislative

Initiative - power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislation through an election called for the purpose

REQUISITES FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION BY INITIATIVE:

The people must author and thus sign the entire proposal
As an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition

Referendum - power of the electorate to approve or reject legislation

Amendment - changing a few provisions of the Constitution

WHO MAY AMEND THE CONSTITUTION:

Constitutional convention
Constitutional assembly (Congress)
People on Initiative

Revision - a total overhaul of the Constitution; changing the substance

People’s initiative: the amendment must be directly proposed by the people

Lambino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, Oct. 25, 2006 (read digest)

An initiative petition is filed to change the 1987 Constitution, among such proposed changes is to shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Supreme Court denied the petition on ground of failure to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting a people’s initiative: the amendment must be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition.

“Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment should be ready and shown to the people before they sign such proposal. xxx The framers also envisioned that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.”

2 ELEMENTS:
(1) The people must author and thus sign the entire proposal.
(2) As an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

“xxx Thus, an amendment is directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.”

ELECTION PROCESS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS

Registration of Voters (System of Continuing Registration)

WHEN: daily during office hours; at the office of the Election Officer; personally file application to register as voter; no registration 120 days before regular elections and 90 days before special elections (Sec. 1, RA 8189)

WHO MAY REGISTER: (Sec. 8, RA 8189)

citizens
not otherwise disqualified by law
1-yr. Residence in the Philippines
6-mo. Residence in the place where one will vote

DISQUALIFICATIONS:

Sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment of not less than 1 yr. (Auto-reacquire right to register upon expiration of 5 yrs. after service)
Sentenced by final judgment of crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government (rebellion, sedition, violation of firearms laws, crimes against national security, etc.; auto-reacquire upon expiration of 5 yrs. after service)
Insane or incompetent person

Challenges to Right to Register (sec. 18, RA 8189)

Q: Are there limitations to a person’s right to register?
A: Yes. The right to register to vote is not an absolute right but more of a privilege with limitations imposed by law. The COMELEC may motu propio or upon application of any voter challenging the right to register deny a person’s registration application. The Court (MTC), through inclusion or exclusion proceedings, may also limit a person’s right to register.

WHO CAN CHALLENGE: any voter, candidate or representative of a registered political party

WHAT: challenge to right to register in writing, under oath, attached to the application together with proof of notice of hearing to the challenger and applicant

Exclusion and Inclusion Proceedings (Sec. 33)

WHERE: MTC (EOJ), who shall determine the right of voter to be included or excluded in the list; decide within 10 days

APPEAL: within 5 days from judgment to the RTC who shall decide the issue within 10 days

NO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (Summary)

PROCEDURE: (Sec. 32)

file during office hours
notice of place, date, time of hearing to the Board and the challenged voter
refer to one precinct and Board impleaded as respondent
no costs, EXCEPT: if it is found that the case was filed to harass the adverse party
if the ground for challenging right to register is the person is fictitious, the non-appearance of such person said to be fictitious shall be considered as prima facie evidence
decide within 10 days for both MTC and RTC upon appeal; should not be later than 15 days before the election

Nature and effect of proceedings: No Res Judicata

Domino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999
Domino is running for representative of Province of Sarangani but is disqualified for lack of compliance with the 1-yr. residence requirement. Before this, Domino was declared by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in an exclusion proceedings that he was a resident of Sarangani and not of Quezon City. Domino contends that the MTC decision is conclusive upon the COMELEC. But the Supreme Court held otherwise because any fact established in an inclusion or exclusion proceedings only applies to that election and not to elections thereafter held. The decision of the MTC does not preclude the COMELEC, in the determination of the candidate’s qualification, to pass upon the issue of compliance with the residency requirement.

The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters are summary in character. “xxx Although the court in inclusion or exclusion proceedings may pass upon any question necessary to decide the issue raised including the question of citizenship and residence of the challenged voter, the authority to order the inclusion or exclusion from the list of voters necessarily carries with it the power to inquire into and settle all matters essential to the exercise of said authority. However, except for the right to remain in the list of voters or for being excluded therefrom for the particular election in relation to which the proceedings had been held, a decision in an exclusion or inclusion proceeding, even if final and unappealable, does not acquire the nature of res judicata. In this sense, it does not operate as a bar to any further action that a party may take concerning the subject passed upon in the proceeding. Thus, a decision in an exclusion proceeding would neither be conclusive on the voter’s political status, nor bar subsequent proceedings on his right to be registered as a voter in any other election.”

Taxation: Statute of Limitations

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FOR ASSESSMENT: within 3 years after last day for filing of return or if after deadline, then from actual filing; or 10 years from date of discovery if ITR is fraudulent, false or no ITR was filed

NOTA BENE:

The fraud must be proved as a fact. When the CIR fails to impute fraud in the assessment notice or demand for payment, or for failure to allege it in his answer to the taxpayer’s petition for review, fraud is negated and precludes the application of the 10-yr period.
Mere understatement of income in itself does not constitute fraud. To justify the application of the 10-yr prescriptive period, fraud must be the product of a deliberate intent to evade taxes.
But proof of fraud may be dispensed with when the court takes judicial notice of fraud assessments which have become final and executory in collection cases

ADDENDUM: If return was substantially amended, count the period from filing of amended return.

PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF FRAUD

taxpayer substantially underdeclares his taxable sales, receipts or income -- amount that he failed to report exceeds 30%
taxpayer substantially overdeclared his deductions -- amount of deduction exceeds 30%

INFORMER'S REWARD, REQUISITES (on Fraudulent Tax Returns)

voluntarily filed confidential information under oath with the Law Division of the BIR alleging therein specific violations constituting fraud
information must not yet be in possession of BIR or refer to a case already pending or previously investigated by BIR
informer must not be a government employee or a relative of the government employee within the 6th degree of consanguinity
information must result to collection of revenues and/or fines and penalties

FOR COLLECTION: within 5 years following the assessment of the tax; or within 10 yrs if the Government’s action is on a BOND which the taxpayer executes in order to secure the payment of his tax obligation

FOR CRIMINAL ACTIONS: within 5 yrs from the day of the commission of the violation, or from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment or from time assessment became final and unappealable

NOTA BENE:

period does not run if the person is absent from the Philippines
interrupted when the proceedings are instituted, to run again once proceedings are dismissed for reasons constituting jeopardy
may be raised even on appeal

Extension of Prescriptive Periods
Government and the taxpayer may enter into mutual agreement in writing PROVIDED THAT:

the agreement must be entered into before the lapse of the 5-yr period
but if the agreement provides that the taxpayer is not merely extending the prescriptive period but renouncing his right to invoke the defense of prescription, then even if the agreement was entered into beyond the 5-yr period, it is still binding

Q: If the 5-yr period has already lapsed and the BIR official failed to collect the tax, may he set-off the tax against a claim for tax refund filed by the taxpayer?
A: Set-off is not allowed in this case. The collecting officer should not be encouraged to be negligent in collecting taxes within the prescriptive period.

Interruption of Prescriptive Period

when the CIR is prohibited from making the assessment or beginning distraint and levy or a proceeding in court and for 60d thereafter
when the taxpayer requests for the reinvestigation which is granted by the CIR
when the taxpayer cannot be located in the address given by him in his return
when the warrant of distraint and levy is duly served upon the taxpayer or his authorized representative or a member of his household with sufficient discretion and no property could be located
when the taxpayer is out of the Philippines

Tax Remedies: Remedies of the Taxpayer

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REMEDIES OF THE TAXPAYER

BEFORE PAYMENT

administrative protest
request for reconsideration
request for reinvestigation
judicial protest

AFTER PAYMENT

claim for tax refund
claim for tax credit

1. Administrative Protest (Protest against Assessment)

WHEN: within 30 days from receipt of final assessment notice (FAN)

WHERE: BIR

HOW: written protest, stating facts, applicable law, rules and regulations or jurisprudence o which his protest is based; if only portions of FAN are disputed, must pay the deficiency tax on undisputed portion

PROCEDURE:

protest against pre-assessment notice (PAN) within 15 days from receipt
protest against FAN within 30 days from receipt
submit relevant documents within 60 days from filing of protest
CIR has 180 days to decide
in case of denial or lapse of 180-day period, taxpayer has 30 days to bring his protest to the CTA en division

WHEN PAN IS NOT REQUIRED:

finding for any deficiency tax is the result of mathematical error in computation of tax as appearing on face of return
a discrepancy has been determined between the tax withheld and the amount actually remitted
taxpayer who opted to claim a refund or credit of excess creditable withholding tax for at taxable period was determined to have carried over and automatically applied the same amount claimed against the estimated tax liabilities for the taxable quarter/s for the succeeding taxable year/s
excise tax due on excisable articles have not been paid
article locally purchased or imported by an exempt person

2. Request for Reconsideration – a plea for re-evaluation of an assessment on the basis of EXISTING RECORDS without need of additional evidence (question of law or fact or both)

3. Request for Reinvestigation – a plea for reinvestigation of an assessment on the basis of NEWLY-DISCOVERED EVIDENCE that a taxpayer intends to present in the reinvestigation (question of law or fact or both)

- in either case, the request must be accompanied by a WAIVER of the statute of limitations in favor of the government

4. Judicial Protest

PROCEDURE

within 30 days from denial of protest by CIR or from lapse of 180-day period, appeal to CTA division
if CTA division denies, motion for reconsideration within 15 days from receipt
within 15 days from denial of motion, appeal to CTA en banc
appeal to SC within 15 days by petition for review (Rule 45)

5. Refund/Credit
- based on the legal principle of quasi-contract or solutio indebiti
- in the nature of an exemption, which cannot be allowed unless granted in the most explicit and categorical language
- strictly construed against the claimant (proof of claim must be established)
- partial payment of a tax cannot be the basis for a tax refund
- interest on taxes refunded may not be paid by the Government to the taxpayer, UNLESS: (a) the CIR acted with patent arbitrariness (inexcusable or obstinate disregard for legal provision); and (b) in the case of income taxes withheld on the wages of employees, which must be refunded within 3 mos from April 15

Tax Refund vs. Tax Credit

R: takes place when there is actually a reimbursement of the tax
C: the Government issues a tax certificate or tax credit memo covering the amount determined to be reimbursable, which can be applied after proper verification against any sum that may be due and collectible from the taxpayer

Requisites for Recovery

there was an actual collection and receipt by the Government of the tax sought to be recovered (factual proof)
legal basis for the granting of refund or credit, including verification of compliance with the statutory requirements relative to the filing of claims within the reglementary 2-yr period
in case of corporations, must signify whether to avail of tax refund or tax credit in the corporate income tax return

Q: Are income tax returns actionable documents which must be specifically denied by the Government, otherwise it would constitute an admission to the allegation that payment has in fact already been made and therefore the taxpayer no longer has to submit proof of claim of refund?
A: Income tax returns are not actionable documents because the action is not based on the income tax returns but on the entitlement of the taxpayer to tax refund. Therefore, his claim for refund must be supported by proof.

