Filcar Transport Services vs. Jose A. Espinas

G.R. No. 174156

June 20, 2012

FACTS:

Respondent Jose A. Espinas was driving his car along Leon Guinto Street in Manila when he was suddenly hit by another car. Upon verifying with the LTO, Espinas learned that the owner of the other car is Filcar. This car was assigned to Filcar's Corporate Secretary Atty. Candido Flor and, at the time of the incident, was driven by Atty. Flor's personal driver, Timoteo Floresca.

Espinas sued Filcar for damages. Filcar denied liability, claiming that the incident was not due to its fault or negligence since Floresca was not its employee but that of Atty. Flor.

ISSUE: Whether or not Filcar, as registered owner of the motor vehicle which figured in an accident, may be held liable for the damages caused to the Espinas

HELD:

Filcar, as registered owner, is deemed the employer of the driver, Floresca, and is thus vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation with Article 2180 of the Civil Code

It is undisputed that Filcar is the registered owner of the motor vehicle which hit and caused damage to Espinas' car. It is on this basis that Filcar is primarily and directly liable to Espinas for damages.

As a general rule, one is only responsible for his own act or omission. Thus, a person will generally be held liable only for the torts committed by himself and not by another. This general rule is laid down in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which provides to wit:

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Based on the above-cited article, the obligation to indemnify another for damage caused by one's act or omission is imposed upon the tortfeasor himself, i.e., the person who committed the negligent act or omission. The law, however, provides for exceptions when it makes certain persons liable for the act or omission of another.

One exception is an employer who is made vicariously liable for the tort committed by his employee. Article 2180 of the Civil Code states:

Article 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

x x x x

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

x x x x

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

Under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code, an action predicated on an employee's act or omission may be instituted against the employer who is held liable for the negligent act or omission committed by his employee.

Although the employer is not the actual tortfeasor, the law makes him vicariously liable on the basis of the civil law principle of pater familias for failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of one's subordinates to prevent damage to another. In the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the employer may invoke the defense that he observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

It is well settled that in case of motor vehicle mishaps, the registered owner of the motor vehicle is considered as the employer of the tortfeasor-driver, and is made primarily liable for the tort committed by the latter under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code.

In so far as third persons are concerned, the registered owner of the motor vehicle is the employer of the negligent driver, and the actual employer is considered merely as an agent of such owner.

Thus, it is clear that for the purpose of holding the registered owner of the motor vehicle primarily and directly liable for damages under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code, the existence of an employer-employee relationship, as it is understood in labor relations law, is not required. It is sufficient to establish that Filcar is the registered owner of the motor vehicle causing damage in order that it may be held vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

Rationale for holding the registered owner vicariously liable

The rationale for the rule that a registered owner is vicariously liable for damages caused by the operation of his motor vehicle is explained by the principle behind motor vehicle registration, viz:

The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the determination of persons responsible for damages or injuries caused on public highways.

Employer-employee relationship between registered owner and driver is irrelevant

Thus, whether there is an employer-employee relationship between the registered owner and the driver is irrelevant in determining the liability of the registered owner who the law holds primarily and directly responsible for any accident, injury or death caused by the operation of the vehicle in the streets and highways.

The general public policy involved in motor vehicle registration is the protection of innocent third persons who may have no means of identifying public road malefactors and, therefore, would find it difficult if not impossible to seek redress for damages they may sustain in accidents resulting in deaths, injuries and other damages; by fixing the person held primarily and directly liable for the damages sustained by victims of road mishaps, the law ensures that relief will always be available to them.

To identify the person primarily and directly responsible for the damages would also prevent a situation where a registered owner of a motor vehicle can easily escape liability by passing on the blame to anther who may have no means to answer for the damages caused, thereby defeating the claims of victims of road accidents. We take note that some motor vehicles running on our roads are driven not by their registered owners, but by employed drivers who, in most instances, do not have the financial means to pay for the damages caused in case of accidents.

Filcar cannot pass on the liability to another party

The agreement between Filcar and Atty. Flor to assign the motor vehicle to the latter does not bind Espinas who was not a party to and has no knowledge of the agreement, and whose only recourse is to the motor vehicle registration.

