Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel

G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008

• Election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
• Justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.

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Ynot vs. IAC

G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987

• MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: (1) notice; (2) hearing; exceptions
• SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: (1) public interest requires government interference; (2) reasonable means necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose

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Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca

G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918

• JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective.
• The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such.
• DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.

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HSBC vs. Sherman

G.R. No. 72494, Aug. 11, 1989

• Choice-of-forum clause
• Jurisdiction and Venue
• Parties can stipulate as to their choice of venue. But if the stipulation is not restrictive, it shall be treated as merely permissive and will not bar the other party from airing the case in a different forum which has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
  

FACTS:

Sometime in 1981, Eastern Book Supply PTE, Ltd. (Company), a company incorporated in Singapore, applied with and was granted by the Singapore Branch of HSBC an overdraft facility. To secure the overdraft facility, private respondents who were directors of the Company executed a Joint and Several Guarantee in favour of HSBC, which provides that:

“This guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall be construed and determined under and may be enforced in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that the Courts of Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this guarantee….”

However, when the Company failed to pay its obligation, HSBC filed this action with the Philippine courts. In a Motion to Dismiss, the private respondents raised the abovementioned provision of the Joint and Several Guarantee. The trial court affirmed the plaintiffs but CA reversed, citing said provision as basis.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the suit

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Zapanta vs. Local Civil Registrar of the City of Davao

G.R. No. 55380, Sept. 26, 1994

• GENERAL RULE: Rule 108, Rules of Court justifies the correction of innocuous or clerical errors apparent on the face of the record and capable of being corrected by mere reference to it.
• EXCEPTION: Even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.

FACTS:

Petitioner Gliceria Zapanta is the widow of Florencio B. Zapanta. When Florencio died, the local civil registrar of Davao City issued a death certificate. However, she found that the name appearing therein was “Flaviano Castro Zapanta” albeit the date of death and all other circumstances and information reflected therein clearly and conclusively revealed that the person referred to therein was no other than her late husband, Florencio. Gliceria, therefore, filed a petition for correction of entry in the register of death. The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that the correction of the name “Flaviano Castro Zapanta” to “Florencio B. Zapanta” was not merely clerical but substantial in nature.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error

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RULE 18: Pre-Trial

- plaintiff’s duty to move ex parte that the case be set for trial
- WHEN: after the last pleading (normally a reply) has been served, or the period to file it has expired (10 days if reply, 15 days if answer)
- held on a date separate from that of the trial on the merits

Sec. 2: Nature and Purpose

1. amicable settlement or other alternative modes of dispute resolution
2. simplification of issues
3. amendments to the pleadings
4. stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents
5. limitation of the number of witnesses
6. preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner
7. proprietary of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or dismissing the case if there is a ground
8. suspending the proceedings
9. other matters that would ensure a speedy disposition of the case

- notice of pre-trial served on counsel, or on the party who has no counsel (sec. 3)
- counsel will notify his client; if he does not, he will be subject to administrative disciplinary action
- parties are required to appear
- EXCUSABLE NON-APPEARANCE:

• valid cause
• representative with authority to:
• enter into amicable settlement
• submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution
• enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents

NOTA BENE: Authority of the representative need not be in writing if it is established by competent evidence or subsequently ratified by the party concerned.

Q: What if the party is a corporation, can the president authorize another person to appear in behalf of the corporation?
A: The president’s authorization is not sufficient. If party is a corporation, the authority must be made with an appropriate resolution by its board of directors.

Q: Is it sufficient to appear as authorized representative?
A: No, because the authorization must be complemented by a showing of a valid cause for non-appearance of the party.

Q: What if no one appeared during the trial, not the defendant or his counsel and not the plaintiff? Only the plaintiff’s counsel appeared but he does not have authority to represent his client.
A: It is proper to declare the plaintiff non-suited and the court may dismiss the case without motion by the defendant.

Q: What is the remedy of the plaintiff?
A: He can appeal from the order of the dismissal by ordinary appeal. The order is already final and not interlocutory.

Q: What is the effect of defendant’s non-appearance during pre-trial?
A: The court will allow the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte and render judgment based on such evidence presented. Defendant is not technically “in default” because no party can be held in default after he has filed his pleading, but the effect is substantially the same in that the defendant is no longer allowed to actively participate during the proceedings. (Sec. 5)

Q: What is the remedy of the defendant?
A: He can file a motion for reconsideration without need for affidavits of merits regarding fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence (FAME) because these grounds are already raised in his answer. If still denied, he can resort to certiorari under Rule 65 for grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Sec. 6: Pre-trial Brief

- WHEN: at least 3 days before the date of pre-trial
- mandatory duty of parties to file it with court and serve it to the adverse party; failure to file it will result in plaintiff declared non-suited or ex parte proceedings against defendant, whichever may be the case
- CONTENTS:

• statements expressing their willingness to submit to amicable settle or other alternative modes of dispute resolution
• summary of admitted facts and proposed stipulation of facts
• issues to be tried or resolved
• documents or exhibits to presented and purpose
• manifestation that they have availed of or intended to avail of discovery procedures or referral to commissioners
• number and names of witnesses and substance of their testimony

- after pre-trial, court shall issue an order, which explicitly define and limit the issues to be tried

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RULE 17: Dismissal of Action

• Dismissal upon NOTICE by plaintiff (sec. 1)

- before service of answer or of a motion for summary judgment
- ministerial duty of court to issue order confirming the dismissal
- without prejudice, EXCEPT:

1. where notice states otherwise
2. where plaintiff has previously dismissed case in court of competent jurisdiction
3. where the dismissal is premised on the fact that the defendant has already paid the claim

• Dismissal upon MOTION by plaintiff (sec. 2)

- after the defendant has served his answer to the plaintiff
- Motion for Leave of Court to Withdraw the Complaint
- if defendant filed a counterclaim before service of motion for dismissal by plaintiff, the dismissal shall not affect the counterclaim and only dismiss the main complaint

2 REMEDIES OF DEFENDANT (within 15 days from notice of motion):

1. prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action
2. opt to have it resolved in the same action

• Dismissal due to FAULT of plaintiff (sec. 3)

- motu propio of the court or upon motion of the defendant
- dismissal is with prejudice, UNLESS otherwise declared by court or ground is lack of jurisdiction
- GROUNDS

1. non-appearance on the date plaintiff is to present his evidence in chief without justifiable reason - limited to the date of presentation of evidence in chief only; plaintiff’s failure to appear, not absence of lawyer, that warrants dismissal
2. failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time - applies to pre-trials and appeals; if plaintiff has already presented his evidence, his failure to appear in subsequent proceedings is not failure to prosecute but a waiver of right to cross-examine and object to the admissibility of evidence
3. non-compliance with the Rules or any court order - e.g. plaintiff fails to amend complaint even after court orders him to do so

NOTA BENE: This also applies to dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party complaint.