NOTA BENE: If proof of claim for refund is established, the BIR should refund without any unreasonable delay

Q: Is tax deficiency assessment a bar to tax refund or credit claim?
A: Yes. The deficiency assessment creates a doubt as to the truth and accuracy of the return. Said return cannot therefore be the basis of refund or credit.

Statutory Requirements for Refund/Credit Claims

written claim for refund or tax credit must be filed by the taxpayer with the CIR
the claim must be a categorical demand for reimbursement
both administrative and judicial claims for refund/credit must be filed within 2 years from date of payment regardless of any supervening cause (in case of corporations, the 2-year period is counted from the date final adjusted return was filed at end of taxable year)

Q: Suppose A filed his claim for tax refund with the BIR within the 2-yr reglementary period but it is only after two years have lapsed before BIR rendered a decision and it is one of denial. A now files an appeal of the BIR’s decision with the CTA within the 30-day period to appeal. Will A’s action prosper?
A: No, A’s action will not prosper. Although A filed his claim for refund with the BIR within the 2-yr prescriptive period, he failed to file the same within the same period with the CTA. The rule is that the taxpayer need wait for the action of CIR on his claim for refund before he can take his claim to the CTA. The 2-yr period must be complied with in both the BIR and CTA, regardless of any supervening cause.

WHEN 2-YR PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD SUSPENDED

there is a pending litigation between the two parties
the CIR in that litigated case agreed to abide by the decision of the SC

WHY WRITTEN CLAIM IS NECESSARY:

to afford CIR an opportunity to correct action of subordinates
to notify Government that taxes sought to be refunded are under question and that, therefore, such notice should be borne in mind in estimating the revenue available for expenditure

GR: Government is not liable for interest on tax refund, UNLESS:

CIR acted with patent arbitrariness
int eh case of income taxes withheld on wages of employees, which must be refunded within 3 months from April 15

PRINCIPLE OF EQUITABLE RECOUPMENT – allows a taxpayer whose claim for a refund has been barred due to prescription (lapse of more than 2yrs counted from date of payment) to recover said tax by setting off the prescribed refund against a tax that may be due and collectible from him; NOT ALLOWED in the Philippines because it puts a premium on the taxpayer’s neglect to enforce or assert his rights under the law

Tax Remedies: Remedies of the Government

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IMPORTANCE OF TAX REMEDIES

to enhance the government’s tax collection efforts
to safeguard against arbitrary action

NON-INJUNCTION OF TAX STATUTES

Sec. 218, NIRC: No court shall have the authority to grant injunction to restrain the collection of any national internal revenue tax, fee or charge imposed by this Code.

EXCEPTION: a decision of the CIR appealed to the CTA does not suspend payment, levy or distraint of taxpayer’s property; but if the CTA finds that collection may jeopardize the interest of the taxpayer or the government, then CTA may suspend or restrain the collection of tax and require the taxpayer to either deposit the amount claimed or to file a surety bond for more than double the amount with the court

Q: During pendency of the appeal in the CTA, the BIR files a civil action for collection of tax in the RTC, what is the remedy of the taxpayer?
A: The taxpayer may file a motion to dismiss in the RTC on the ground that the collection of tax has no basis where the assessment thereof is still under dispute with CTA.

REMEDIES OF THE GOVERNMENT

- these remedies may be pursued singly or simultaneously

1. Tax Lien
- from the moment the tax is due, not from the service of the warrant of distraint
- not valid against a mortgage purchaser or judgment creditor until NOTICE has been filed by CIR with the RD of the province or city where property is located (the tax lien shall be annotated on the title)

2. Compromise
- allowed when:

a reasonable doubt as to validity of the claim against the taxpayer exists
financial position of the taxpayer demonstrates a clear inability to pay the assessed tax (minimum compromise rate equivalent to 10% of the basic assessed tax and the taxpayer must waive in writing his privilege under the Banking Secrecy Law, such waiver constituting authority of the CIR to inquire into his bank deposits)

Compromise v. ABATEMENT:

As Effect – C: reduce tax liability; A: cancel the entire tax liability
As to when proper – C: when there is reasonable doubt as to validity of tax assessment or the taxpayer is financially incapacitated to pay; A: when there is unjust assessment (excessive) or when administration and collection cost do not justify the amount of tax due

GR: compromise of criminal violations is allowed, EXCEPT:

those already filed in court
those involving fraud

GR: power to compromise is a non-delegable power of CIR, EXCEPT that regional evaluation board may compromise:

basic taxes less than P500,000
minor criminal violations

NOTA BENE: A compromise penalty is in lieu of a criminal prosecution. If the taxpayer fails to abide by the compromise arrangement, the government has two options:

collect the compromised sum; or
disregard the compromise and collect the original tax due.

ADDENDUM: But if the taxpayer does not agree to the compromise, a collection action by the government for the compromise penalty does not lie. This is because, by its nature, a compromise is entered into by mutual agreement between parties and the proposed compromise penalty is neither tax nor an administrative penalty for tax delinquency.

Q: May a case still be compromised after final judgment?
A: No, because by virtue of the final judgment, the government had already acquired a vested right.

Q: Can withholding tax be compromised?
A: No. Taxpayer constituted as withholding agent who deducted and withheld at source the tax on income payment made by him holds the taxes as trust funds for the government. He is obligated to remit them to the BIR. His subsequent inability to pay or remit the tax withheld is not a ground for compromise because the withholding tax is not a tax upon the withholding agent but is only a procedure for collection of tax.

3. Distraint and Levy
- summary, extra-judicial or administrative enforcement remedies

DISTRAINT v. LEVY: distraint is to personal property while levy is to real property

KINDS OF DISTRAINT:

Actual – when delinquency of the payment sets in; there is actual seizure and distraint
Constructive – no actual delinquency ; the owner is prohibited from disposing of his property; preventive remedy to forestall a possible dissipation of the taxpayer’s assets when delinquency takes place

CONSTRUCTIVE DISTRAINT PROPER IF:

taxpayer is retiring from any business subject to tax
he intends to leave the Philippines
he removes his property therefrom
he performs any act tending to obstruct the proceedings for collecting the tax due or which may be due from him

PROCEDURE:

Actual Distraint Procedure

commencement of distraint proceedings by CIR (P1M+) or RDO (P1M or less)
service of warrant of distraint
notice of sale of distrained property to the owner or possessor not less than 20 days from date of sale, and osting in not less than 2 public places in municipality or city where distraint is made
sale of property distrained by public auction, highest bidder for cash, or with approval of CIR through duly licensed commodity or stock exchange

EQUITY OF REDEMPTION: payment of all proper charges any time prior to sale

NOTA BENE: A person in possession or having control of property under actual distraint (or levy) may be penalized if upon demand he fails or refuses to surrender the goods, EXCEPT in case of judicial attachment or execution.

Constructive Distraint Procedure

commencement of distraint proceedings
service of warrant of constructive distraint
taxpayer is required to sign a receipt covering the property distrained and obligate himself to preserve the same; if taxpayer refuses to sign the receipt, the revenue officer shall prepare a list of property distrained and in the presence of two witnesses leave a copy thereof in the premises

Procedure on Levy of Real Property

service of warrant of levy after the expiration of time required to pay the delinquent tax
duly authenticated certificate showing the name of the taxpayer and the amounts of the tax and penalty due from him (operate with the force of a legal execution)
written notice of levy to the Register of Deeds and the delinquent taxpayer, his agent or manager (if TP is absent), occupant of the property (if no agent/manager); in case government first effected distraint and it is not enough to cover the tax, then CIR shall, within 30d after execution of the distraint, proceed with levy
advertisement of the sale within 20d after levy for a period of at least 30d at the main entrance of the municipal building and other public, conspicuous places and publication once a week for 3wks in a newspaper of general circulation
public sale of the property under levy at main entrance of the municipal building or on the premises to be sold
return of sale within 5d after sale
issue certificate of sale; taxpayer is entitled to any residue
in case of no bidder, the property shall be declared forfeited to the government

EQUITY OF REDEMPTION: any time prior to sale
RIGHT OF REDEMPTION: within 1yr from date of sale or forfeiture

4. Civil Action

WHEN:

when a tax is assessed and the assessment becomes final and unappealable (because TP failed to file administrative protest with BIR within 30d from receipt of assessment)
when an administrative protest is denied or is not acted upon within 180d from submission of documents and TP fails to appeal to the CTA

WHERE: regular courts, with approval of CIR except if express delegation to Regional Director; motion to dismiss the complaint should also be filed in the regular courts

HOW: the complaint must be brought in the name of the Government and conducted by a legal officer of the BIR

5. Criminal Action

WHEN: before lapse of 5 years (prescription period)

WHERE: DOJ

HOW: complaint approved by CIR brought in the name of the Government and conducted by a legal officer of the BIR

GROUND: prima facie showing of failure to file a required tax return or a willful attempt to evade taxes; no need for assessment

6. Other Remedies Available

Forfeiture
Suspension of Business Operations
Enforcement of Administrative Sanctions

Primer on Bouncing Checks Law

2010-03-10T07:08:00.001+08:00

BP 22, April 3, 1979

I.HOW VIOLATED

A.DRAWING CHECK WITHOUT SUFFICIENT FUNDS (Sec. 1)

A person makes or draws and issues any check
The check is made or drawn and issued to apply on account or for value
The person who makes or draws and issues the check knows at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment
The check is subsequently dishonoured by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or would have been dishonoured for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment

B.FAILING TO KEEP SUFFICIENT FUNDS (Sec. 1, par. 2)

A person has sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check
He fails to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within 90 days from the date appearing
The check is dishonoured by the drawee bank

II.EVIDENCE OF KNOWLEDGE OF INSUFFICIENT FUNDS (Sec. 2)

The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit UNLESS such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee

III.DUTY OF DRAWEE (Sec. 3)

It shall be the duty of the drawee of any check, when refusing to pay the same to the holder thereof upon presentment, to cause to be thereon, or attached thereto, the written, printed, or stamped in plain languagereason for drawee's dishonor or refusal to pay the same: Provided, That where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank, such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal. In all prosecutions under this Act, the introduction in evidence of any unpaid and dishonored check, having the drawee's refusal to pay stamped or written thereon or attached thereto, with the reason therefor as aforesaid, shall be prima facie evidence of the making or issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof, and that the same was properly dishonored for the reason written, stamped or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check.