Filcar cannot use the defense that the employee acted beyond the scope of his assigned task or that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage

Neither can Filcar use the defenses available under Article 2180 of the Civil Code – that the employee acts beyond the scope of his assigned task or that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage – because the motor vehicle registration law, to a certain extent, modified Article 2180 of the Civil Code by making these defenses unavailable to the registered owner of the motor vehicle. Thus, for as long as Filcar is the registered owner of the car involved in the vehicular accident, it could not escape primary liability for the damages caused to Espinas.

Filcar's recourse is against the actual employer of the driver and the driver himself

This does not mean, however, that Filcar is left without any recourse against the actual employer of the driver and the driver himself. Under the civil law principle of unjust enrichment, the registered owner of the motor vehicle has a right to be indemnified by the actual employer of the driver of the amount that he may be required to pay as damages for the injury caused to another.

• Registered owner is deemed employer of the driver and is thus vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation with Article 2180 of the Civil Code
• The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner.
• The motor vehicle registration law modified Article 2180 to a certain extent so that the defense available thereunder cannot be used by the registered owner
• The registered owner can recover from the actual owner and the driver under the doctrine of unjust enrichment

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United Airlines vs. Uy

G.R. No. 127768, Nov. 19, 1999

INTERNATIONAL LAW: Applicability of the Warsaw Convention: the Convention's provisions do not regulate or exclude liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier or misconduct of its officers and employees, or for some particular or exceptional type of damage. Neither may the Convention be invoked to justify the disregard of some extraordinary sort of damage resulting to a passenger and preclude recovery therefor beyond the limits set by said Convention. Likewise, we have held that the Convention does not preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. It does not regulate, much less exempt, the carrier from liability for damages for violating the rights of its passengers under the contract of carriage, especially if willful misconduct on the part of the carrier's employees is found or established

FACTS:

October 13, 1989 – Respondent Willie Uy is a passenger of petitioner United Airlines, bound from San Francisco to Manila. While in San Francisco, it was found that one piece of his luggage was over the maximum weight allowance of 70 kg. per bag. A United Airlines employee rebuked him and in a loud voice, in front of the milling crowd, ordered him to repack his things accordingly. Wishing not to create a scene, Willie did as asked. Unfortunately, his luggage was still overweight so the airline billed him overweight charges. Willie offered to pay the charges with a Miscellaneous Charge Order (MCO) or an airline pre-paid credit but the same employee, and an airline supervisor, refused to honor it, contending that there were discrepancies in the figures. Thus, Willie was forced to pay the charges with his American Express credit card. Upon arrival in Manila, Willie discovered that one of his bags had been slashed and its contents, amounting to US$5,310.00, stolen.

October 16, 1989 – he sent his first letter of demand to United Airlines. The airline did not refute Willie’s allegations and mailed a check representing payment of his loss based on the maximum liability of US$9.70 per pound. Willie, thinking the amount to be grossly inadequate to compensate him for his losses as well as for the indignities he was subjected to, sent two more letters to petitioner airline, one dated January 4, 1990 and the other dated October 28, 1991, demanding out-of-court settlement of P1,000,000.00.

June 9, 1992 – Willie filed a complaint for damages before the Philippine courts. He had two causes of action: (1) the shabby and humiliating treatment he received from petitioner’s employees at the San Francisco Airport which caused him extreme embarrassment and social humiliation; and (2) the slashing of his luggage and the loss of personal effects amounting to US$5,310.00.

For its part, United Airlines moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was filed out of time. Under Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention, the right to damages shall be extinguished if an action is not brought within 2 years. However, the second paragraph of the said provision stated that the method of calculating the period of limitation shall be determined by the law of the court to which the case is submitted. It is Willie’s position that our rules on interruption of prescriptive period should apply. When he sent his letters of demand, the 2-year period was tolled, giving him ample time to file his complaint.

The trial court ordered the dismissal of the case, holding that Art. 29(2) refers not to the local forum’s rules in interrupting the prescriptive period but only to the rules of determining the time in which the action was deemed commenced (meaning “filed”). Willie filed his motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal only on the 14th day. The trial court denied his motion and 2 days later Willie filed his notice of appeal. United Airlines this time contended that the notice of appeal was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period and should therefore be dismissed. The CA, however, took cognizance of the case in the interest of justice and ruled in favour of respondent. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action for damages is barred by the lapse of the 2-year prescriptive period under Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention

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Tayag vs. Benguet Consolidated, Inc.

