G.R. No. 134577, Nov. 18, 1998
- While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who could thereby elect the minority leader. No law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.
- Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other than Senate President and House Speaker
- Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of legislature
- Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are subject to revocation, modification and waiver by the body adopting them
FACTS:
During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo Fernan and Sen. Tatad were both nominated to the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Sen. Fernan was declared the duly elected Senate President. Thereafter, Sen. Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Sen. Fernan comprised the “majority,” while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the “minority.” However, senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party – number 7 and, thus, also a minority – had chosen Sen. Guingona as the minority leader. Thus, Petitioners filed this case for quo warranto.
ISSUE:
- Whether or not there was an actual violation of the Constitution in the selection of respondent as Senate minority leader
- Whether or not courts have the power to intervene in matters of legislative procedure
RULING:
The petition fails.
The meaning of majority vis-a-vis minority
The term “majority” has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply “means the number greater than half or more than half of any total.” The plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the “majority,” much less the “minority,” in the said body. And there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of these terms.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.
xxx
Majority may also refer to “the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes,” not necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is “a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the majority.” Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority, while the lesser would be the minority. But where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the leader representing all the minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of which has to be identified by the Comelec as the “dominant minority party” for purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing composition of the present Senate, members either belong to different political parties or are independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of the many minority groups or the independents or a combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader.
Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other than Senate President and House Speaker
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that “[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.” To our mind, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power “to determine the rules of its proceedings.” xxx
Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of legislature
Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work. Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene.
Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are subject to revocation, modification and waiver by the body adopting them
Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they “are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.” Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority.
In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such officers as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold -- the very duty that justifies the Court’s being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.
To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial legislation, a clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this argument alone, the petition would easily fail.