Not with standing receipt of an order to stop payment, the drawee shall state in the notice that there were no sufficient funds in or credit with such bank for the payment in full of such check, if such be the fact.

Primer on Obstruction of Justice

2010-03-09T07:05:00.001+08:00

PD 1829, Jan. 16, 1981

I.PURPOSE

To discourage public indifference or apathy towards the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders

II.ACTS PUNISHED (Sec. 1)

Any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:

preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal proceeding or from reporting the commission of any offense or the identity of any offender/s by means of bribery, misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation, force or threats;
altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or object, with intent to impair its verity, authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence in any investigation of or official proceedings in, criminal cases, or to be used in the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases;
harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest prosecution and conviction;
publicly using a fictitious name for the purpose of concealing a crime, evading prosecution or the execution of a judgment, or concealing his true name and other personal circumstances for the same purpose or purposes;
delaying the prosecution of criminal cases by obstructing the service of process or court orders or disturbing proceedings in the fiscal's offices, in Tanodbayan, or in the courts;
making, presenting or using any record, document, paper or object with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases;
soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept any benefit in consideration of abstaining from, discounting, or impeding the prosecution of a criminal offender;
threatening directly or indirectly another with the infliction of any wrong upon his person, honor or property or that of any immediate member or members of his family in order to prevent such person from appearing in the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases, or imposing a condition, whether lawful or unlawful, in order to prevent a person from appearing in the investigation of or in official proceedings in, criminal cases;
giving of false or fabricated information to mislead or prevent the law enforcement agencies from apprehending the offender or from protecting the life or property of the victim; or fabricating information from the data gathered in confidence by investigating authorities for purposes of background information and not for publication and publishing or disseminating the same to mislead the investigator or to the court

NOTA BENE: If any of the acts mentioned herein is penalized by any other law with a higher penalty, the higher penalty shall be imposed

Primer on Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

2010-03-08T07:04:00.001+08:00

RA 3019, Aug. 17, 1960

I.PURPOSE (Sec. 1)

In line with the principle that a public office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.

II.DEFINITION OF TERMS (Sec. 2)

GOVERNMENT – includes the national government, the local governments, the government-owned and –controlled corporations, and all other instrumentalities or agencies of the Republic of the Philippines and their branches

PUBLIC OFFICER – includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government

RECEIVING ANY GIFT – includes the act of accepting directly or indirectly a gift from a person other than a member of the public officer’s immediate family, in behalf of himself or of any member of his family or relative within the fourth civil degree, either by consanguinity or affinity, even on the occasion of a family celebration or national festivity like Christmas, if the value of the gift is under the circumstances manifestly excessive

PERSON – includes natural and juridical persons unless the context indicates otherwise

III.CORRUPT PRACTICES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS (Sec. 3)

In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.

- Here the inducer and the induced are punished

(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.

- “TRANSACTION” is analogous to “CONTRACT” so does not include preliminary investigation (not a contract)
- Amount or value is immaterial

(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for another, from any person for whom the public officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government permit or license, in consideration for the help given or to be given, without prejudice to Section thirteen of this Act.

- A form of extortion

(d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept which has employment in a private enterprisepending official business with him during the pendency thereof or within one year after its termination.

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

ELEMENTS:

The accused is a public officer or private person in conspiracy with public officer
Said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or her public positions
He or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private party
Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties
Public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evidence bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence

- “UNDUE INJURY” is synonymous to actual damages so it must be proven
- “UNWARRANTED BENEFITS” means baseless/unjustifiable benefits
- “MANIFEST PARTIALITY” refers to obvious bias
- “BAD FAITH” connotes a dishonest purpose or breach of sworn duty through ill-will
- “GROSS INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE” means lack or want of slight care or omission of care which an inattentive or thoughtless man gives to his own property

(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party.

(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.

- Overpricing

(h) Directly or indirectly having financing or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.

(i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain, or having a material interest in any transaction or act requiring the approval of a board, panel or group of which he is a member, and which exercises discretion in such approval, even if he votes against the same or does not participate in the action of the board, committee, panel or group.

Interest for personal gain shall be presumed against those public officers responsible for the approval of manifestly unlawful, inequitable, or irregular transaction or acts by the board, panel or group to which they belong.

(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled.

(k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or by him on account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in advance of its authorized release date.

The person giving the gift, present, share, percentage or benefit referred to in subparagraphs (b) and (c); or offering or giving to the public officer the employment mentioned in subparagraph (d); or urging the divulging or untimely release of the confidential information referred to in subparagraph (k) of this section shall, together with the offending public officer, be punished under Section nine of this Act and shall be permanently or temporarily disqualified in the discretion of the Court, from transacting business in any form with the Government.

IV.PROHIBITION ON PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS (Sec. 4)

Capitalizing or exploiting or taking advantage of family or close personal relation with any public official by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from any other person having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with the government, in which such public official has to intervene (“Influence-peddling”)
Knowingly inducing or causing any public official to commit any of the offenses defined in Sec. 3

FAMILY RELATION – include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree

CLOSE PERSONAL RELATION – include close personal friendship, social and fraternal connections, and professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free access to such public officer

V.PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN RELATIVES (Sec. 5)

A.COVERED: spouse or any relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree, of the President, Vice-President, Senate President and House Speaker, to intervene, directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with the Government

B.EXCEPTION: any person who, prior to the assumption of office of any of the above officials to whom he is related, has been already dealing with the Government:

Along the same line of business
Any transaction, contract or application already existing or pending at the time of such assumption of public office
Any application filed by him the approval of which is not discretionary on the part of the official or officials concerned but depends upon compliance with requisites provided by law, or rules or regulations issued pursuant to law
Any act lawfully performed in an official capacity or in the exercise of a profession

VI.PROHIBITION ON MEMBERS OF CONGRESS (Sec. 6)

A.COVERED:

Any Member of Congress during the term for which he has been elected
Any other public officer who recommended the initiation in Congress of the enactment or adoption of any law or resolution, and acquires or receives any such interest during his incumbency

B.ACTS PROHIBITED:

Acquiring or receiving any personal pecuniary interest in any specific business enterprise which will be directly and particularly favoured or benefited by any law or resolution authored by him previously approved or adopted by the Congress during the same term
Having such interest prior to the approval of such law or resolution authored or recommended by him, continues for 30 days after such approval to retain such interest

VII.STATEMENT OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES (Sec. 7)

A.COVERED: every public officer

B.WHEN:

Within 30 days from approval of this Act or after assuming office
Within the month of January of every other year thereafter
Upon expiration of his term of office, or upon resignation or separation from office

VIII.DISMISSAL DUE TO UNEXPLAINED WEALTH (Sec. 8)

- Found to have acquired during his incumbency, whether in his name or in the name of other persons, an amount of property and/or money manifestly out of proportion to his salary and to his other lawful income

- Including properties in the name of the spouse and unmarried children, when their acquisition through legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown
As well as bank deposits (exception to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act)

IX.COMPETENT COURT (Sec. 10)

Sandiganbayan (OJ) → appeal to SC

X.PRESCRIPTION (Sec. 11)

- 10 years

XI.TERMINATION OF OFFICE (Sec. 12)

No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.

XII.SUSPENSION AND LOSS OF BENEFITS (Sec. 13)

PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION: mandatory 90-day period (3 mos, no more no less) by Sandiganbayan

- Hearing is mandatory, which is complied: (1) if prosecution files a motion for preventive suspension; (2) accused files a motion to quash the information; or (3) if (1) or (2) does not happen, the Sandiganbayan will issue a “show-cause” order

- Distinguish from preventive suspension (60 days) by Ombudsman for administrative charges; the period is extendible

PURPOSE: (1) to prevent him from intimidating the witnesses or destroying evidence; (2) to avoid further acts of malfeasance while in office

CONVICTION: lose all retirement and gratuity benefits, except terminal leave pay

ACQUITTAL: entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him

XIII.EXCEPTION (Sec. 14)

Unsolicited gifts or presents of small or insignificant value offered or given as a mere ordinary token of gratitude or friendship according to local customs or usage

Phil. Bank of Commerce v. CA

2010-02-10T06:00:00.001+08:00

G.R. No. 97626, March 14, 1997

The negligence must be the proximate cause of the loss

FACTS:

Rommel’s Marketing Corporation (RMC) maintained two separate current accounts with PBC in connection with its business of selling appliances. The RMC General Manager Lipana entrusted to his secretary, Irene Yabut, RMC funds amounting to P300,000+ for the purpose of depositing the same to RMC’s account with PBC. However, it turned out that Yabut deposited the amounts in her husband’s account instead of RMC. Lipana never checked his monthly statement of accounts regularly furnished by PBC so that Yabut’s modus operandi went on for the span of more than one year.
ISSUE:

What is the proximate cause of the loss – Lipana’s negligence in not checking his monthly statements or the bank’s negligence through its teller in validating the deposit slips?

HELD:

The bank teller was negligent in validating, officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips, original or duplicate.

The bank teller’s negligence, as well as the negligence of the bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller, is the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent, not the latter’s entrusting cash to a dishonest employee. Xxx Even if Yabut had the fraudulent intention to misappropriate the funds, she would not have been able to deposit those funds in her husband’s current account, and then make plaintiff believe that it was in the latter’s accounts wherein she had deposited them, had it not been for the bank teller’s aforesaid gross and reckless negligence.