G.R. No. L-23145, Nov. 29, 1968

• PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Situs of Shares of Stock: domicile of the corporation
• SUCCESSION: Ancillary Administration: The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets of the deceased liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs.
• SUCCESSION: Probate: Probate court has authority to issue the order enforcing the ancillary administrator’s right to the stock certificates when the actual situs of the shares of stocks is in the Philippines.

FACTS:

Idonah Slade Perkins, an American citizen who died in New York City, left among others, two stock certificates issued by Benguet Consolidated, a corporation domiciled in the Philippines. As ancillary administrator of Perkins’ estate in the Philippines, Tayag now wants to take possession of these stock certificates but County Trust Company of New York, the domiciliary administrator, refused to part with them. Thus, the probate court of the Philippines was forced to issue an order declaring the stock certificates as lost and ordering Benguet Consolidated to issue new stock certificates representing Perkins’ shares. Benguet Consolidated appealed the order, arguing that the stock certificates are not lost as they are in existence and currently in the possession of County Trust Company of New York.

ISSUE: Whether or not the order of the lower court is proper

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Vda. De Perez vs. Tolete

G.R. No. 76714, June 2, 1994

• PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Extrinsic Validity of Wills of Non-Resident Aliens
• PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Reprobate of Foreign Wills: Requirement of Notices

FACTS:

Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens and residents of New York, each executed a will also in New York, containing provisions on presumption of survivorship (in the event that it is not known which one of the spouses died first, the husband shall be presumed to have predeceased his wife). Later, the entire family perished in a fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was named trustee in Jose’s will, filed for separate probate proceedings of the wills.

Later, Evelyn’s mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in Bulacan. Rafael opposed, arguing that Salud was not an heir according to New York law. He contended that since the wills were executed in New York, New York law should govern. He further argued that, by New York law, he and his brothers and sisters were Jose’s heirs and as such entitled to notice of the reprobate proceedings, which Salud failed to give.

For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the two wills were in accordance with New York law. But before she could present evidence to prove the law of New York, the reprobate court already issued an order, disallowing the wills.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be allowed

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Phil. Bank of Commerce v. CA

G.R. No. 97626, March 14, 1997

• The negligence must be the proximate cause of the loss

FACTS:

Rommel’s Marketing Corporation (RMC) maintained two separate current accounts with PBC in connection with its business of selling appliances. The RMC General Manager Lipana entrusted to his secretary, Irene Yabut, RMC funds amounting to P300,000+ for the purpose of depositing the same to RMC’s account with PBC. However, it turned out that Yabut deposited the amounts in her husband’s account instead of RMC. Lipana never checked his monthly statement of accounts regularly furnished by PBC so that Yabut’s modus operandi went on for the span of more than one year.
ISSUE:

• What is the proximate cause of the loss – Lipana’s negligence in not checking his monthly statements or the bank’s negligence through its teller in validating the deposit slips?

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Phil. School of Business Administration v. CA

G.R. No. 84698, Jan. 4, 1992

• School's responsibility in loco parentis over its own students: the harm or negligent act must be committed by its students against another student, not by an outsider
• General rule on the application of quasi-delict: no pre-existing contract between the parties

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Air France v. Carrascoso

G.R. No. L-21438, Sept. 28, 1966

• When culpa aquiliana may arise even when there is a pre-existing contract between the parties

FACTS:

Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a first class passenger of Air France on his way to Rome for a pilgrimage. From Manila to Bangkok, he traveled in ‘first class,’ but at Bangkok, the Manager of Air France forced him to vacate his seat in favor of a ‘white man’ who had a ‘better right to the seat.’ Carrascoso filed for moral damages, averring in his complaint the contract of carriage between Air France and himself. Air France claims that to authorize an award for moral damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith, upon which Carrascoso’s complaint is silent.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not Carrascoso is entitled to award for moral damages

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Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca

G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918

• JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective.
• The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such.
• DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.

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Aznar vs. Garcia

G.R. No. L-16749, January 31, 1963

• Nationality Principle
• EXCEPTION: Renvoi Doctrine

FACTS:

Edward E. Christensen, who at his death was a US citizen but domiciled in the Philippines, left a will devising unto Maria Helen (Christensen Garcia) the amount of P3, 600.00, and leaving the rest of his estate to his daughter, Maria Lucy (Christensen Daney). During partition, Helen opposed, saying that she is deprived of her legitime as acknowledged natural child of the testator. She further argued that Section 946 of the California Civil Code provides that the laws of the domicile of the decedent should be applied.