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RULE 16: Motion to Dismiss

Q: When should a motion to dismiss be filed?
A: Within the time for or before the filing of the answer, which is 15 days from receipt of summons.

Sec. 1: Grounds

• lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant

EXCEPTIONS:

1. waiver
2. voluntary appearance
3. improper service but defendant nevertheless received the summon so no reliance on rules of technicality
4. improper service but the fault is with the sheriff, an officer of the court, not with the defendant

Q: How does court acquire jurisdiction over defendant?
A: By service of summons. Thus, if there is absence or improper service of summons, court has acquired no jurisdiction over the his person.

Q: If, aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person, defendant includes in his motion to dismiss other grounds, would that constitute as voluntary appearance?
A: Some jurisprudence held that the inclusion of other grounds for a motion to dismiss aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person is considered as voluntary appearance. However, recent rulings, and more particularly Sec. 20, Rule 4 provides that the inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed as voluntary appearance.

• lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter

- fixed by law therefore no waiver; can be raised at any time before or during trial, even for the first time on appeal

Q: How is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter determined?
A: By the allegations in the complaint.

NOTA BENE: When the defendant files a motion to dismiss, he hypothetically admits all the allegations contained in the complaint, but even so, the plaintiff cannot prosecute because the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Q: What is the rule on adherence of jurisdiction?
A: Once the court acquires jurisdiction over the case, the court retains it, regardless of any subsequent legislation, EXCEPT if the new law passed has a curative effect.

Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 (1968)

The court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter but the defendant never filed a motion to dismiss and the case was tried. The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff so defendant appealed but still he did not raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The defendant appealed again to the Court of Appeals and this time he raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court found that ten years had already lapsed before the defendant raised the question of whether or not the original court had jurisdiction over the case. He can no longer raise the issue because under the equitable doctrine of estoppel by laches, he is already estopped to raise the ground. Although the general rule is that the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter can be raised at any stage of the trial, even for the first time on appeal, to follow such rule would mean declaring as null and void everything, from the city court to the Court of Appeals. Everything – a judicial work which lasted for 10 years – will all be thrown in the waste basket. That is practically compelling the plaintiff to undergo a second calvary.

NOTA BENE: This ruling is an exception and should not be taken as a rule.

• improper venue

- waivable so if the defendant fails to raise this in a motion to dismiss or in an answer then it is deemed waived

Q: Defendant files a motion to dismiss but the court denied the motion. What is the remedy of the defendant?
A: Defendant cannot appeal the decision of the court denying the motion to dismiss because it is an interlocutory order. However, he can resort to the special civil action of prohibition under Rule 65 on ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

• plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue

2 POSSIBLE INSTANCES:

1. plaintiff lacks the necessary qualifications to appear at trial (e.g. minor, insane)
2. plaintiff does not have the character or representation which he claims (e.g. claiming to be a guardian when in fact he is not)

Q: Distinguish lack of legal capacity to sue from lack of legal personality to sue.
A: Lack of legal capacity to sue refers to the disability of the plaintiff to sue because he lacks certain qualifications to appear at trial or he does not have the representation which he claims. Lack of personality to sue, on the other hand, means that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, in which case the ground for dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action.

• litis pendentia

- when there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; not waivable

ELEMENTS:

1. identity of parties (or identity of interest represented) between the two actions
2. identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for
3. identity of facts
4. identity in these particulars should be that any judgment rendered, regardless of which party is successful, amounts to res judicata

Q: Between the two identical actions filed, which one should be dismissed – the first or second – on ground of litis pendentia?
A: As a general rule, the second one should be dismissed, following the principle of priority of time and the maxim of qui prior estempore ochor estiore (priority in time gives preference in law). But there is an EXCEPTION as when the court determines what is the more appropriate action to remain or which court is in a better position to serve the interests of justice. Another EXCEPTION is whether the party in any of the actions is in bad faith or good faith.

Q: Distinguish litis pendentia from forum-shopping (splitting a cause of action under sec. 4, Rule 2).
A: The two share the same concepts in that both contemplate two or more suits filed by the same parties on the basis of the same cause of action. The difference is in the effect because in litis pendentia, only one action will be dismissed, while in forum-shopping both actions will be dismissed without prejudice to any disciplinary action taken by the court against the lawyer. There is no contempt of court in litis pendentia.

• res judicata or prescription (statute of limitations)

- not waivable

Q: Distinguish res judicata from litis pendentia.
A: Although the two are related in that they both contemplate two or more actions filed by the same parties on the basis of the same action, the difference is that in res judicata, one of the suits has already been settled. Adjudication in one suit bars the filing of another suit with identical parties and based on identical causes of action.

• claim states no cause of action

ELEMENTS OF A CAUSE OF ACTION:

1. existence of a right of plaintiff
2. corollary obligation of defendant to the plaintiff
3. violation of the right of plaintiff
4. resulting to damage.

NOTA BENE: If any of these requisites are missing, the case must be dismissed for lack of cause of action.

- determined by the allegations in the pleading, which the defendant must hypothetically admit; EXCEPTION: where evidence has already been presented in the main cause of action because of the application for preliminary injunction or any provisional remedy

• payment, waiver, abandonment, or extinguishment

• statute of frauds

- ART. 1403, N.C.C.