Doctrine of Last Clear Chance – where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. It means that the antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by exercise of due diligence. (Phil. Bank of Commerce v. CA, supra)

Phil. School of Business Administration v. CA

2010-02-09T06:00:00.001+08:00

G.R. No. 84698, Jan. 4, 1992

School's responsibility in loco parentis over its own students: the harm or negligent act must be committed by its students against another student, not by an outsider
General rule on the application of quasi-delict: no pre-existing contract between the parties

FACTS:

Carlitos Bautista, a third-year commerce student of PSBA, was stabbed to death while on the second-floor premises of the school. The assailants were not members of the schools’ academic community but were elements from outside the school. The parents of Carlitos filed a civil action against the school authorities, alleging them negligent, reckless and with failure to take security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim. The appellate court found in their favor, primarily anchoring its decision on the law of quasi-delicts.

Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellate court was correct in deciding the case based on Article 2180 (in loco parentis)
Whether or not the application of the law on quasi-delict is proper when there is a pre-existing contract

HELD:

The SC did not agree with the premises of the CA’s ruling. Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule in in loco parentis. It had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of PSBA, for whose acts the school could have been made liable.

IS PSBA EXCULPATED FROM LIABILITY?

It does not necessarily follow. When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. Moreover, there is that “built-in” obligation to provide students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. The school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.

Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between PSBA and Carlitos, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. However, the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties. Art. 21 of the Civil Code comes to mind, so that should the act which breaches a contract be done in bad faith and violative of Art. 21, then there is a cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict.

In the present case, there is no finding that the contract between the school and Carlitos had been breached thru the former’s negligence in providing proper security measures.

Air France v. Carrascoso

2010-02-08T06:00:00.001+08:00

G.R. No. L-21438, Sept. 28, 1966

When culpa aquiliana may arise even when there is a pre-existing contract between the parties

FACTS:

Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a first class passenger of Air France on his way to Rome for a pilgrimage. From Manila to Bangkok, he traveled in ‘first class,’ but at Bangkok, the Manager of Air France forced him to vacate his seat in favor of a ‘white man’ who had a ‘better right to the seat.’ Carrascoso filed for moral damages, averring in his complaint the contract of carriage between Air France and himself. Air France claims that to authorize an award for moral damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith, upon which Carrascoso’s complaint is silent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Carrascoso is entitled to award for moral damages

HELD:

The foregoing substantially aver: First, That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, That there was bad faith when petitioner’s employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth “after he was already seated” and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassment and humiliation, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there; it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. The contract was averred to establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion.

NOTA BENE: Here there is a contract of carriage between the parties and such contract was breached by Air France when it wrongfully forced Carrascoso to vacate the first class seat which he paid for. The wrongful expulsion is independent of the breach since even without the contract, such wrongful expulsion may still make Air France liable for damages. In other words, the wrongful expulsion is in itself a tort.

Joya vs. PCGG

2010-02-03T07:47:00.001+08:00

G.R. No. 96541, Aug. 24, 1993

Requisites for exercise of judicial review: (1) that the question must be raised by the proper party; (2) that there must be an actual case or controversy; (3) that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, (4) that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
LEGAL STANDING: a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.
EXCEPTIONS TO LEGAL STANDING: Mandamus and Taxpayer's Suits
REQUISITES FOR MANDAMUS: a writ of mandamus may be issued to a citizen only when the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the state are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.
WHEN TAXPAYER SUIT MAY PROSPER: A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.
ACTUAL CONTROVERSY: one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice.

FACTS:

The Republic of the Philippines through the PCGG entered into a Consignment Agreement with Christie’s of New York, selling 82 Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacanang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late Pres. Marcos, his relatives and cronies. Prior to the auction sale, COA questioned the Consignment Agreement, there was already opposition to the auction sale. Nevertheless, it proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PCGG has jurisdiction and authority to enter into an agreement with Christie’s of New York for the sale of the artworks

RULING:

On jurisdiction of the Court to exercise judicial review

The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by the proper party; that there must be an actual case or controversy; that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. But the most important are the first two (2) requisites.

Standing of Petitioners

On the first requisite, we have held that one having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an action. This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party.

EXCEPTIONS TO LEGAL STANDING: Mandamus and Taxpayer’s Suit:

There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on legal standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public right recognized by the Constitution, and when a taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act authorizing the disbursement of public funds.

Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply concerned with the preservation and protection of the country's artistic wealth, they have the legal personality to restrain respondents Executive Secretary and PCGG from acting contrary to their public duty to conserve the artistic creations as mandated by the 1987 Constitution, particularly Art. XIV, Secs. 14 to 18, on Arts and Culture, and R.A. 4846 known as "The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act," governing the preservation and disposition of national and important cultural properties. Petitioners also anchor their case on the premise that the paintings and silverware are public properties collectively owned by them and by the people in general to view and enjoy as great works of art. They allege that with the unauthorized act of PCGG in selling the art pieces, petitioners have been deprived of their right to public property without due process of law in violation of the Constitution.

Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law. They themselves allege that the paintings were donated by private persons from different parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation, which is a non-profit and non-stock corporations established to promote non-Philippine arts. The foundation's chairman was former First Lady Imelda R. Marcos, while its president was Bienvenido R. Tantoco. On this basis, the ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members thereof, although the public has been given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they were placed on exhibit.

Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of antique silverware were given to the Marcos couple as gifts from friends and dignitaries from foreign countries on their silver wedding and anniversary, an occasion personal to them. When the Marcos administration was toppled by the revolutionary government, these paintings and silverware were taken from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and transferred to the Central Bank Museum. The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration however should not be understood to mean that the ownership of these paintings has automatically passed on the government without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just compensation. If these properties were already acquired by the government, any constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be raised only by the proper parties — the true owners thereof — whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition.

Requisites for a Mandamus Suit

Further, although this action is also one of mandamus filed by concerned citizens, it does not fulfill the criteria for a mandamus suit. In Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, this Court laid down the rule that a writ of mandamus may be issued to a citizen only when the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the state are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. In the case at bar, petitioners are not after the fulfillment of a positive duty required of respondent officials under the 1987 Constitution. What they seek is the enjoining of an official act because it is constitutionally infirmed. Moreover, petitioners' claim for the continued enjoyment and appreciation by the public of the artworks is at most a privilege and is unenforceable as a constitutional right in this action for mandamus.

When a Taxpayer's Suit may prosper

Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Not every action filed by a taxpayer can qualify to challenge the legality of official acts done by the government. A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. Obviously, petitioners are not challenging any expenditure involving public funds but the disposition of what they allege to be public properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit that the paintings and antique silverware were acquired from private sources and not with public money.

Actual Controversy

For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case of controversy — one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, such as the case before us. Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date — 11 January 1991 — which is long past, the issues raised in the petition have become moot and academic.

At this point, however, we need to emphasize that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case or legal standing when paramount public interest is involved. We find however that there is no such justification in the petition at bar to warrant the relaxation of the rule.

ARTICLE VI: Legislative Department (Part 2)

2010-02-02T07:31:00.001+08:00

Sec. 18: Commission on Appointments

COMPOSITION:

President of Senate as ex officio Chairman
12 Senators
12 Reps

Act on all appointments within 30 session days of Congress from their submission
Majority vote of all members

Proportional Representation vis-a-vis Political Realignment

Daza vs. Singson, G.R. No. 86344, Dec. 21, 1989

FACTS:

Petitioner Daza, a Liberal Party member, was given a seat in the Commission on Appointments. However, after the reorganization of the LDP, which resulted in a political realignment in the House. 24 members of the Liberal Party formally resigned and joined the LDP, thereby welling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17 members. On the basis of this development, the House revised its representation in the Commission by withdrawing the seat occupied by petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP, who was represented by Respondent Singson.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the reorganization of the House representation in the Commission is based on a permanent political realignment as to warrant petitioner’s removal therein

RULING:

In the case of Cunanan v. Tan, the Court noted that the Allied Majority was a merely temporary combination as the Nacionalista defectors had not disaffiliated from their party and permanently joined the new political group. Officially, they were still members of the Nacionalista Party. The reorganization of the Commission on Appointments was invalid because it was not based on the proportional representation of the political parties in the House of Representatives as required by the Constitution. The Court held:

... In other words, a shifting of votes at a given time, even if du to arrangements of a more or less temporary nature, like the one that has led to the formation of the so-called "Allied Majority," does not suffice to authorize a reorganization of the membership of the Commission for said House. Otherwise the Commission on Appointments may have to be reorganized as often as votes shift from one side to another in the House. The framers of our Constitution could not have intended to thus place a constitutional organ, like the Commission on Appointments, at the mercy of each House of Congress.

The petitioner's contention that, even if registered, the party must still pass the test of time to prove its permanence is not acceptable. Under this theory, a registered party obtaining the majority of the seats in the House of Representatives (or the Senate) would still not be entitled to representation in the Commission on Appointments as long as it was organized only recently and has not yet "aged." The Liberal Party itself would fall in such a category. That party was created in December 1945 by a faction of the Nacionalista Party that seceded therefrom to support Manuel A. Roxas's bid for the Presidency of the Philippines in the election held on April 23, 1946. The Liberal Party won. At that time it was only four months old. Yet no question was raised as to its right to be represented in the Commission on Appointments and in the Electoral Tribunals by virtue of its status as the majority party in both chambers of the Congress.

The LDP has been in existence for more than one year now. It now has 157 members in the House of Representatives and 6 members in the Senate. Its titular head is no less than the President of the Philippines and its President is Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, who took over recently from Speaker Ramon V. Mitra. It is true that there have been, and there still are, some internal disagreements among its members, but these are to be expected in any political organization, especially if it is democratic in structure. In fact even the monolithic Communist Party in a number of socialist states has undergone similar dissension, and even upheavals. But it surely cannot be considered still temporary because of such discord.
If the petitioner's argument were to be pursued, the 157 members of the LDP in the House of Representatives would have to be denied representation in the Commission on Appointments and, for that matter, also the Electoral Tribunal. By the same token, the KBL, which the petitioner says is now "history only," should also be written off. The independents also cannot be represented because they belong to no political party. That would virtually leave the Liberal Party only with all of its seventeen members to claim all the twelve seats of the House of Representatives in the Commission on Appointments and the six legislative seats in the House Electoral Tribunal.