The trial court ruled that since Edward E. Christensen was a US citizen at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions of his will are to be governed by the law of California.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not the Renvoi Doctrine should be applied

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Zapanta vs. Local Civil Registrar of the City of Davao

G.R. No. 55380, Sept. 26, 1994

• GENERAL RULE: Rule 108, Rules of Court justifies the correction of innocuous or clerical errors apparent on the face of the record and capable of being corrected by mere reference to it.
• EXCEPTION: Even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.

FACTS:

Petitioner Gliceria Zapanta is the widow of Florencio B. Zapanta. When Florencio died, the local civil registrar of Davao City issued a death certificate. However, she found that the name appearing therein was “Flaviano Castro Zapanta” albeit the date of death and all other circumstances and information reflected therein clearly and conclusively revealed that the person referred to therein was no other than her late husband, Florencio. Gliceria, therefore, filed a petition for correction of entry in the register of death. The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that the correction of the name “Flaviano Castro Zapanta” to “Florencio B. Zapanta” was not merely clerical but substantial in nature.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error

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Cadalin vs. POEA

G.R. No. L-104776, Dec. 5, 1994

• GENERAL RULE: A foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum.
• EXCEPTION: When the country of the forum has a "borrowing statute," the country of the forum will apply the foreign statute of limitations.
• EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION: The court of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum's public policy.

FACTS:

Cadalin et al. are overseas contract workers recruited by respondent-appellant AIBC for its accredited foreign principal, Brown & Root, on various dates from 1975 to 1983. As such, they were all deployed at various projects in several countries in the Middle East as well as in Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and Malaysia. The case arose when their overseas employment contracts were terminated even before their expiration. Under Bahrain law, where some of the complainants were deployed, the prescriptive period for claims arising out of a contract of employment is one year.

ISSUE:

• Whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of action based on the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on prescription that shall be the governing law

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Saudi Arabian Airlines vs. CA

G.R. No. 122191, Oct. 8, 1998

• Jurisdiction is based on allegations on the pleading
• State of the Most Significant Relationship Theory
• Conflicts of Laws Problem
• Points of Contact

FACTS:

Plaintiff Morada is a flight attendant for defendant SAUDIA’s airlines based in Jeddah. On April 27, 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, Morada became a victim of attempted rape by fellow crewmembers, Thamer and Allah, who are both Saudi nationals. The two were eventually arrested and deported back to Saudi Arabia while Morada was transferred to Manila. On various dates after the incident, Morada was summoned to Jeddah by her employer in order to sign documents, purporting to be statements dropping the case against Thamer and Allah. However, it turned out that a case was in fact filed against her before the Saudi court, which later found her guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.

Hence, Morada filed this complaint for damages based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code against SAUDIA and its country manager.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the case
• Whether the proper law applicable is Philippine law or the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
• Whether or not the case involves a ‘conficts problem’

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Leoncia Balogbog vs. CA

G.R. No. 83598, March 7, 1997

• Presumption of marriage
• Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place.

FACTS:

This is an action for partition brought by Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog against Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog. Ramonito and Generoso claimed that they were the legitimate children of Catalina and Gavino, the elder brother of Leoncia and Gaudioso. Gavino died in 1935, predeceasing their parents, the grandparents of Ramonito and Generoso.

Ramonito and Generoso presented witnesses: one, the mayor of Asturias from 1928 to 1934, another, who was a family friend, and Catalina herself. For its part, defendants denied knowing Ramonito and Generoso and claimed that Gavino died single and without issue. As proof of this, they presented certificates showing that there was no record in the Register of both the marriage between Gavino and Catalina and the birth of Ramonito.

The lower court rendered judgment in favor of Ramonito and Generoso. CA affirmed, holding that private respondents failed to overcome the legal presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are in fact married, that a child is presumed to be legitimate, and that things happen according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.

Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not the presumption of marriage applies
• Whether or not Ramonito and Generoso were legitimate children of Gavino

HELD:

The SC found no reversible error committed by the CA.

Petitioner contends that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should be proven in accordance of Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 (only by a certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry) since the marriage was celebrated when such law was in effect.