• non-compliance with a condition precedent

- e.g. failure to exhaust administrative remedies, or failure to undergo barangay conciliation

Sec. 2: Hearing of Motion

- presentation of arguments and evidence to prove grounds for dismissal, EXCEPT if the ground is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and no cause of action

Sec. 3: Resolution of Motion

• grant the motion

- case is dismissed without prejudice to its refiling, EXCEPT if the ground is res judicata or prescription, payment, waiver, abandonment, or extinguishment, and statute of frauds (sec. 5)

• deny the motion

- defendant must then file an answer within the remainder of the reglementary period (15 days), which should not be less than 5 days from notice of denial (sec. 4)

• order an amendment of the pleading (which is really the same as dismissing the motion and allowing the plaintiff to amend the complaint in order to correct any defect)

- the amendment is a matter of right because a motion to dismiss is neither a responsive pleading nor even a pleading; amendment still a matter of right if the resolution over the motion to dismiss has not yet achieved finality

NOTA BENE: The court cannot defer resolution of the motion because the ground relied upon is not indubitable.

Sec. 6: Pleading Grounds as Affirmative Defense

2 OPTIONS:

1. file a motion to dismiss, if denied, then ANSWER
2. file an ANSWER and raise the grounds for dismissal in the form of a special affirmative defense and then ask the court to hear over the matter first (purpose: so plaintiff can no longer amend the pleading as a matter of right in order to cure any defects that would have been raised in a motion to dismiss)

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RULE 121: New Trial or Reconsideration

Sec. 1. New Trial or Reconsideration

- after judgment is rendered but before the judgment of conviction becomes final (before perfection of appeal)

WHO MAY FILE:

1. The accused
2. The court motu propio but with consent of accused

NEW TRIAL/RECONSIDERATION vs. MODIFICATION OF JUDGMENT
- NT: new proceeding, new evidence; MJ: proceed on the evidence on record

NEW TRIAL vs. REOPENING
- NT: after judgment is rendered but before it becomes final; RO: before rendering of judgment but after submission of case for decision

NOTA BENE:

• The moment appeal is perfected, trial court loses jurisdiction over the case and therefore can no longer set aside its judgment and grant new trial.
• But a mere oral notice by the accused of his intention to appeal does not count to cause trial court to lose jurisdiction. EXCEPT: if he also posts bail bond for his provisional release

- discretionary on the court
- suspends the period from promulgation of judgment to its finality

Sec. 2. Grounds for New Trial

• Errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused
• Newly discovered evidence

- irregularity must be committed during the trial

REQUISITES OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE:

1. Discovered after trial
2. Evidence could not have been discovered or introduced during trial even with reasonable diligence
3. Material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and one that can probably change the outcome of the judgment

RULE ON RECANTING WITNESSES:
- is not a ground for granting of new trial, UNLESS: no evidence is available except the testimony of that recanting witness, or if the circumstances changes the conclusion arrived at by the trial judge

Sec. 3. Grounds for Reconsideration

• Errors of law
• Errors of fact in the judgment

Sec. 4. Form of Motion and Notice to the Prosecution

- in writing, containing the specific grounds
- if based on NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE: supporting affidavits of new witnesses or duly authenticated copies of new documents to be introduced
- prosecutor should be notified

Sec. 5. Hearing on Motion

- QUESTION OF FACT: court may hear evidence by affidavits or otherwise
- purpose is to determine whether new trial should be granted or not

Sec. 6. Effects of Granting a New Trial or Reconsideration

1. ERRORS OF LAW OR IRREGULARITIES: proceedings and evidence affected thereby shall be set aside and taken anew; additional evidence
2. NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE: evidence on record shall stand and taken together with the newly discovered evidence

- original judgment shall be vacated or set aside and a new one be rendered accordingly
- waiver of double jeopardy

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RULE 120: Judgment

Sec. 1. Judgment; DEFINITION AND FORM

- adjudication of the court that the accused is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged and the imposition on him of the proper penalty and civil liability, if any
- written in the official language, prepared and signed by the judge, and contain the facts and law on which it is based

Sec. 2. Contents of the Judgment

CONVICTION:

1. Legal qualifications, aggravating and mitigating circumstance
2. Participation of the accused, whether principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact
3. Penalty
4. Civil liability and damages, if any, UNLESS civil liability has been expressly reserved or waived

ACQUITTAL:
- state whether the evidence absolutely failed to prove guilt or failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt
- determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist

- if accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt, civil liability is not extinguished (because only preponderance of evidence is needed in civil cases)

Sec. 3. Judgment of Two or More Offenses

- WAIVER: if the accused did not object before trial (motion to quash), court may sentence for as many offenses as has been charged and proved and impose on him the penalty for each offense
- but penalty should not exceed three-fold the severest penalty imposed or 40 years of imprisonment

Sec. 4. Judgment in Case of Variance between Allegation and Proof

- accused can be convicted of the offense proved if it is necessarily included in the offense charged
- accused can be convicted of the offense charged if it is necessarily included in the offense proved
- only when it is both charged and proved, UNLESS either is included in the other

NOTA BENE: What determines the nature and cause of the accusation is the actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated they being conclusions of law.

Sec. 5. When an Offense Includes or is Included in Another

- when some of the essential elements or ingredients are present in both
- based on greater offense includes the lesser offense
- but accused cannot be convicted for a greater offense

Sec. 6. Promulgation of Judgment

- reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court where judgment is rendered

PRESENCE OF JUDGE; EXCEPTION:

1. Clerk of Court if judge is absent or outside the province or city
2. If the accused is confined or detained in another place, executive judge of the Regional Trial Court with jurisdiction over place of confinement or detention

- the trial court who promulgated judgment has authority to receive notice of appeal and approve bail bond pending appeal; PROVIDED: if change from bailable to non-bailable, the authority to approve bail bond is with appellate court

PRESENCE OF ACCUSED
- clerk of court shall notify accused, or his bondsman, warden, or counsel

EXCEPTION: Trial in absentia because accused jumped bail or escaped from prison (notice to his last known address)
- if despite due notice, accused fails to appear without justifiable cause, then promulgation in absentia done through recording of the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy at last known address

FAILURE TO APPEAR; CONSEQUENCES:

1. Promulgation in absentia
2. Accused loses his entitlement to all remedies available against judgment
3. Court shall order his arrest

NOTA BENE: But if within 15 days from promulgation, accused surrenders and gives justifiable reasons for absence, he may file leave of court to avail of the remedies. Court shall allow him 15 days to avail of the remedies from notice.