It is noteworthy that when with 41 members the Liberal Party was alloted two of the seats in the Commission on Appointments, it did not express any objection. Inconsistently, the petitioner is now opposed to the withdrawal from it of one seat although its original number has been cut by more than half.

As for the other condition suggested by the petitioner, to wit, that the party must survive in a general congressional election, the LDP has doubtless also passed that test, if only vicariously. It may even be said that as it now commands the biggest following in the House of Representatives, the party has not only survived but in fact prevailed. At any rate, that test was never laid down in Cunanan.

KINDS OF APPOINTMENT:

Regular – requires concurrence of CA; if revoked by CA, can return to his old post but cannot be reappointed; if bypassed by CA, reappointment is allowed
Ad Interim – permanent and effective until revoked or disapproved by CA; if revoked by CA, cannot return to his old post or be reappointed; if bypassed, the appointment shall only last until the next adjournment of Congress and official may be reappointed to the same position
Temporary – appointments in acting capacity; no need for concurrence of CA and shall last only for a period not exceeding one year

Acting Appointments of President (See Pimentel vs. Executive Secretary)

Legislative Inquiries/Investigations

KINDS:

In Aid of Legislation (Sec. 21)
Question Hour (Sec. 22)

In Aid of Legislation vs. Question Hour (See Neri vs. Senate)

In Aid of Legislation

CONDITIONS:

Must be in aid of legislation – either in making a new legislation or improving a defective one
The rules and regulations providing for its conduct must be duly published
The rights of individuals must be respected (e.g. right against self-incrimination)

Question Hour – Congress may summon heads of executive departments to shed light on certain matters in aid of legislation or the heads may appear before Congress upon their own initiative with approval of the President; either in the Congressional Chamber or the Executive Office

Q: Can a member of the Cabinet refuse to appear before Congress?
A: A distinction must be made between the question hour and inquiries in aid of legislation. The former is merely permissive and does not, as a rule, include compulsory processes such that a Cabinet member may validly refuse to appear before Congress. However, if the inquiry is in aid of legislation, Congress is empowered to issue subpoenas and may rightly cite anyone called before it in contempt should they refuse to appear. The only exemption to this power is if the President or the Executive Secretary by the President’s authority invokes executive privilege.

Sec. 23: Power to Declare Existence of War and Delegate Emergency Powers

Q: Can Congress declare war?
A: No. The power to declare war rests with the President. All that the Congress can do, via two-thirds vote of all its members in a joint session, is to declare its existence.

Q: How does Congress delegate emergency powers to the President?
A: Through a law passed for purpose of carrying out a declared national policy. It ceases with the passing of another resolution from Congress without need for President’s approval. If no resolution is passed, the power will automatically cease upon the next adjournment of Congress.

Requisites to Declare Existence of War (See David vs. Arroyo)

Sec. 24: Bills Originating from the House of Reps

MUST ORIGINATE FROM THE HOUSE OF REPS:

Appropriation, revenue and tariff bills (ART)
Bills authorizing the increase of public debt
Bills of local application
Private bills

Q: Why should these bills originate from the House of Reps?
A: The House Reps are elected by district, hence, they are more familiar with the needs of their constituents. They are also more numerous, therefore, representative of the people.

Q: Does Sec. 24 violate the co-equality between the House Reps and Senate?
A: No, because the Senate can still file ahead of the House Reps any of the bills mentioned above. However, they must withhold any action on the bill until it has received the version filed by the House of Reps.

Sec. 25: ART Bills, Transfer of Funds, Discretionary Funds

Appropriation Bill – a statue the primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the release of funds from the treasury

2 KINDS OF APPROPRIATION BILLS:

General Appropriation
Special Appropriation

SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS OF GENERAL APPROPRIATION BILL:

Must originate from the House of Reps which has the power of the purse
Must be based on a budget prepared by the President
The particular provision must relate to a particular item in the said bill
Must not be for the use, benefit or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or any priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, EXCEPT: when such priest, etc. is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium

Q: Can a law creating an office and at the same time provide for disbursement of funds be considered an appropriation bill?
A: No, because the main purpose of that law is not the disbursement of funds but the creation of an office.

Q: Can Congress increase the budget appropriated or recommended by the President?
A: No, but Congress can decrease the amount.

Q: What happens if Congress fails to pass a general appropriations act?
A: The previous act will be re-enacted to be used for the fiscal year until such time that a General Appropriations Bill shall be passed.

SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS OF SPECIAL APPROPRIATION BILL:

Must be for a specific purpose
Must have a certification from the National Treasurer that the funds are available or if there is an accompanying revenue proposal as to how to raise the funds needed

NOTA BENE:

Certification from the National Treasurer is needed in order to avoid “sub rosa” appropriation, wherein a special appropriations measure is done even though the funds are not available.
But a special appropriation bill may be filed even if there is no budget yet so long as there is an accompanying revenue proposal on how to raise the funds.

Tax/Revenue – enforced proportional contributions from persons and property, levied by the State by virtue of its sovereignty, for the support of government and for public needs

INHERENT CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF TAXATION:

Taxes are for public purposes
Non-delegation of taxing power
Territoriality or situs of taxation
Tax exemptions as provided in the Constitution with concurrence of majority of Congress
International comity
Taxes should not be oppressive
Due process must be observed
Adheres to the bill of rights
Non-infringement of religious freedom
Non-impairment of contracts
Tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only (any balance shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government
Tax laws must be uniform and equitable
Progressive tax system

Discretionary Funds

CONDITIONS:

Disbursed for a public purpose
Duly supported by appropriate vouchers
Subject to guidelines prescribed by law

Transfer of Funds
GR: transfer of funds is not allowed
EXC: if the transfer is only within one department, or if there is surplus or savings and the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting any item in the appropriation law

WHO MAY TRANSFER FUNDS:

President
Senate President
Speaker of the House
Chief Justice
Heads of the Constitutional Commissions

Sec. 26: Requirements as to Bills

REQUIREMENTS:

One subject per title – to prevent hodgepodge or logrolling legislation wherein many subjects are contained in a single bill in order to accommodate some subjects that cannot possibly pass through a single bill on its own and so that greater support for the bill is garnered
Subject of the bill must be expressed in the title – to prevent surprise or fraud beause some members of Congress might not be able to read the whole bill; a way of informing the public of what the bill is all about
Some bills must originate EXCLUSIVELY from the House of Reps
3 readings on 3 separate days and printing and distribution at least 3 days before final approval – EXCEPTION: when the President certifies the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency

NOTA BENE:

Logrolling legislation is sought to be prevented in order to avoid a situation wherein what had been disapproved if taken on its own, may be approved because it was lumped in a favorable subject.
It is enough that the title must be able to state what the bill is all about, without necessarily enumerating the details of the bill.
Presidential certification dispenses with both the 3-day printing and the 3 readings on 3 separate days. But the bill must still go through 3 readings, which may be done on the same day. This is not subject to judicial review, as a general rule, because there is no factual basis of grave abuse of discretion to speak of.

Sec. 27: President’s Veto

HOW PRESIDENT EXERCISES VETO POWER:

General – for all bills except ART bills; veto the whole bill (general rule)
Line or Item – only for ART bills because each item of ART is a bill in itself in terms of importance; veto only certain provisions that are inappropriate

INAPPROPRIATE PROVISIONS:

Any provision that does not relate to a particular, distinctive appropriation or item; in such a case, the inappropriate provision shall be treated as an item and therefore can be vetoed
Any provision blocking admnistrative action in implementing the law or requiring legislative approval for executive action
Any provision that is unconstitutional
Any provision that amends a certain law

Q: When does a bill become a law?
A: A bill becomes a law after the President’s approval. A bill may also become a law through the President’s inaction (given 30 days to either approve or veto a bill; if no action, it is implied approval). Another way for a bill to become a law is if Congress, after the President’s veto, overrides the same by 2/3 votes of the members of each House.

Q: What is the effect of an invalid veto?
A: It will be like there was no veto at all.

Q: What is a pocket veto?
A: The rule is that if the President, after receiving a copy of the bill, does not act on the same within 30 days, neither indicating his approval nor veto, the bill shall pass into law as if he had signed it. The exception is before the lapse of the 30-day period the Congress adjourns and the President does not act on the bill until the said period lapses, thus effectively vetoing it. Ignoring legislation, or “putting a bill in one’s pocket” until Congress adjourns is thus called a pocket veto. Since Congress cannot vote while in adjournment, a pocket veto cannot be overridden.

Q: When does a law take effect?
A: A law becomes effective 15 days after publication, unless otherwise provided. The phrase “unless otherwise provided”does not mean that publication may be dispensed with. Rather, the phrase refers to the 15-day period. In other words, the law itself may provide, through its effectivity clause, that it becomes effective after the lapse of a different period. (See Tanada vs. Tuvera)

The Legislative Mill

Drafting – done by either a member of the House or the Bill Drafting Division. The draft goes to the Plenary Affairs Bureau of the Index and Bills Division where it will be docketed and assigned a bill number, e.g. House Bill No.
First Reading – only the title and the number of the bill is read, after which, the Senate President or the House Speaker will refer it to the right committee, depending on the title; the committee will study the bill and, if necessary, conduct public hearings; this is where the bill either gets “killed” or recommended for approval, with amendments, if any, or consolidated with other bills on the same subject
Second Reading – involves a reading of the whole text of the bill, not just the title and docket number; the sponsor of the bill will make his Sponsorship Speech, followed by the Turno en Contra who will oppose the passage of the bill; then comes the debate and interpellation, after which, the amendments agreed upon are finalized; the bill as amended is then printed and distributed to the members at least 3 days before the 3rd reading
Third Reading – no more debates or discussions or questions; members are only there to vote to approve or reject the bill and, if required by law, to explain why so; voting will be done through yeas and nays
Referral – after the 3rd reading, the bill will be referred to the other chamber where it will also undergo 3 readings; in case of conflict, the bill will be referred to the Bicameral Chamber, which is a committee composed of members of each House; the Bicameral Chamber will draft a compromise measure that, if approved by both Houses, will be submitted to the President for him to veto or approve into law

Limitations on Legislative Power

Substantive - curtail the contents of a law

Non-delegation of legislative power
Prohibiting passage of irrepealable laws
Prohibiting passage of law that increases the appellate jurisdiction of SC without its advice and concurrence (Sec. 30)
Prohibiting law granting royalty or nobility (Sec. 31)

Procedural – curtail the manner of passing a law

ARTICLE VI: Legislative Department (Part 1)

2010-02-01T07:30:00.001+08:00

Sec. 1: One Congress, Two Houses

Sec. 1: The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.