But the SC noted that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 1889 of Spain did not take effect, having been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after the extension of that code to this country. Consequently, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was brought in the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights, and the rules on evidence.

Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary.

Evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage. Indeed, although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to prove marriage.

Rationale for the presumption

The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in the preservation of the family and the sanctity of the family is a matter of constitutional concern.

Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee: The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is “that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.” Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.

Legitimacy of Children

The SC held that the fact that there was no record of birth in the Civil Registry does not mean that Ramonito and Generoso were not legitimate children. Their legitimacy was proved by testimony of witnesses, including Catalina, the mother herself. Moreover, there was submitted an official transcript of an investigation before the Police Investigation Committee of Balamban, Cebu, wherein Gaudioso himself admitted that Ramonito is his nephew.

The Court held this admission of relationship as admissible against Gaudioso as a reliable declaration against interest.

Decision affirmed.

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Florence Macalampo-Sin vs. Philipp Sin

G.R. No. 137590, March 26, 2001

PRINCIPLE:

The Family Code emphasizes the permanent nature of marriage, hailing it as the foundation of the family. It is this inviolability which is central to our traditional and religious concepts of morality and provides the very bedrock on which our society finds stability. Marriage is immutable and when both spouses give their consent to enter it, their consent becomes irrevocable, unchanged even by their independent wills.


However, this inviolability depends on whether the marriage exists and is valid. If it is void ab initio, the “permanence” of the union becomes irrelevant and the Court can step in to declare it so. Article 36 of the Family Code is the justification. Where it applies and is duly proven, a judicial declaration can free the parties from the rights, obligations, burdens and consequences stemming from their marriage.

A declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code requires the application of procedural and substantive guidelines. While compliance with these requirements mostly devolves upon the petitioner, the State is likewise mandated to actively intervene in the procedure. Should there be non-compliance by the State with its statutory duty, there is a need to remand the case to the lower court for proper trial.

FACTS:

This is a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage due to psychological incapacity.

Florence is married to Philipp, a Portuguese citizen. Several years after they were married (Jan. 4, 1987 - Sept. 20, 1994), Florence filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage. The trial court dismissed the petition so Florence elevated the case to the CA, which affirmed the decision.

Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not psychological capacity was adequately proven

HELD:

We note that throughout the trial in the lower court, the State did not participate in the proceedings. After filing a manifestation in the trial court that he found on collusion between the parties, the Fiscal did not actively participate therein and neither did the presiding judge take any step to encourage him to contribute to the proceedings.

Citing Article 48 of the Civil Code, the Supreme Court held that the lack of participation of the State was not cured by the fact that the evil sought to be prevented did not come about when the lower court dismissed the petition. The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.

In Republic of the Philippines vs. Erlinda Matias Dagdag, while we upheld the validity of the marriage, we nevertheless characterized the decision of the trial court as “prematurely rendered” since the investigating prosecutor was not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered. This stresses the importance of the participation of the State.

Having so ruled, we decline to rule on the factual disputes of the case, this being within the province of the trial court upon proper re-trial.

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Republic vs. Lolita Quintero-Hamano

G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004

• Presumption of validity of marriage
• Mere abandonment does not amount to psychological incapacity
• Guidelines to prove psychological incapacity

FACTS:

This is a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage between Lolita Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.

In October 1986, Lolita and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines where Lolita gave birth to their child. Later, she and Toshio were married before a judge. However, one month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan. Despite his promise to return, he did not come back. Moreover, he also stopped giving financial support and stopped all communication with his family. Consequently, Lolita filed for declaration of nullity of her marriage.

The trial court declared the marriage null and void, holding that respondent spouse failed to fulfill his obligations as husband of the petitioner and father to his daughter. This failure was considered to be a sign of immaturity and that his behavior could be traced to his mental incapacity and disability of entering into marital life.

Upon appeal, CA affirmed, concluding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to his family. Moreover, it ruled that this case could not be equated with Republic vs. CA and Molina and Santos vs. CA, because in those cases, the spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a “mixed marriage.”

Republic, as represented by the Solicitor-General, appealed.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not respondent was able to prove the psychological incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform his marital obligations

HELD:

SC ruled in favor of petitioner.

The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

The guidelines in the Molina case incorporate the three basic requirements of psychological incapacity outlined in Santos:

“It must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be “medically or clinically identified.” What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.”