- judgment is rendered after presentation of evidence
- 90-day period for rendering judgment shall be reckoned from date of submission of case for decision
- render judgment with or without transcript of stenographic notes

ADDENDUM: Where there is no promulgation of judgment, no right to appeal accrues.

Sec. 7. Modification of Judgment

- motion to modify or set aside judgment is allowed before appeal is perfected or judgment becomes final

WHEN JUDGMENT BECOMES FINAL: (except death penalty because it is automatically reviewable)

1. After the lapse of period to perfect appeal
2. Sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served
3. Waiver in writing
4. Application for probation (not exceed imprisonment of 6 years)

GENERAL RULE: Judgment ipso facto becomes final and executory after lapse of 15 days from date of promulgation. But trial court may lose jurisdiction over the case even before lapse of 15 days, PROVIDED:

• Accused voluntarily submits to the execution of judgment
• Accused perfects an appeal
• Accused waives his right to appeal in writing
• Accused applies for probation

Sec. 8. Entry of Judgment

- entered by the clerk
- recorded in the book of entries of judgment

CONTENTS:

1. Dispositive part of judgment order
2. Signed by clerk
3. Certificate that judgment has become final and executory

* Mittimus - process in writing issuing to the sheriff or officer directing him to deliver the accused to jail, and to the jailer commanding him to receive and safely keep such person

Sec. 9. Existing Provisions Governing Suspension of Sentence, Probation, and Parole not Affected by this Rule

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RULE 119: Trial

Sec. 1. Time to Prepare for Trial

- after plea of not guilty, accused has 15 days to prepare for trial
- trial commences within 30 days from receipt of pre-trial order

Sec. 2. Continuous Trial until Terminated; POSTPONEMENTS

- entire trial period shall not exceed 180 days from first day of trial, EXCEPT:

• Otherwise authorized by Supreme Court
• Special laws
• Supreme Court circulars

- discretionary on court so it may not be compelled by mandamus or by appeal, UNLESS there is grave abuse of discretion

Sec. 3. Exclusions

- delays that are to be excluded in computing the time within which trial must commence

Sec. 4. Factors for Granting Continuance

• When continuation of proceeding would become impossible or result in miscarriage of justice
• Novelty of the case, complexity or unusualness, or unreasonable to expect adequate preparation within the period

- no granting of continuance for the following REASONS:

1. Congestion of the court’s calendar
2. Lack of diligent preparation by prosecutor
3. Failure to obtain available witnesses by prosecutor
   

Sec. 5. Time Limit Following an Order for New Trial

- new trial shall commence within 30 days from notice of order
- court may extend but not to exceed 180 days from notice of order

Sec. 6. Extended Time Limit

- arraignment can be made anytime after 80 days

Sec. 7. Public Attorney’s Duties where Accused is Imprisoned

• Obtain presence of the accused for trial, or notify the prison custodian to advise the accused of his right to demand trial
• Upon receipt of notice, the prison custodian shall promptly advise the accused of the same and inform the public attorney of such advice made
• Upon receipt of notice by prison custodian, the prosecutor shall request the availability of the accused for purposes of trial
  

Sec. 8. Sanctions

- administrative, criminal, and contempt of court for the following ACTS:

1. Knowingly allows trial to proceed even though a material witness is unavailable
2. Files a motion solely for delay, frivolous and without merit
3. Makes statements for purpose of obtaining continuance, knowing them to be false and are material to the granting of continuance

Sec. 9. Remedy where Accused is not brought to Trial within the Time Limit

- accused may file motion to dismiss on ground of denial of his right to speedy trial; he has burden of proving the same
- prosecution has burden of going forward with the evidence to establish the exclusion of time

NOTA BENE: If accused fails to move to dismiss prior to trial, it shall constitute a waiver.

Sec. 10. Law on Speedy Trial not a Bar to Provision on Speedy Trial in the Constitution

- the Constitution prevails

Sec. 11. Order of Trial

• Prosecution presents evidence
• Accused may present evidence to prove his defense
• Both prosecution and defense may present rebuttal and sur-buttal evidence, but court may allow them to present additional evidence
• Upon admission of evidence, case is submitted for decision, but court may allow oral argument or submission of written memoranda
  

- reverse trial if accused interposes a lawful defense

Sec. 12. Application for Examination of Witness for Accused before Trial

• Name and residence of the witness
• Substance of his testimony
• Witness is sick or infirm in such a manner as to afford reasonable ground for believing that he may not be able to attend the trial, or he lives more than 100 kilometers away from place of trial
  

- motion shall be supported by affidavit of the accused and any other evidence

Sec. 13. Examination of Defense Witness; HOW MADE

- order made, containing specific date, time, and place
- a copy shall be sent to the prosecutor at least 3 days before scheduled examination
- WHO MAY EXAMINE: judge, member of the Bar in good standing so designated by the judge, or judge of inferior court

NOTA BENE: If the prosecutor fails to appear for examination despite due notice, the examination shall proceed.