POWERS:

Legislative

Republican Systems:
1. Original – possessed by the sovereign people
2. Derivative – that which is delegated by the sovereign people to the legislative bodies and is subordinate to the original power of the people; vested in Congress

Power according to its application:
1. Constituent – power to amend the Constitution
2. Ordinary – power to pass ordinary laws

Non-legislative

NOTA BENE:

Powers of Congress may be inherent (like the determination of its rules of proceedings and discipline of its members) or implied (like the power to punish for contempt in legislative investigations).
The people, through amendatory process, can exercise constituent power, and, through initiative and referendum, legislative power.

Allowable Delegation of Legislative Power

To the President (See ABAKADA Guro case)

To Administrative Agencies: 2 Tests of Valid Delegation; Subordinate Legislation
Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA, 166 SCRA 533 (1988)

What must be examined to determine if rule passed the tests of valid delegation

Echegaray vs. Sec. of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, Oct. 12, 1998

There is no undue delegation of legislative power in RA 8177 to the Sec. of Justice and the Dir. Of Bureau of Corrections, but Sec. 19 of the Rules and Regulations to implement RA 8177 is invalid.

Empowering the Sec. of Justice in conjunction with the Sec. of Health and the Dir. Of the Bureau of Corrections, to promulgate rules and regulations on the subject of lethal injection is a form of delegation of legislative authority to administrative bodies.

xxx

Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself – it must be set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate – and (b) fix a standard – the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable – to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.

Considering the scope and the definiteness of RA 8177, which changed the mode of carrying out the death penalty, the Court finds that the law sufficiently describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.

RA 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carried out. RA 8177 specifically requires that “[t]he death sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence during the lethal injection as well as during the proceedings prior to the execution.” Further, “[t]he Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall take steps to ensure that the lethal injection to be administered is sufficient to cause the instantaneous death of the convict.” The legislature also mandated that “all personnel involved in the administration of lethal injection shall be trained prior to the performance of such task.” The Court cannot see that any useful purpose would be served by requiring greater detail. The question raised is not the definition of what constitutes a criminal offense, but the mode of carrying out the penalty already imposed by the Courts. In this sense, RA 8177 is sufficiently definite and the exercise of discretion by the administrative officials concerned is…canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing.

Thus, the Court finds that the existence of an area for exercise of discretion by the Sec. of Justice and the Dir. Of the Bureau of Corrections under delegated legislative power is proper where standards are formulated for the guidance and the exercise of limited discretion, which though general, are capable of reasonable application.

xxx

A careful reading of RA 8177 would show that there is no undue delegation of legislative power from the Sec. of Justice to the Dir. Of the Bureau of Corrections for the simple reason that under the Administrative Code of 1987, the Bureau of Corrections is a mere constituent unit of the Dept. of Justice. Further, the Dept. of Justice is tasked, among others, to take charge of the “administration of the correctional system.” Hence, the import of the phraseology of the law is that the Sec. of Justice should supervise the Dir. Of the Bureau of Corrections in promulgating the Lethal Injection Manual, in consultation with the Dept. of Health.

However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement RA 8177 suffer serious flaws that could not be overlooked. To begin with, something basic appears missing in Sec. 19 of the implementing rules...

xxx

Thus, the Court finds in the first paragraph of Sec. 19 of the implementing rules a veritable vacuum. The Sec. of Justice has practically abdicated the power to promulgate the manual on the execution procedure to the Dir. Of the Bureau of Corrections, by not providing for a mode of review and approval thereof. Being a mere constituent unit of the Dept. of Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the administrative superior, the Sec. of Justice as the rule-making authority under RA 8177. Such apparent abdication of departmental responsibility renders the said paragraph invalid.

To People (See Santiago and Lambino cases)

Sec. 2: Composition of Senate
24 Senators

Sec. 3: Qualifications of Senators

Natural-born citizen
35 years old
Able to read and write
Registered voter
2-year residency

Sec. 4: Term of Office
6 yrs.
COMMENCE: noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election (unless otherwise provided by law)
RE-ELECTION: no Senator shall serve for more than 2 consecutive terms
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term

Sec. 5: Composition of the House of Representatives
(1)not more than 250 members, UNLESS otherwise provided by law; and (2) party-list members
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT: contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory (city: 250,000 pop.)
VACANCY: holding of special election is discretionary on House concerned (Sec. 9)

Congress has power of reapportionment of legislative districts

Montejo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118702, March 16, 1995

It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a regular province brought about an imbalance in the distribution of voters and inhabitants in the five (5) legislative districts of the province of Leyte. This imbalance, depending on its degree, could devalue a citizen’s vote in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Be that as it may, it is not proper at this time for petitioner to raise this issue using the case at bench as his legal vehicle. The issue involves a problem of reapportionment of legislative districts and petitioner’s remedy lies with Congress. Sec. 5(4), Art. VI of the Constitution categorically gives Congress the power to reapportion, thus: “Within three (3) years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section. In Macias v. COMELEC, we ruled that the validity of a legislative apportionment is a justiciable question. But while this Court can strike down an unconstitutional reapportionment, it cannot itself make the reapportionment as petitioner would want us to do by directing respondent COMELEC to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte.

Congress may increase its present composition

Tobias vs. Abalos, G.R. No. L-114783, Dec. 8, 1994

As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Art. VI, Sec. 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, “unless otherwise provided by law.” The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by RA 7675 is not unconstitutional.

xxx

As to the contention that Sec. 49 of RA 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Sec. 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.

xxx

Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on RA 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.

Similarly, petitioner’s additional argument that the subject law has resulted in “gerrymandering,” which is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not worthy of credence. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora’s constituency has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly be considered as favorable to him.

Party-list System: Inviolable parameters to determine the winners; Computation

Veterans Federation Party vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 136781, Oct. 6, 2000

To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and RA 7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters. These are:

First, the twenty percent allocation – the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.

Second, the two percent threshold – only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are “qualified” to have a seat in the House of Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit – each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one “qualifying” and two additional seats.

Fourth, proportional representation – the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed “in proportion to their total number of votes.”

The Party-list System, Explained

Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our presidential system of government – the party-list method of representation. Under this system, any national, regional or sectoral party or organization registered with the Commission on Elections may participate in the election of party-list representatives who, upon their election and proclamation, shall sit in the House of Representatives as regular members. In effect, a voter is given two (2) votes for the House – one for a district congressman and another for a party-list representative. xxx

xxx

Complying with its constitutional duty to provide by law the “selection or election” of party-list representatives, Congress enacted RA 7941 on March 3, 1995. Under this statute’s policy declaration, the State shall “promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.”

Whether the Twenty Percent Constitutional Allocation is Mandatory

Determination of the Total Number of Party-List Lawmakers

Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise “twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list.” We thus translate this legal provision into a mathematical formula, as follows:

No. of district representatives
---------------------------------- x .20 = No. of party-list
.80 representatives

This formulation means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be provided by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats. To illustrate, considering that there were 208 district representatives to be elected during the 1998 national elections, the number of party-list seats would be 52, computed as follows:

208
-------- x .20 = 52
.80

The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The problematic question, however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all circumstances? Our short answer is “No.”

Twenty Percent Allocation a Mere Ceiling

The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list.”
According to petitioners, this percentage is a ceiling; the mechanics by which it is to be filled up has been left to Congress. In the exercise of its prerogative, the legislature enacted RA 7941, by which it prescribed that a party, organization or coalition participating in the party-list election must obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the system in order to qualify for a seat in the House of Representatives.
xxx

We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the equally simple message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for party-list representatives.

xxx

Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.

On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result in a “mathematical impossibility,” suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine whether to adjust or change this percentage requirement rests in Congress. Xxx

The Statutory Requirement and Limitation

The Two Percent Threshold

In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress. xxx

The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local representation.

All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is precise and crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple application, not interpretation or circumvention.

The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit

An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and encourage a multiparty system of representation. xxx

Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set the seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House.

Method of Allocating Additional Seats

Having determined that the twenty percent seat allocation is merely a ceiling, and having upheld the constitutionality of the two percent vote threshold and the three-seat limit imposed under RA 7941, we now proceed to the method of determining how many party-list seats the qualified parties, organizations and coalitions are entitled to. The very first step - there is no dispute on this - is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions (hereafter collectively referred to as "parties") according to the votes they each obtained. The percentage of their respective votes as against the total number of votes cast for the party-list system is then determined. All those that garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast have an assured or guaranteed seat in the House of Representatives. Thereafter, "those garnering more than two percent of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." The problem is how to distribute additional seats "proportionally," bearing in mind the three-seat limit further imposed by the law.

The Formula

Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the “first” party.

Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.

For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be entitled to two additional seats. Another qualified party which received 500,000 votes cannot be entitled to the same number of seats, since it garnered only fifty percent of the votes won by the first party. Depending on the proportion of its votes relative to that of the first party whose number of seats has already been predetermined, the second party should be given less than that to which the first one is entitled.

The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than the first party for two reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties and the first party will always be less than 1:1, and (2) the formula does not admit of mathematical rounding off, because there is no such thing as a fraction of a seat. Verily, an arbitrary rounding off could result in a violation of the twenty percent allocation. An academic mathematical demonstration of such incipient violation is not necessary because the present set of facts, given the number of qualified parties and the voting percentages obtained, will definitely not end up in such constitutional contravention.

The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales that a fractional membership cannot be converted into a whole membership of one when it would, in effect, deprive another party's fractional membership. It would be a violation of the constitutional mandate of proportional representation. We said further that "no party can claim more than what it is entitled to x x x.”

Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party

Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice the latter's number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for computing the number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:

Number of votes
of first party Proportion of votes of
-------------------- = first party relative to
Total votes for total votes for party-list system
party-list system

If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat.

We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to the maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than the total number of available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the highest rank and are thus entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to which all the parties are entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in the House of Representatives.

Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties

Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula:

No. of votes for concerned party
--------------------------------------- x No. of additional seats allocated for first party
No. of votes for first party

xxx

Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the number of votes for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end result would be zero additional seat for each of the other qualified parties as well.