Was respondent able to successfully prove Toshio’s psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital responsibilities?

The Court found that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. There was no evidence to show that his behavior was caused by a psychological order. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondent’s case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.

We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. There was no showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. AS we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

On issue of “Mixed Marriage”

In proving psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.

In Pesca vs. Pesca, this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social institution that the State cherishes and protects. While we commiserate with respondent, terminating her marriage to her husband may not necessarily be the fitting denouement.

Petition granted. Decision of CA reversed and set aside.

*FYI*

The case of Molina outlines the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36:

• The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.

• The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

• The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

• Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

• Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

• The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and children. Such non-complied marital obligations must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

• Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

• The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within 15 days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

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Maria del Rosario Mariategui vs. CA

G.R. No. 57062, Jan. 24, 1992

FACTS:

This is a case for partition of several pieces of land belonging to Lupo Mariategui, who died without a will.

During his lifetime, Lupo contracted three (3) marriages. The first wife died, so he contracted a second marriage. The second wife also passed away so he contracted a third marriage. The third wife also preceded Lupo in death.

The issue in this case arose because at the time of his death, Lupo left certain properties which he acquired when he was still unmarried. Later, Lupo’s descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves a certain lot of the Muntinglupa Estate and title was issued. Now, Lupo’s children by his third marriage filed a complaint with the lower court, contending that since they were co-heirs of Lupo’s estate they were deprived of their respective shares in the lot mentioned. In answer, the other party said that the complaint was not really for annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition but for recognition of natural children.

The lower court ruled in favor of Lupo’s heirs from the first and second marriage. Thus, the case was elevated to the CA, where they raised the issue of their parents’ lawful marriage and their legitimacy as children.

CA ruled that all the heirs of Lupo were entitled to equal shares in the estate. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

• Whether or not the action for partition has prescribed
• Whether or not the private respondents are entitled to successional rights over the said lot

HELD:

The case is really one for partition. The question of the status of the private respondents was raised only collaterally to assert their rights in the estate of the deceased.

Existence of the Marriage

Lupo and Felipa were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about 1930. This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo to his son who testified that “when his father was still living, he was able to mention to him that he and his mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal.” The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all the requisites for its validity are present.

Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.

Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on the following rationale:

“The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans towards legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to that case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law.”

So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such relationship is not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of their being married must be admitted as a fact.

Filiation

Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto’s birth certificate was a record of birth referred to in Article 172 of the Code. Again, no evidence which tends to disprove facts contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In the case of the two other private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence any of the documents required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo in the same manner as their brother Jacinto.

Prescription of Action for Partition

In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private respondents are legitimate children and heirs of Lupo and therefore, the time limitation prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is inapplicable to this case. Corollarily, prescription does not run against private respondents with respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In other words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner.

Petition dismissed.

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PT&T vs. NLRC and Grace de Guzman

G.R. No. 118978, May 23, 1997

FACTS:

This is a case for illegal dismissal filed by Grace de Guzman against PT&T.

Grace de Guzman is a probationary employee of PT&T. In her job application, she represented that she was single although she was married. When management found out, she was made to explain. However, her explanation was found unsatisfactory so she was subsequently dismissed from work.

Grace thus filed a case for illegal dismissal against PT&T with RAB. According to the Labor Arbiter, Grace, who had already gained the status of regular employee, was illegally dismissed by PT&T. Moreover, he ruled that Grace was apparently discriminated against on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company rules.

On appeal to the NLRC, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was upheld. The Motion for Reconsideration was likewise rebuffed, hence, this special civil action.

Petitioner argued that the dismissal was not because Grace was married but because of her concealment of the fact that she was married. Such concealment amounted to dishonesty, which was why she was dismissed from work.

ISSUES:

• Whether or not the company policy of not accepting married women for employment was discriminatory
• Whether or not Grace’s act of concealment amounted to dishonesty, leading to loss of confidence
• Whether or not Grace was illegally dismissed

HELD:

There was discrimination

Article 136 of the Labor Code explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the marriage of a female employee.

Petitioner’s policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion that it dismissed private respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved principally because of the company’s policy that married women are not qualified for employment in PT&T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.

Concealment did not amount to willful dishonesty

Verily, private respondent’s act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she was practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified from work. While loss of confidence is a just cause for termination of employment, it should not be simulated. It must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by the employee and not on the employer’s caprices. Furthermore, it should never be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified.