- a written record of the testimony

Sec. 14. Bail to Secure Appearance of Material Witness

- if material witness refuses to appear, court may order him to post bail
- if material witness still refuses to post bail, court may commit him to prison until he complies or is legally discharged after giving testimony

Sec. 15. Examination of Witness for the Prosecution

- conditional examination by judge of the court where case is pending

REASONS:

1. Witness is too sick or infirm
2. Has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning

- accused should be notified; failure to appear despite due notice shall constitute a waiver

Sec. 16. Trial of Several Accused

- tried jointly, UNLESS court orders otherwise

Sec. 17. Discharge of Accused to be State Witness

• Absolute necessity for his testimony
• No other direct evidence available except his testimony
• Testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points
• Does not appear to be the most guilty
• Has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude
  

NOTA BENE: If court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

- file before prosecution rests its case
- with the consent of the accused who is going to become witness
- prosecution must prove that discharge satisfies the above conditions

Sec. 18. Discharge of the Accused Operates as Acquittal

- a bar to future prosecution for the same offense, UNLESS accused fails or refuses to testify in accordance with his sworn statement
- if proven that one of the conditions for discharge do not exist, the court cannot recall the discharge, EXCEPT if the accused fails or refuses to testify as promised

EFFECT OF FAILURE TO TESTIFY:

1. He may be prosecuted for the same offense
2. His confession may be used against him

Sec. 19. When Mistake Has Been Made in Charging the Proper Offense

- DURING TRIAL: accused shall not be discharged; court will instead dismiss the original case and order refiling of the proper information

Sec. 20. Appointment of Acting Prosecutor

Sec. 21. Exclusion of the Public

- GENERAL RULE: accused is entitled to a public trial
- EXCEPTION: if the evidence to be produced is offensive to decency or public morals; if the accused, on motion, requests exclusion of public

Sec. 22. Consolidation of Trials of Related Offenses

- tried jointly

Sec. 23. Demurrer to Evidence

- court may dismiss the case on ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving prosecutor opportunity to be heard; and (2) upon demurrer to evidence by accused with or without leave of court

WITH LEAVE OF COURT: (file this within non-extendible period of 10 days after prosecution rests)
- if demurrer to evidence is denied, accused may adduce evidence in his defense
- if leave of court is granted, accused shall file demurrer to evidence within non-extendible period of 10 days from notice...prosecution also has same period from receipt to oppose the demurrer

WITHOUT LEAVE OF COURT:
- if denied, accused waives right to present evidence in his defense and submits the case for judgment relying only on the evidence of the prosecution

NOTA BENE:

• Denial of motion for leave of court or demurrer to evidence is not reviewable by appeal or certiorari before judgment.
• If court dismisses the case based on demurrer to evidence, this is tantamount to acquittal, so bar against a subsequent prosecution (double jeopardy).

Sec. 24. Reopening

- before finality of judgment
- motu propio or upon motion, with hearing in both cases
- proceedings shall terminate within 30 days from order of reopening

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RULE 117: Motion to Quash

Sec. 1. Time to Move to Quash

WHEN:

• at any time before entering plea
• even before jurisdiction over his person has been acquired
• even during preliminary investigation (PI)
• if during PI, the investigating judge finds the accused has not committed the crime, he may order his discharge
  

EXCEPTIONS:

• When the complaint or information does not charge an offense
• When the court lacks jurisdiction
• When the offense or penalty had been extinguished
• When there is double jeopardy

NOTA BENE: Absent these exceptions and he does not move to quash, he is deemed to have waived his objections which are grounds for a motion to quash.

MOTION TO QUASH - a special pleading filed by defendant before entering his plea wherein he hypothetically admits the truth of the facts spelled out in the information or complaint at the same time that he sets up a matter which, if duly proved, would preclude further proceedings

- interlocutory in character so if dismissed, the remedy is generally not to appeal on certiorari (except when judge committed grave abuse of discretion or acted in excess of jurisdiction) but to appeal after trial.

- if granted, it is a final order so therefore immediately appealable, provided no double jeopardy attaches

MOTION TO QUASH VS. DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE

1. Q: before entry of plea; D: after prosecution rests
2. Q: based not on merits but anchored on matters not directly related on the question of guilt or innocence; D: based on inadequacy of evidence adduced by the prosecution in support of the accusation
3. Q: governed by Rule 117; D: governed by Sec. 23, Rule 119

Sec. 2. Form and Contents

- must be in writing signed by either the accused or his counsel
- must distinctly specify all factual and legal grounds

NOTA BENE: Any ground not alleged shall not be taken cognizance of by the court (deemed waived), except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged.

Sec. 3. Grounds

1. The facts charged do not constitute an offense - no waiver
2. The court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged - no waiver
3. The court has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused - waivable
4. The investigating officer who filed the complaint or information has no authority to do so - waivable
5. It does not conform substantially to the prescribed form - waivable
6. The information or complaint charges more than one offense - waivable
7. The criminal action or liability has already been extinguished - no waiver
8. It contains averments that, if proven, constitute a legal excuse or justification - waivable
9. The accused has been convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or his case has been otherwise terminated without his express consent - waivable

NOTA BENE:

• If the facts alleged do not constitute a punishable offense, the court, instead of dismissing the case, should allow the prosecution to amend the information.
• No first jeopardy if case is dismissed because information is defective or void or does not charge a proper offense.

ELEMENTS OF JURISDICTION OVER SUBJECT MATTER:

• Nature of the offense and/or the penalty attached thereto;
• The fact that the offense has been committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court

NOTA BENE:

• If lack of jurisdiction is alleged and case is dismissed because of that, but it turns out that the court has jurisdiction, the party who alleged lack of jurisdiction is estopped from assuming the inconsistent position that court had jurisdiction.
• Jurisdiction over subject matter and territorial jurisdiction are conferred by law so cannot be waived. However, jurisdiction over person of accused is generally waivable.
• The court’s jurisdiction is determined at the first instance from the facts alleged in the information or complaint. So even if the complaint alleges an offense cognizable by the RTC but after trial, the crime proven is really cognizable by a lower court, the RTC retains jurisdiction for the purpose of imposing penalty.
• If lack of conformity to prescribed form, this can be cured by amendment.
• f multiplicity of offenses, EXCEPTIONS are (1) complex and compound crimes, and (2) specific crime set forth in various counts.