The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number of additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical proportions are not whole numbers and are not rounded off for the reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a number of seats in excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum of two additional slots. An increase in the maximum number of additional representatives a party may be entitled to would result in a more accurate proportional representation. But the law itself has set the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we need to work within such extant parameter.

NOTA BENE: In a later decision (Banat vs. COMELEC), SC has struck down in part the "two percent threshold" so that now, the way to allocate seats for party-list representatives is as follows:

Step One. Parties, organizations and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes garnered
Step Two. Those receiving at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat
Step Three. Those garnering sufficient number of votes according to the ranking in Step One, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
Step Four. Each party, organization or coalition shall not be entitled to more than 3 seats.

Computing additional seats for party-list other than first party: use the number of additional seats allotted for first party as multiplier

CIBAC vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 172103, April 13, 2007

Applying the Veterans formula in petitioner’s case, we reach the conclusion that CIBAC is not entitled to an additional seat. Party-list Canvass Report No. 20 contained in the petition shows that the first party, Bayan Muna, garnered the highest number of votes, that is, a total of 1,203,305 votes. Petitioner CIBAC, on the other hand, received a total of 495,190 votes. It was proclaimed that the first party, Bayan Muna, was entitled to a maximum of three (3) seats based on June 2, 2004 Resolution NO. NBC 04-004 of the COMELEC. A computation using the Veterans formula would therefore lead us to the following result:

No. of votes of
concerned party No. of additional Additional
––––––––––––– x seats allocated to = Seats for
No. of votes of the first party concerned
first party (Emphasis supplied.) party

Applying this formula, the result is as follows:

495,190
–––––––– x 2 =
1,203,305
0.41152493 x 2 = 0.82304986

This is a far cry from the claimed Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula which used the multiplier “allotted seats for the first party,” viz:

Additional Seats = Votes Cast for Qualified Party x Allotted Seats
____________________ for First Party
Votes Cast for First Party

Applying the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula to CIBAC, it yields the following result:

Additional seats = 495,190 x 3 = 1.2345
________
1,203,305

Unfortunately, it is the Veterans formula that is sanctioned by the Court and not the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula that petitioner alleges.

Since petitioner CIBAC got a result of 0.82304986 only, which is less than one (1), then it did not obtain or reach a whole number. Petitioner has not convinced us to deviate from our ruling in Veterans that “in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary.” Clearly, petitioner is not entitled to an additional seat.

Are people entitled to know the nominees of party-list organizations?

BA-RA 7941 vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 177271, May 4, 2007

The Right to Information

The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise. And for every right of the people recognized as fundamental lies a corresponding duty on the party of those who govern to respect and protect that right. This is the essence of the Bill of Rights in a constitutional regime. Without a government’s acceptance of the limitations upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties, without an acknowledgment on its part of those duties exacted by the rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes sophistry.

By weight of jurisprudence, any citizen can challenge any attempt to obstruct the exercise of his right to information and may seek its enforcement by mandamus. And since every citizen by the simple fact of his citizenship possesses the right to be informed, objections on ground of locus standi are ordinarily unavailing.

Right to Information Limited to Matters of Public Concern

Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion right of access to official records are not absolute. As articulated in Legaspi, supra, the people’s right to know is limited to “matters of public concern” and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. Similarly, the policy of full disclosure is confined to transactions involving “public interest” and is subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law. Too, there is also the need of preserving a measure of confidentiality on some matters, such as military, trade, banking and diplomatic secrets or those affecting national security.
The terms “public concerns” and “public interest” have eluded precise definition. But both terms embrace, to borrow from Legaspi, a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally whet the interest of an ordinary citizen. At the end of the day, it is for the courts to determine, on a case to case basis, whether or not at issue is of interest or importance to the public.

If, as in Legaspi, it was the legitimate concern of a citizen to know if certain persons employed as sanitarians of a health department of a city are civil service eligibles, surely the identity of candidates for a lofty elective public office should be a matter of highest public concern and interest.

Disclosure of Party-list Group Nominees not an Exception

As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.

The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: “[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list” is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the same provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to read into the law something that is not intended. As it were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the “Certified List” the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007 elections. The interpretation thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941.

People’s Right to Elect based on Informed Judgment

The Comelec’s reasoning that a party-list election is not an election of personalities is valid to a point. It cannot be taken, however, to justify its assailed non-disclosure stance which comes, as it were, with a weighty presumption of invalidity, impinging, as it does, on a fundamental right to information. While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives.

It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their representatives on the basis of an informed judgment. Hence the need for voters to be informed about matters that have a bearing on their choice. The ideal cannot be achieved in a system of blind voting, as veritably advocated in the assailed resolution of the Comelec. The Court, since the 1914 case of Gardiner v. Romulo, has consistently made it clear that it frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that would hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election. So it must be here for still other reasons articulated earlier.

In all, we agree with the petitioners that respondent Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein petitions.

Sec. 6: Qualifications of Member of House of Representatives

Natural-born citizen
25 years old
Able to read and write
Registered voter of the district in which he shall be elected (except party-list representatives)
Resident of at least one year of such district

Sec. 7: Term of Office of House of Representatives
3 years
COMMENCE: noon on the 30th day of June next following their election (unless otherwise provided by law)
LIMIT: no more than 3 consecutive terms
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected

Sec. 11: Parliamentary Immunities

Sec. 11: A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years of imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.

Congress’ Immunity from Arrest vs. Confinement under Penal Sanction

People vs. Jalosjos, G.R. No. 132975-76, Feb. 3, 2000

Aguinaldo Doctrine does not apply

Accused-appellant’s reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos, which states, inter alia, that –

The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When a people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with the knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people.

will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in the above-quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. It does not apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.

Rationale of Confinement: Public Self-defense and Example/Warning to Others

One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example and warning to others.

A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo, it is the injury to the public which State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to the complainant. After conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and thus subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding.

The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into office cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape eventual punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties outside his regular place of confinement.

It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellant’s arrest was issued, he fled and evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in the House of Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body whose call he initially spurned which accused-appellant is invoking to justify his present motion. This can not be countenanced because, to reiterate, aside from its being contrary to well-defined Constitutional restrains, it would be a mockery of the aims of the State’s penal system.

Only Emergency Temporary Leaves from Imprisonment Allowed

Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of Makati granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or medical reasons

xxx

There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.

What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

xxx

When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.

Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law?

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.

A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.

Parliamentary Immunity as to Speech vis-à-vis Power of Congress to Discipline its Members for Disorderly Behavior

Osmena vs. Pendatun. G.R. No. L-17144, Oct. 29, 1960

Parliamentary Immunity, background

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may occasion offense."2 Such immunity has come to this country from the practices of Parliamentary as construed and applied by the Congress of the United States. Its extent and application remain no longer in doubt in so far as related to the question before us. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But is does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. xxx

For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been, or could be censured, committed to prison, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. The appendix to this decision amply attest to the consensus of informed opinion regarding the practice and the traditional power of legislative assemblies to take disciplinary action against its members, including imprisonment, suspension or expulsion. It mentions one instance of suspension of a legislator in a foreign country.

Who determines if an act is disorderly conduct

On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmeña may be discipline, many arguments pro and con have been advanced. We believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.

xxx

We have underscored in the above quotation those lines which in our opinion emphasize the principles controlling this litigation. Although referring to expulsion, they may as well be applied to other disciplinary action. Their gist as applied to the case at bar: the House has exclusive power; the courts have no jurisdiction to interfere.

Sec. 12: Full Disclosure

Sec. 13 and 14: Disqualifications

Cannot hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including GOCCs or their subsidiaries, during term without forfeiting his seat (incompatible office)
Cannot be appointed to an office created or the emolument of which was increased during his term (prohibited office)
Cannot personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies
Cannot be directly or indirectly interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including GOCCs or its subsidiary, during term
Cannot intervene in any matter before any government office for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office

An Assemblyman cannot appear as counsel before an administrative body, whether directly or indirectly

Puyat vs. de Guzman, G.R. No. L-51122, March 25, 1982

FACTS:

An election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI), a private corporation, was held. A quo warranto proceeding was subsequently instituted with the SEC, wherein Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, appeared as counsel for respondent Acero. Puyat objected on constitutional ground than an assemblyman cannot appear as counsel before any administrative body, like SEC. Thus, Fernandez withdrew his appearance, but later, he purchased ten IPI shares and then filed a motion for intervention on the basis that he is a shareholder in said corporation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then stockholder of IPI may intervene in the SEC case

RULING:

Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation and not for the protection of the petitioners nor respondents who have their respective capable and respected counsel.

However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them "after the fact" that is, on May 30, 1979, after the contested election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit had been filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. And it maybe noted that in the case filed before the Rizal Court of First Instance (L-51928), he appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent Acero therein.

Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has been an indirect "appearance as counsel before ... an administrative body" and, in our opinion, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the avowed purpose, that is, to enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in the event of an unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case would be pure naiveté. He would still appear as counsel indirectly.

A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited.

In brief, we hold that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC. No. 1747 falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution.

Sec. 15: Sessions
REGULAR – once every year on the fourth Monday of July, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine until 30 days before the next regular session
SPECIAL – anytime when called by the President

Sec. 16: Officers, Quorom, Rules of Proceedings, Discipline of Members

DISCIPLINE:

Expulsion – disorderly behavior
Suspension – should not be for more than 60 days

NOTA BENE: The 60-day suspension imposed by Congress to discipline its member does not include the preventive suspension which may be imposed by the Sandiganbayan for prosecution of offenses.

Courts have no authority to interfere in the manner of choosing officers in the Senate; such prerogative belongs to the Senate
Santiago vs. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 134577, Nov. 18, 1998

What constitutes a Quorom

Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821, March 4, 1949

When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House: does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the House". (Missouri Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239). There is a difference between a majority of "the House", the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo believes furthermore than even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.

Rules of Proceedings: Courts do not have the power to inquire into their observance; Enrolled Bill Doctrine vis-à-vis Journal

Arroyo vs. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, Aug. 14, 1997

Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision that “each House may determine the rules of its proceedings” and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable. To begin with, this contention stands the principle on its head. In the decided cases, the constitutional provision that “each House may determine the rules of its proceedings” was invoked by parties, although not successfully, precisely to support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business free from interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial review.