However, SC nevertheless ruled that Grace did commit an act of dishonesty, which should be sanctioned and therefore agreed with the NLRC’s decision that the dishonesty warranted temporary suspension of Grace from work.

Grace attained regular status as an employee

Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status at the time of her dismissal. When she was served her walking papers on Jan. 29, 1992, she was about to complete the probationary period of 150 days as she was contracted as a probationary employee on September 2, 1991. That her dismissal would be effected just when her probationary period was winding down clearly raises the plausible conclusion that it was done in order to prevent her from earning security of tenure.

There was illegal dismissal

As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been dismissed without just cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent.

On Stipulation against Marriage

In the final reckoning, the danger of PT&T’s policy against marriage is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the foundation of the nation.

Petition dismissed.

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Liwayway Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco, Corp.

G.R. No. 141309, June 19, 2007

FACTS:

This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune against Liwayway as CIR.

On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged an ad valorem tax of “55% provided that the maximum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos per pack.” Prior to effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” (all manufactured by Fortune) as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands were already covered.

In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance of the rule violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws.

For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts. She also contended that the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith.

The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who dismissed the case on the ground that under Article 32, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith.

Hence this appeal.

ISSUES:

• Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her office
• Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code

HELD:

On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.

Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness or negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.

Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.

On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it being a special law, which prevails over a general law (the Administrative Code).

Article 32 was patterned after the “tort” in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property or reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of another’s legal right; that is, liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.

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Chua Tee Dee vs. CA

G.R. No. 135721, May 27, 2004

FACTS:

This is a case for collection of back rentals plus interest and attorney’s fees filed by Agricom against Chua Tee Dee, doing business as Pioneer Enterprises.

On May 22, 1985, Agricom and Dee entered into a 15-year lease contract over the rubber plantation owned by the former. Among the stipulations in the contract was the payment of deposit in the amount of P135,000.00 and payment of back rentals in case of non-payment of rentals for three months. The contract also stipulated that Agricom had the duty to maintain Dee in the quiet peaceful possession and enjoyment of the leased premises.

However, sometime in 1986, a labor case for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice was filed against Agricom, Amado Dee (Chua Tee Dee’s husband) and Pioneer. This case arose from the fact that some of the plantation laborers were dismissed from work due to the contract of lease with Dee. The labor case dragged on for a number of years. In addition, Dee also complained of being pestered by some individuals who claimed portions of the plantation as their own property.
Later on, Pioneer defaulted in its monthly payments, prompting Agricom to file a complaint for sum of money. In its Answer, Dee asserted that Agricom committed breach of contract for its failure to maintain her in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the leased premises. The breach, in turn, entitled her to suspend payment of rentals.

While the case was pending, Dee extended a personal loan of P30,000 to Lillian Carreido. When judgment was finally rendered, the complaint was dismissed and the lease contract terminated, the court stating that it was Agricom’s duty as lessor to maintain the lessee in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the leased premises.

Upon motion for recommendation, the lower court reversed its own ruling, ordering Dee to pay Agricom back rentals and rentals for the first three years of the lease already paid for. The CA affirmed the order.

Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not CA committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the validity of the lease contract and holding Dee liable for back rentals, including rentals already paid for

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled partly in favor of Dee.

On the issue of suspension of payment of rentals, Dee anchors her argument on Art. 1658, NCC, which entitles the lessee to suspend payment of rent in case the lessor fails to make the necessary repairs or to maintain the lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the property leased. Dee asserted that she was harassed by squatters and several claimants of the leased premises.

The duty “to maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the duration of the contract” is merely a warranty that the lessee shall not be disturbed in his legal, and not physical, possession. In the present case, however, petitioner had not been disturbed in her legal possession of the property.

As to the claims of loss due to the labor dispute, the Supreme Court agreed with the CA that Dee failed to prove this. During the period of pendency of the labor case, Dee regularly paid the monthly rentals. It was only after the labor case has been resolved that she started to fail to pay her rentals, strongly indicating that the labor case has not dampened her peaceful and adequate possession of the leased premises.