HOW CRIMINAL LIABILITY IS EXTINGUISHED:

1. Death of the convict for personal liabilities; for pecuniary liabilities, only when the death of the offender happens before final conviction
2. Service of sentence
3. Amnesty
4. Absolute Pardon
5. Prescription of the crime
6. Prescription of the penalty
7. Marriage of the offended woman with the accused in case of rape
   

NOTA BENE: Absence of preliminary investigation is not a ground for motion to quash.

Sec. 4. Amendment of Complaint or Information

- if defective information, remedy is amendment (no jeopardy)
- motion to quash is granted, if prosecution fails to make amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers the same defect despite amendment

Sec. 5. Effect of Sustaining the Motion to Quash

- if motion to quash is sustained, court may order another complaint or information to be filed, EXCEPT:

1. If the criminal action or liability has already been extinguished
2. If the accused has already been convicted or acquitted for the offense charged, or his case has been terminated without his express consent

- if order to file new information or complaint is made, the accused in custody shall not be discharged, UNLESS admitted to bail

- if no order is made, or having been made, no amendment was made within specified time, the accused in custody shall be set free, UNLESS if in custody for another crime


NOTA BENE:

• If ground is lack of jurisdiction over subject matter, better practice is to remand or forward the case to the proper court instead of quashing the information or complaint.
• Refile information or complaint if the ground is: (1) facts charged do not constitute an offense; (2) investigating officer who filed has no authority; (3) no conformity to prescribed form; and (4) more than one offense is charged

Sec. 6. Order Sustaining a Motion to Quash not a Bar to Another Prosecution; EXCEPTION

• Criminal liability has been extinguished
• Accused has already been convicted or acquitted for the offense charged, or his case has been terminated without his express consent

Sec. 7. Former Conviction or Acquittal; DOUBLE JEOPARDY

ELEMENTS:

• Valid information or complaint (in form and substance)
• Competent court
• Arraignment and plea
• Conviction, acquittal, or dismissal on the merits or terminated without express consent of the accused
• Second offense charged is the same as the first, or is an attempt to commit or a frustration thereof; The second offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first

NOTA BENE:

• If the case was dismissed after trial on ground that information was insufficient to sustain a conviction when said information is in fact sufficient, re-filing the case is barred by double jeopardy.
• If the case was dismissed after trial on ground of lack of jurisdiction when in fact court has jurisdiction, the party who alleged lack of jurisdiction is estopped from appealing case based on the inconsistent position that it had jurisdiction.
• If accused pleaded guilty and allowed to prove mitigating circumstance but instead proves complete self-defense, the plea of guilty is deemed withdrawn. If no new plea is entered and the court acquits, no double jeopardy because no standing plea.
• An order of dismissal made by court motu propio based on merits or failure of prosecution witnesses to appear has the effect of judgment so there is double jeopardy.
• For jeopardy to attach, the dismissal must be without express consent of the accused, EXCEPT: (so double jeopardy attaches even if it was accused who made the motion)

1. Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence after prosecution rests (EFFECT: acquittal)
2. Where the dismissal is based on violation of accused’s right to speedy trial (EFFECT: failure to prosecute)
   

• A dismissal for lack of due process of law does not constitute a proper basis for double jeopardy.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE IDENTITY RULE:

• When the graver offense is due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission constituting the offense charged;
• When the facts constituting the graver offense were only discovered after plea was entered
• When the plea of guilty for the lesser offense was done without the consent of the trial prosecutor and the offended party, EXCEPT when the offended party was duly notified but failed to appear during arraignment for no justifiable reason

Sec. 8. Provisional Dismissal

REQUISITES:

• Express consent of accused
• Notice to the offended party
• Court grants motion for provisional dismissal
• Public prosecutor is served a copy of the court order

PRESCRIPTION

- if offense is punishable with imprisonment not exceeding 6 years, then order of provisional dismissal becomes final after one year from issuance
- if offense is punishable with imprisonment for more than 6 years, then order of provisional dismissal becomes final after 2 years from issuance
- but State can still file even after expiration of these prescription periods if there is “justifiable necessity for the delay”

Sec. 9. Failure to Move to Quash or Allege Any Ground Therefor

- constitute waiver; EXCEPT:

1. If facts alleged do not constitute an offense
2. Court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged
3. Criminal action or liability has been extinguished
4. Double jeopardy

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Filipino Metals Corp., et al vs. DTI Sec., et al

G.R. No. 157498, July 15, 2005

• Clearly, safeguard measures are not in the nature of taxes, in the sense of being the lifeblood of the national economy, such that their enforcement cannot per se be enjoined.

FACTS:

Petitioners are manufacturers of various steel products, for which the principal raw materials are steel billets, which they import in bulk from foreign suppliers.

On July 17, 2000, R.A. No. 8800 was enacted codifying the provisions of Art. XIX, GATT and the WTO Agreement on Safeguards. These agreements authorize the application of a safeguard measure if a product is being imported into the country in such quantities as would cause or threaten to cause serious injury to domestic producers of like or directly competitive products.

On April 6, 2001, petitioners filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City a petition for declaratory relief and/or certiorari and prohibition seeking to declare R.A. No. 8800 as unconstitutional.

The RTC judge, while holding in abeyance a ruling on the validity of R.A. No. 8800, found a strong case against the constitutionality of said law sufficient to justify a preliminary injunctive relief. Upon appeal, the CA ruled that the RTC judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of injunction.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not the preliminary injunction issued by the trial court should be upheld

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

R.A. No. 8800, also known as the Safeguard Measures Act, authorize the application of a safeguard measure upon finding that a product is being imported into the country in increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat to the domestic industry. Hence, the primary purpose of safeguard measures is not at all to generate revenue for the government, but to provide protection to domestic industry threatened by import surges. Thus, while suspending the collection of internal revenue taxes will definitely cripple the government, enjoining the enforcement of safeguard measures would not necessarily drain the national coffer.

Note that safeguard measures are not always in the form of a tariff increase. Safeguard measures may, and in fact, usually take the form of a simple quantitative restriction on imports.

Clearly, safeguard measures are not in the nature of taxes, in the sense of being the lifeblood of the national economy, such that their enforcement cannot per se be enjoined.