But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: “At any rate, courts have declared that ‘the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.’ And it has been said that ‘Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.’ Consequently, ‘mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.’”

In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than members of that House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.
xxx

Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly be contended that in signing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, respondent Speaker of the House be acted with grave abuse of his discretion. Indeed, the phrase “grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power. As Chief Justice Concepcion himself said in explaining this provision, the power granted to the courts by Art. VIII, §1 extends to cases where “a branch of the government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.”

Matter complained of is a matter of internal procedure of the House

Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly — especially when the quorum is obviously present — for the purpose of delaying the business of the House. Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect acknowledged the presence of a quorum.

Enrolled Bill Doctrine

Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. Much energy and learning is devoted in the separate opinion of Justice Puno, joined by Justice Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To be sure, there is no claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that the enrolled bill embodies a conclusive presumption. In one case we “went behind” an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate.
But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the certification of the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims that the three-fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to the Constitution had not been obtained, because “a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts.”

Journal

The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to be recorded therein. With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons, this Court spoke of the imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as “public memorials of the most permanent character,” thus: “They should be public, because all are required to conform to them; they should be permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of individuals.” As already noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its due enactment has been duly proven.

Discipline of Members (See Osmena case supra)

Sandiganbayan is not precluded from issuing preventive suspension against a Senator facing criminal charges
Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001

Sec. 17: Electoral Tribunals

COMPOSITION: (9 members)

3 SC Justices – senior Justice is the Chairman
6 Congressmen (Senators or Representatives)

Based on proportional representation from the political parties or party-lists
Instituted within 30 days after organization of Senate and House with election of President and Speaker

FUNCTIONS:

Exclusive power to determine the qualifications of members of Congress
Sole jurisdiction to judge election contest between a member and the defeated candidate

HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction to judge election contests concerning its members; House has no power to interfere; HRET members are entitled to security of tenure, regardless of any change in their political affiliations
Bondoc vs. Pineda, G.R. No. 97710, Sept. 26, 1991

If the validity of the proclamation is the core issue of the disqualification case, the proclamation of the candidate cannot divest Comelec en banc of its jurisdiction to review its validity; Ministerial duty of the House to administer oath of office
Codilla vs. de Venecia, G.R. no. 150605, Dec. 10, 2002

NOTA BENE:

Distinguish between Codilla and Barbers. In Codilla, the action was still pending in the Comelec when the proclamation was made and the main issue raised was the legality of the proclamation. Thus, Comelec could not be divested of its jurisdiction to see the case through even when the proclaimed winner already assumed office. On the other hand, in the Barbers case, the action was only taken after the proclamation of the winning candidate. Thus, the proper forum should have been the SET, and not the Comelec, since the act of proclaiming the winner made the latter a member of the Senate and thus within the sole jurisdiction of the SET.
Appeal, as a general rule, does not lie in election contests decided by the SET/HRET. However, the Supreme Court may exercise its power of judicial review if the circumstances warrant.

Q: Who is the proper party to put up an election contest against a winning candidate?
A: Follow the rule on real party-in-interest. The proper party is the one who stands to benefit or lose as a result of the decision. Thus, only a losing candidate (2nd or 3rd placer) can file an election contest.

Q: What if the winning candidate is a lone candidate. Who can question his qualification? Who has jurisdiction?
A: It is submitted that in case of a winning candidate who is a lone candidate, a non-candidate may question his qualification. In which case, jurisdiction belongs with the electoral tribunal of the House concerned in quo warranto proceedings.

Remedy: Petition for Cancellation of Candidacy before election, or Quo Warrant within 10 days from proclamation
Sampayan vs. Daza, 213 SCRA 807

Enrolled Bill and Journal

MATTERS REQUIRED TO BE ENTERED IN THE JOURNAL:

The yeas and nays on the third and final reading of a bill
The yeas and nays on any question, at the request of 1/5 of the members present
The yeas and nays upon repassing a bill over the President’s veto
The President’s objection to a bill he had votoed

Enrolled Bill vis-à-vis Journal (See Arroyo vs. De Venecia case supra)

Rationale of the Enrolled Bill Theory; when courts may turn to the journal
Astorga vs. Villegas, G.R. No. L-23475, April 30, 1974

Astorga vs. Villegas

2010-01-27T07:00:00.001+08:00

G.R. No. L-23475, April 30, 1974

Enrolled Bill Doctrine: As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the Chief Executive, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress.
Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers, is essential
When courts may turn to the journal: Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, the entries in the journal should be consulted.

FACTS:

House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of Representatives and then sent to the Senate for reading. During discussion at the Senate, Senator Tolentino and Senator Roxas recommended amendments thereto. Despite the fact that it was the Tolentino amendment that was approved and the Roxas amendment not even appearing in the journal, when Senate sent its certification of amendment to the House, only the Roxas amendment was included, not the Tolentino amendment. Nevertheless, the House approved the same. Printed copies were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Reps, the Speaker, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President, and sent to the President of the Philippines who thereby approved the same. The Bill thus was passed as RA 4065. However, when the error was discovered, both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures.

ISSUES:

Whether or not RA 4065 was passed into law
Whether or not the entries in the journal should prevail over the enrolled bill

RULING:

Rationale of the Enrolled Bill Theory

The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as follows:

The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.

It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical conclusion reached in a number of decisions, although they are silent as to whether the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present.

Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers, is essential

As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential.

When courts may turn to the journal

Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted.

The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body.

Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan

2010-01-26T07:00:00.001+08:00

G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001

Power of Sandiganbayan to suspend members of Congress vis-a-vis Congress' prerogative to discipline its own members: the former is not punitive, the latter is

FACTS:

A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) filed a complaint for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against then CID Commissioner Miriam Defensor-Santiago. It was alleged that petitioner, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, approved the application for legalization of the stay of several disqualified aliens. The Sandiganbayan then issued an order for her suspension effective for 90 days.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has authority to decree a 90-day preventive suspension against a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines

RULING:

The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. xxx

It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be “no ifs and buts about it.” Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan observed:

“x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension.”

In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan’s authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.

Power of Sandiganbayan to Decree Preventive Suspension vis-à-vis Congress’ Prerogative to Discipline its Members

The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner, behooved Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension.

The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each-
“x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.”

The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the house of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.

xxx
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.

Santiago vs. Guingona, Jr.

2010-01-25T06:56:00.001+08:00

G.R. No. 134577, Nov. 18, 1998

While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who could thereby elect the minority leader. No law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.
Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other than Senate President and House Speaker
Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of legislature
Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are subject to revocation, modification and waiver by the body adopting them

FACTS:

During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo Fernan and Sen. Tatad were both nominated to the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Sen. Fernan was declared the duly elected Senate President. Thereafter, Sen. Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Sen. Fernan comprised the “majority,” while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the “minority.” However, senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party – number 7 and, thus, also a minority – had chosen Sen. Guingona as the minority leader. Thus, Petitioners filed this case for quo warranto.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was an actual violation of the Constitution in the selection of respondent as Senate minority leader
Whether or not courts have the power to intervene in matters of legislative procedure

RULING:

The petition fails.

The meaning of majority vis-a-vis minority

The term “majority” has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply “means the number greater than half or more than half of any total.” The plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the “majority,” much less the “minority,” in the said body. And there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of these terms.

In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.

xxx

Majority may also refer to “the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes,” not necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is “a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the majority.” Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority, while the lesser would be the minority. But where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the leader representing all the minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of which has to be identified by the Comelec as the “dominant minority party” for purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing composition of the present Senate, members either belong to different political parties or are independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of the many minority groups or the independents or a combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader.

Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other than Senate President and House Speaker

While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that “[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.” To our mind, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.

In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power “to determine the rules of its proceedings.” xxx

Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of legislature

Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work. Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene.

Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are subject to revocation, modification and waiver by the body adopting them

Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they “are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.” Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority.

In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such officers as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold -- the very duty that justifies the Court’s being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.

To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial legislation, a clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this argument alone, the petition would easily fail.

Legal Form: Special Power of Attorney

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SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

THAT I, _____________________, of legal age, Filipino, (single/married), a resident of _______, Philippines, do hereby name, constitute, and appoint X, of legal age, Filipino, (single/married), a resident of ____________, Philippines, as my attorney-in-fact for me and in my name, place and stead and for my own use and benefit, to do and perform the following acts, to wit:

(state the act);
As well as any and all acts necessary in the full and complete discharge of the same.

HEREBY GIVING AND GRANTING unto my said attorney-in-fact full power and authority to do and perform all and every act and thing whatever requisite and necessary to be done in and about the premises; hereby ratifying and confirming all that my said attorney-in-fact shall lawfully do and cause to be done by virtue of these presents.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my signature this ____th day of _____ at _____, Philippines.

____________________
Principal

SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:

1. (witness ) 2. (witness)

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Republic of the Philippines )
City of ____________ ) S.S.

BEFORE ME, a Notary Public, this _____th day of _____ in ______, Philippines, personally appeared ___________________, with (personal identification), issued on ________ at __________, Philippines, known to me and to me known to be the same person who executed the foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that teh same is his/her free and voluntary act.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereby set my hand and seal on the date and place above written.

___________________
Notary Public

Affidavit of Loss

2010-01-19T10:00:00.003+08:00

Republic of the Philippines )
City of ___________________ ) S.S.

AFFIDAVIT OF LOSS

I, ________, of legal age, single, Filipino and resident of ___________, Philippines, after having been duly sworn in accordance with law, do hereby depose and say:

That I am a bona fide student of the University of ______________;
That as such, I was issued a Student Identification Card with I.D. No. _______;
That some time on _________, (state the circumstances of the loss);
That, despite diligent efforts to locate the said I.D., the same could not be found;
That my Student Identification Card is now lost and beyond recovery;
That I am executing this affidavit to attest to the truth of the foregoing and to facilitate the replacement of my lost Student Identification Card.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my signature this ____th day of ______, in _____, Philippines.

_____________
Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, this _____th day of _________ in ______, Philippines, affiant exhibiting to me his (personal identification) issued on _______ at ___________, Philippines.

_______________
Notary Public

(NOTA BENE: The portion in blue font is referred to as the "Jurat." It often accompanies affidavits but is not considered part of it.)