The Supreme Court, however, ruled that Dee should not be made to pay rentals for the first three years of the lease, since those rentals were already paid for. Moreover, the personal loan extended by Dee to Lillian Carriedo should not be charged against Agricom. While it is true that the petitioner and Carriedo had agreed that the personal loan of the latter shall be “chargeable against Agricom’s account,” the private respondent is not privy to the agreement; nor did it agree to pay the said loan. It must be stressed that the private respondent has a personality separate and distinct from its stockholders.

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Almario vs. Philippine Airlines

G.R. No. 170928, September 11, 2007

• Unjust enrichment: Article 22, CC recognizes the principle that one may not enrich himself at the expense of another.
• Form of "enrichment:" Enrichment of the defendant consists in every patrimonial, physical, or moral advantage, so long as it is appreciable in money

FACTS:

This is a complaint for reimbursement of training costs filed by PAL against its pilot, Almario.

Almario was initially hired as a Boeing 747 Systems Engineer. Later on, he successfully bid for the higher position of Airbus 300 First Officer, for which he was given additional training at PAL’s expense. After completing the course, Almario served as A-300 First Officer of PAL but after eight months of service, he tendered his resignation for “personal reasons.”

PAL then wrote him a letter, stating that they invested heavily on his professional training on the basis that he continue to serve the Company for a definite period of time which is approximately 3 yrs. In short, PAL wanted Almario to reconsider his resignation, otherwise they would be compelled to ask reimbursement for the training costs from him. Despite this, Almario pushed through with his resignation. Hence, a reimbursement case was filed.

In the lower court, PAL invoked the existence of an innominate contract of do ut facias (I give that you may do) with Almario in that by spending for his training, he would render service to it until the costs of training were recovered in at least 3 yrs. They based the period of “3 yrs” to a decision of the Secretary of Labor concerning PAL’s CBA with its employee-union.

For his part, Almario denied the existence of any agreement with PAL that he would render service to it for three years after his training, failing which he would reimburse the training costs. The lower court ruled in favor of Almario. On appeal, CA found Almario liable under the CBA and under Article 22 of the Civil Code.

Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not Almario is obliged to reimburse the costs incurred by PAL for his training

HELD:

The petition fails.

The rationale of the three-year period is the prohibitive training costs. At an earlier time, when the CBA between PAL and its employees were still negotiated, the Secretary of Labor basically ruled that PAL should be allowed a return on investment for their pilots’ training expenses. Thus, the provisions that pilots 57 years of age shall be frozen and pilots less than 57, provided they have previously qualified in any company’s turbo-jet aircraft, shall be permitted to occupy any position in the company’s turbo-jet fleet, were incorporated in later incarnations of the CBA.

When Almario took the training course, he was about 39 yrs old, 21 yrs away from the retirement age of 60. Hence, with the maturity, expertise and experience he gained from the training course, he was expected to serve PAL for at least three yrs to offset “the prohibitive costs” thereof.

Article 22 of the Civil Code applies.

This provision on unjust enrichment recognizes the principle that one may not enrich himself at the expense of another.

Enrichment of the defendant consists in every patrimonial, physical, or moral advantage, so long as it is appreciable in money. It may consist of some positive pecuniary value incorporated into the patrimony of the defendant, such as: (1) the enjoyment of a thing belonging to the plaintiff; (2) the benefits from service rendered by the plaintiff to the defendant; (3) the acquisition of a right, whether real or personal; (4) the increase of value of property of the defendant; (5) the improvement of a right of the defendant, such as the acquisition of a right of preference; (6) the recognition of the existence of a right in the defendant; and (7) the improvement of the conditions of life of the defendant.

The enrichment of the defendant must have a correlative prejudice, disadvantage, or injury to the plaintiff. This prejudice may consist, not only of the loss of property or the deprivation of its enjoyment, but also of non-payment of compensation for a prestation or service rendered to the defendant without intent to donate on the part of the plaintiff, or the failure to acquire something which the latter would have obtained. The injury to the plaintiff, however, need not be the cause of the enrichment of the defendant. It is enough that there be some relation between them, that the enrichment of the defendant would not have been produced had it not been for the fact from which the injury to the plaintiff is derived.

In the present case, PAL invested for the training of Almario on the expectation that they may recover by availing of Almario’s services for at least three years. This expectation was not fully realized, however, due to Almario’s resignation after only eight months of service following the completion of his training course. He cannot, therefore, refuse to reimburse the costs of training without violating the principle of unjust enrichment.

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