Only two requisites are necessary for a preliminary injunction to issue: (1) existence of a right to be protected and (2) facts, against which the injunction is to be directed violate said right. While a clear showing of right is necessary, its existence need not be conclusively established. For the purpose of issuing a provisional remedy, a law need not be declared unconstitutional.

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Moran Sison vs. Teodoro

G.R. No. L-9271, March 29, 1957

• Administrator's bond is not a necessary expense chargeable against the estate

FACTS:

Carlos Moran Sison was appointed, without compensation, as judicial administrator of the estate of Margarita David. He filed a bond of P5,000, the premium of which as well as renewal fee he charged as disbursement items in his accounting.

Teodoro, one of the heirs, objected on the grounds that they are not necessary expenses of administration and should not be charged against the estate.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not a judicial administrator, serving without compensation, is entitled to charge as an expense of administration the premiums paid on his bond

HELD:

IN resolving the case, the Supreme Court cited the case of Sulit vs. Santos, 56 Phil 626, where the Court ruled that the expense incurred by an executor or administrator to produce a bond is not a proper charge against the estate. The Court further commented in that case that the ability to give bond is in the nature of a qualification for office. The execution and the approval of the bond constitute a condition precedent to acceptance of the responsibilities of the trust.

The difference between Sulit vs. Santos, and the present case is that in the former, the administrator accepted the trust with the emolument that the law allows where in the latter, the administrator accepted the same without compensation.

Still, the difference is of no merit. It is far-fetched to conclude that the giving of a bond by an administrator is a necessary expense in the care, management and settlement of the estate within the meaning of the law, because these expenses are incurred "after the executor or administrator has met the requirement of the law and has entered upon the performance of his duties."

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Cuenco vs. CA

G.R. No. L-24742, October 26, 1973

• The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts

FACTS:

Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and two minor sons, residing in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and Quezon City.

The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife, filed a petition with CFI Rizal for the probate of the last will and testament, where she was named executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have acted on the probate proceedings.

Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.

ISSUEs:

• Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition
• Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings

HELD:

The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the last will and testament of the deceased and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's wish.

On Venue and Jurisdiction

Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

The residence of the decent or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. If this were otherwise, it would affect the prompt administration of justice.

The court with whom the petition is first filed must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.

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Estate of Cosme de Mendoza vs. Pacheco

G.R. No. 43351, February 26, 1937

• Power of probate court to execute administrator's bond

FACTS:

Manuel Soriano was former administrator of the estate of Cosme. As such administrator, he filed a bond for P5,000 with Januario Pacheco and Raymundo Cordero as sureties. When an account was made, Soriano was indebted to the estate. Thus, the lower court ordered the execution of his bond.

Some time later, Soriano and the new administratrix entered into a settlement whereby Soriano ceded certain real properties to the estate, thereby reducing his indebtedness to P5,000. The sureties now question the jurisdiction of the court to execute the bond.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not a probate court has the power to order the execution of an administrator's bond

HELD:

To begin with, it lies within discretion of the court to select an administrator of the estate of a deceased person. Before an administrator, or an executor, enters upon the execution of his trust, and letters testamentary or of administration are issued, the person to whom they are issued is required to give a bond in such reasonable sum as the court directs, with one or more sufficient sureties, conditioned upon the faithful performance of his trust. The administrator is accountable on his bond along with the sureties for the performance of certain legal obligations.

It is clear that the Court of First Instance, exercising probate jurisdiction, is empowered to require the filing of the administrator's bond, to fix the amount thereof, and to hold it accountable for any breach of the administrator's duty. Possessed, as it is, with an all-embracing power over the administrator's bond and over administration proceedings, a Court of First Instance in a probate proceeding cannot be devoid of legal authority to execute and make that bond answerable for the very purpose for which it was filed. It is true that the law does not say expressly or in so many words tat such court has power to execute the bond of an administrator, but by necessary and logical implication, the power is there as eloquently as if it were phrased in unequivocal term.

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Basa vs. Mercado

G.R. No. L-42226, July 26, 1935

• Meaning of "newspaper of general circulation"

FACTS:

Hon. Hermogenes Reyes, Judge of Pampanga CFI, allowed and probated the last will and testament of Ines Basa, decedent. The same judge also approved the account of the administrator of the estate, declared him the only heir and closed the administration proceedings. Joaquin Basa, et al., filed a motion to reopen the proceedings, alleging that the court lacked jurisdiction because there was failure to comply with the requirements as to the publication of the notice of hearing. They contended that the hearing took place only twenty-one days after the date of first publication instead of three full weeks. Moreover, they questioned whether Ing Katipunan, the newspaper where the notice was published was a newspaper of general circulation as contemplated by the law.

ISSUEs:

• Whether or not there was compliance with the publication requirement
• Whether or not Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation

HELD:

The language used in section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not mean that the notice, referred to therein, should be published for three full weeks before the date set for the hearing of the will. In other words, the first publication of the notice need not be made 21 days before the day appointed for the hearing.

The records show that Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation in view of the fact that it is published for the dissemination of local news and general information; that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is published at regular intervals and that the trial court ordered the publication to be made in Ing Katipunan precisely because it was a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Pampanga.

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Cayetano vs. Leonidas

G.R. No. L-54919, May 30, 1984

• GENERAL RULE: Limited jurisdiction of the probate court
• EXCEPTION: Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issues.

FACTS:

Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving Hermogenes Campos (father) and her sisters, Nenita Paguia, Remedios Lopez, and Marieta Medina as the surviving heirs. As the only compulsory heir is Hermogenes, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication, adjudicating unto himself the entire estate of Adoracion.

Later that same year, Nenita filed a petition for reprobate of a will, alleging among others that Adoracion was an American citizen and that the will was executed in teh US. Adoracion died in Manila while temporarily residing in Malate.

While this case was still pending, Hermogenes died and left a will, appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix. Hence, this case.

ISSUEs:

• Whether or not the will was valid
• Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over probate proceedings

HELD:

As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issues.

In this case, it was sufficiently established that Adoracion was an American citizen and the law which governs her will is the law of Pennsylvania, USA, which is the national law of the decedent.

It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, the national law of the decedent must apply.

As to the issue of jurisdiction --

The settlement of estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the CFI of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, USA and not a usual resident of Cavite.

Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.

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Solgus Corp. v. CA

G.R. No. 157488, February 6, 2007

FACTS:

On different dates, complainants Alagos et al., were hired as security guards by Solgus Corp., a duly licensed security and investigation agency, and then assigned to its clients.

In 1994, they separately filed complaints for illegal dismissal and underpayment of salaries and related benefits against Solgus and its principals. Among their allegations are: (1) at the time of hiring, there was no stipulation they there were hired as probationary employees; (2) they worked 12 hours daily; (3) they were made to sign blank payrolls; and (4) they were summarily dismissed from employment.

For its defense, Solgus alleged that complainants Soriano, Emano and Deseo were probationary employees who, due to unsatisfactory performance, failed to pass the 6-month probationary period; and that the other complainants were removed from their posts at the request of Solgus clients and that, thereafter, they abandoned their jobs.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaints and affirmed the validity of the Affidavits of Desistance submitted by two of the complainants. The case was appealed to the NLRC who reversed the decision of the LA and ordered reinstatement. Solgus then elevated the case to the CA, who modified the NLRC decision. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE:

• W/N the Labor Arbiter’s decision to give effect and validity to the affidavits of desistance was proper

HELD:

In Periquet v. National Labor Relations Commission, the guideposts to determine validity of affidavits of desistance were set, thus:

"Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. x x x. "

In the instant case, we agree with both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals that the Affidavits of Desistance deserve scant consideration.

The NLRC Rules of Procedure particularly Section 3, Rule V, provides:

Section 3. Submission of Position Papers/Memorandum. – Should the parties fail to agree upon an amicable settlement, either in whole or in part, during the conferences, the Labor Arbiter shall issue an order stating therein the matters taken up and agreed upon during the conferences and directing the parties to simultaneously file their respective verified position papers.

These verified position papers shall cover only those claims and causes of action raised in the complaint excluding those that may have been amicably settled, and shall be accompanied by all supporting documents including the affidavits of their respective witnesses which shall take the place of the latter’s direct testimony. The parties shall thereafter not be allowed to allege facts, or present evidence to prove facts, not referred to and any cause or causes of action not included in the complaint or position papers, affidavits and other documents. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

The records clearly indicate that Solgus received the 5 December 1996 Order of the Labor Arbiter on 2 January 1997. However, it inexplicably managed to submit its Memorandum only on 27 August 1997 when it presented for the first time the alleged Affidavits of Desistance executed by complainants Telin and Alagos.

We agree with the NLRC that the Labor Arbiter should not have taken undue haste in considering the Affidavits of Desistance of complainants as presented by Solgus on the ground that it made no reference at all in its position paper, reply, and rejoinder to the existence of the said affidavits in patent violation of the aforementioned rule of the NLRC. The belated presentation of the purported Affidavits of Desistance deprived complainants Telin and Alagos of the opportunity to debunk the authenticity of said Affidavits of Desistance before the Labor Arbiter in gross violation of the rules of fair play.

Even more, the claim of Solgus that they were already existing as early as the time of their execution but submitted to the Labor Arbiter only in 1997 because they could not be located is specious. Such very important documents as the Affidavits of Desistance which are very material to the case could not have been misplaced or difficult to locate as claimed by Solgus. Pertaining as it does to a waiver of rights, Solgus should have exercised more prudence in the custody of these documents.

The Supreme Court does not countenance the genuineness of the allegedly executed affidavits of desistance since the complainants who allegedly executed them deny doing the same. Such being the case, the rule that when the voluntariness of the execution of the affidavit of desistance or release is put into issue then the claim of the employee may still be given due course, finds application in this case.

The Affidavits of Desistance do not even bear the prima facie evidence of their due execution accorded to private documents, because even the notaries public before whom they were acknowledged issued a certification that no such affidavit was acknowledged by Telin and Alagos before them.

Quitclaims, releases and other waivers of benefits granted by law or contracts in favor of workers should be strictly scrutinized to protect the weak and the disadvantaged. The waivers should be carefully examined, in regard not only to the words and terms used, but also to the factual circumstances under which they have been executed. Under prevailing jurisprudence, a deed of release or quitclaim cannot bar an employee from demanding benefits to which he is legally entitled. It is the employer’s duty to prove that such quitclaims were voluntary. The mere fact that the respondents were not physically coerced or intimidated does not necessarily imply that they freely or voluntarily consented to the terms thereof. The law looks with disfavor upon quitclaims and releases by employees pressured into signing the same by unscrupulous employers minded to evade legal responsibilities. Settled is the rule that quitclaims are ineffective in barring full recovery of the benefits due the employee.

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Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 115402, July 15, 1998

• purpose of notice of lis pendens and when it may be cancelled

FACTS:

After his mother's death, petitioner filed a complaint against his father, private respondent, to partition the conjugal properties of his parents.

In answer, respondent alleged that four parcels of land registered in petitioner's name are conjugal properties. They were only registered in petitioner's name because at the time, he was the only Filipino citizen in the family. Accordingly, respondent prayed for dismissal of the partition case and to reconvey said parcel of lands to him.

In the meantime, respondent caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the land during pendency of case. Petitioner moved to cancel the notice of lis pendens but trial court dismissed his motion.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

(1) W/N it was proper to pass upon ownership in a partition case
(2) W/N a notice of lis pendens amounts to a collateral attack of his title obtained more than 28 years ago

HELD:

The annotation of lis pendens does not in any case amount nor can it ever be considered as equivalent to a collateral attack of the certificate of title for a parcel of land.

What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title. The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). By title, the law refers to ownership which is represented by that document. Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land. Registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof.

A notice of lis pendens may only be cancelled on two grounds: (1) if the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party; (2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded.

A notice of lis pendens is only for the purpose of announcing "to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property."

On the contention that ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case, suffice it to say that until and unless ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect partition of the property.

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